ANTONYUK VERSUS JAMES: CRITICAL UNFINISHED BUSINESS—THE SUPREME COURT HAS FAILED TO DEFEND OUR MOST VITAL NATURAL LAW RIGHT

Trying to comprehend the nuances of Second Amendment litigation, let alone attempting to untangle the labyrinthine tortuous maze of Court filings, is all too often an exercise in futility.

Litigation descends into an abundance of Court filings—difficult to get a handle on—and often spawning a slew of companion cases, each with its own torrent of filings, further adding to the confusion.

This invariably results in lengthy (often years-long) delay in resolution and therein frustration for plaintiffs who wish only to exercise their Natural Law God-Given Right to Armed Self-Defense, without State resistance, but unable to do so, leading to visible anxiety, frustration, and understandable anger.

The monetary costs to and psychological costs for Americans take its toll.

This, unfortunately, is by design. Anti-Second Amendment States like New York, New Jersey, California, Illinois, Hawaii, and others, know this. They take advantage of this, trusting, expecting, that Americans will lose patience and/or money, and courts will delay review. Time and money are always on the side of the State.

Pro-Second Amendment groups that represent plaintiffs will acknowledge their frustration, but are ever hurrying onto the next case, for there will always be more cases to file.

BUT——as with many things in life, there is a pecking order.

No less is true of legal matters that go to State infringement of the Natural Law right to armed self-defense.

Some may argue that all court challenges to State or Federal Government action affecting the right codified in the Second Amendment have equal significance. They don’t. Yet, that false belief gives Pro Second Amendment organizations an excuse to drop every case that seems to be a losing proposition, and hurry onto the next one, hoping for, trusting for an optimum result.

Some cases, namely, and particularly, the three Twenty-First Century cases: District of Columbia vs. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), McDonald vs. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), and New York State Rifle and Pistol Association (NYSRPA) vs. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) stand out as landmark Second Amendment cases and are rightly considered as  such.

Suppose counsel for those cases were quick to drop prosecution at the first obstacle they came across. Where would we Americans be then?

Heller arose as a challenge to the District of Columbia’s universal ban on handguns and to the requirement that all firearms that are kept in the home must be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device that renders them non-operational in an emergency, thereby defeating the purpose for which one keeps them in the home.

The U.S. Supreme Court struck down both the ban on handguns and the requirement that firearms kept in the home must be rendered inoperable.

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, said, “In sum, we hold that the District's ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as  does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”

If the High Court had limited its review to those narrow issues, then those rulings alone would still be of paramount significance, and Heller would go down in Supreme Court jurisprudential history for those rulings alone.

But three of the Justices did not rest content with a ruling that handguns, as one broad category of firearms, falls within the core protection of the Second Amendment.

Associate Justices, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, saw, in the actions of the D.C. Government, an intentional, insidious, and dangerous attempt to gradually, inexorably erode the touchstone of Freedom and Liberty—the right of the people to keep and bear arms, without which a truly Free Constitutional Republic cannot logically exist.

Moreover, they must have realized, although Scalia never explicitly stated this in the Heller majority opinion he penned, that, holding handguns, or any other category of firearms, as falling within the core of the Natural Law Right, is meaningless if the Right does not reside in the Common Man, himself. Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito therefore realized the need to make clear and categorical what the Supreme Court had heretofore failed to do. These jurists stated as what the Framers of the Second Amendment intended by the plain words of it, which all too many States and the Federal Government blatantly denied—that the right of the people to keep and bear arms is an individual right, accruing to each American.

The prefatory clause serves as a rationale for the Right, to resist the onset of Tyranny in the Nation, and not—as Government has made a pretense of insisting upon, and which the U.S. Supreme Court has, heretofore, acceded to—a limitation on the individual’s exercise of it, which would weaken the peoples’ ability and resolve to prevent tyranny.

To deny the intrinsic quality of the Right—existent in Man, himself, preexistent and eternal, prior to any transient, conditional artifice of Man, such as “Government” and other institutions crafted by Man—would amount to qualifying and denigrating its essential nature, the vitalness of it, thereby trivializing it.

These jurists, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito knew that, if one jurisdiction can ban an entire category of firearms in common use, what then would prevent other jurisdictions as well as the Federal Government from following suit and eventually instituting a wholesale ban on all firearms. And what would prevent each jurisdiction going its own way, determining for itself the parameters and scope of the right, and the boundaries of it, and undermining the very notion of the Natural Law eternal, indivisible nature of it.

Was not the right, and its exercise by the Common Man, understood to constrain Government? How then can the Right to armed self-defense serve to constrain Government predisposed to Tyranny, if that Government should itself preordain the limits of that Right, or whether the people, the Common Man, should be allowed to exercise  at all?

When a crucial Second Amendment case comes before the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari, the Court, if conscientious, should take the case up on review, and clamp down on those brazen Government actions that dare to infringe the core of it.

The U.S. Supreme Court had not taken up a Second Amendment challenge until the late 1800s.

And, when the Court did begin to review Federal Government and State actions, the Court’s rulings have reflected acquiescence to State and Federal Government actions that severely constrain unfettered exercise of the right to armed self-defense.

This disturbing trend, although gradual and inexorable throughout the Twentieth Century, was plainly noticeable to Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. They would not allow this trend to continue into the Twenty-First Century. Heller became an appropriate vehicle upon which to bring to Government an understanding of the import and purport of the Right, consistent with the intent of the Framers.

To prevent inevitable de facto erasure of the Second Amendment, the three Associate Justices—joined, albeit reluctantly, by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy—held clearly, concisely, and categorically that the Right of the people to keep and bear arms operates as an individual right, a right unconnected to a person’s association with a militia. In that respect, the Right to armed self-defense, is like any other Natural Law Right, such as the Right to Free Speech, the Right to Freedom of Religion, the Right to own Property, and the Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.

The Heller rulings were met with opposition from states that abhor the Second Amendment. These states would not adhere to the Heller rulings. Instead, relying on earlier case law dicta, these jurisdictions asserted that Heller applied solely to the Federal Government, not to them.

Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito would not allow intractable States to defy Heller.

In McDonald vs. City of Chicago, these Associate Justices, with the backing, once again, of Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justice Kennedy, held the Right to Armed Self-defense applies to the states, no less so than to the Federal Government.

Two landmark cases, Heller and McDonald now place precise and stringent parameters on both the states and the Federal Government.

But stubborn states would, through time, continue to probe for weaknesses in Heller and McDonald—at times ignoring the rulings of the Court outright—emphatically and shamelessly pushing the boundaries of ostensible permissible state action, impinging upon the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms.

The THIRD potential major Second Amendment case to wend its way to the U.S. Supreme Court came five years after McDonald.

In 2015 the plaintiffs in Friedman vs. City of Highland Park, Illinois, 577 U.S. 1039, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015), filed a lawsuit challenging the City Code that,

“gave anyone who legally possessed ‘an Assault Weapon or Large Capacity Magazine’ 60 days to move these items outside City limits, disable them, or surrender them for destruction. . . . Anyone who violates the ordinance can be imprisoned for up to six months, fined up to $1,000, or both.”

The U.S. Supreme Court should have taken this case up. It didn’t. The failure to do so has led to a myriad of problems for Americans who own or wish to own semiautomatic weapons.

Justice Thomas wrote a blistering dissent, joined by Justice Scalia. Justice Alito could have joined them and likely would have wished to do so but may have decided to bow out, letting the Chief Justice and the Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, save face.

The issue of semiautomatic weapons—all in common use—would come to haunt the Court for the next ten years as the issue would come to the Court’s attention once again, and most prominently, in Harrel vs. Raoul, 144 S. Ct. 2491, 219 L. Ed. 2d 1333 (2024), and yet a third time, eleven months after Harrel, in Snope vs. Brown, 145 S. Ct. 1534 (2025).

Justice Scalia would not take part in the voting on whether to review either one of those two cases, for he had died under mysterious circumstances, fourteen months after the Court denied certiorari in the Friedman case.

The Roberts Court would thereafter continue to deny review of any case involving the constitutionality of semiautomatic weapons in common use.

Justices Thomas and Alito did dissent from the failure of the Court to garner sufficient votes in Harrel or Snope to review State bans on semiautomatic guns in common use.

Harrel is particularly of interest and concern because the ban on AR-15 style weapons mirrors the issue in Friedman an earlier Illinois case.

And, whereas Friedman dealt with a Citywide ordinance, the Harrel case involved a ban on AR-15 weaponry embracing the entire State.

Perhaps the Highland Park ordinance in Friedman was testing the waters. When the Illinois Government saw the U.S. Supreme Court blink in Friedman, it likely decided to ban AR-15 style weapons throughout the State, figuring it could get away with a blatantly unconstitutional, unconscionable restriction. Apparently, it could. Without the clout of three senior originalists on the Bench, after the death of Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts likely felt he could quarantine Justices Thomas and Alito. Plainly, John Roberts has no intention of having the Court hold that semiautomatic weapons, as weapons that are in obviously in common use, fall within the core of the Second Amendment right. His antipathy toward the Second Amendment is abundantly clear.

That semiautomatic weapons are in common use, is not open to any credible debate. “The Gun Zone,” writes,

Estimating the precise number of semi-automatic firearms in the United States is notoriously challenging, but credible estimates place the figure above 100 million. This vast number underscores the widespread availability and popularity of these firearms, influencing debates on gun control, public safety, and the Second Amendment. . . .

The sheer number of semi-automatic firearms in the U.S. is a central point of contention in debates about gun violence and regulation. Proponents of stricter gun control argue that the widespread availability of these firearms contributes to mass shootings and other forms of gun violence. They advocate for measures such as bans on certain types of semi-automatic firearms, restrictions on magazine capacity, and universal background checks.

Opponents of stricter gun control argue that semi-automatic firearms are commonly used for self-defense, hunting, and sport shooting. They contend that restricting access to these firearms would infringe on the Second Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens. They advocate for alternative approaches to reducing gun violence, such as improving mental health services and enforcing existing gun laws. The debate is complex and involves deeply held beliefs on both sides.

Roberts makes a point of asserting that the Supreme Court is not swayed by political concerns. The statement is not only false, but absurd. This is plain from his failure to take up Second Amendment cases that would tend to become landmark cases. As Chief Justice, he has considerable control over the Court docket, and sets the tone and themes, guiding which cases are to be reviewed. See the article in legalclarity.org, published on August 21, 2025.

The Chief Justice of the United States holds a unique and significant position within the American legal system, serving as the head of the judicial branch. This role is distinct from the other eight Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, encompassing both judicial leadership and extensive administrative duties. The Chief Justice’s responsibilities extend beyond simply hearing cases, establishing them as a central figure in the federal judiciary.

The Chief Justice presides over the Supreme Court’s public sessions, including oral arguments, guiding the questioning and ensuring orderly proceedings. This leadership extends to the private conferences where the Justices discuss cases and cast preliminary votes. The Chief Justice also influences the Court’s docket by creating a “discuss list” of cases that merit consideration for review.

A significant power of the Chief Justice is the authority to assign the writing of the majority opinion when they are part of the majority. This power allows the Chief Justice to influence the development of legal precedent by choosing which Justice will articulate the Court’s reasoning. While the Chief Justice leads these proceedings and discussions, their vote on a case carries the same weight as that of any other Associate Justice.

From the above brief discussion of Heller, McDonald, and cases that involve state bans on semiautomatic arms in common use, a person gains an inkling of those type of “gun” cases that the U.S. Supreme Court, under John Roberts, shies away from: cases that involve challenges directed to State bans on firearms in common use; challenges directed to the import and scope of historical tradition as the test that courts of review must utilize in lieu of interest balancing that the High Court in Heller struck down; challenges directed to the Federal Government’s use of the commerce clause to regulate an American’s right to armed self-defense; and, the parameters of State exercise of its police powers to constrain an American’s right to armed self-defense, codified in the Second Amendment.

The above issues beg for U.S. Supreme Court scrutiny, but the Court is hesitant to provide clarification apropos of State and Federal Government regulation.

NYSRPA vs. Bruen was the last Second Amendment case the High Court took up that can be properly inferred as a Landmark case.

John Roberts adamantly refuses to have the Court weigh in on the issue of weapons in common use, despite conflict in the circuits.

Roberts is evidently more concerned over incurring the wrath of a rabid Anti-Second Amendment mob, manipulated by and egged on by wealthy, powerful Anti-Second Amendment NGOs, and much less concerned over protecting and defending the Nation’s Bill of Rights—especially, the Nation’s most vital Right: The Natural Law Right to Armed Self-Defense.

This brings us to the most important Second Amendment case since Bruen, that fizzled out when the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, without dissenting comment, wherefrom the Petitioners’ appeal of an adverse decision was taken.

The case is Antonyuk v. James, No. 24-795, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 1384, 145 S. Ct. 1900, 221 L. Ed. 2d 646, 2025 WL 1020368 (U.S. Apr. 7, 2025). The Court stated, “Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.”

The perfunctory denial belies the importance of the case. Why did not the High Court grant review, or, otherwise act as it did in respect to the Antonyuk Petitioners first Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. In that case, the Court issued a “GVR,” where the Court granted certiorari, vacated the Second Circuit Court's decision, and remanded the case back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with specific instructions on how to proceed.

The authority for such GVR actions is derived from , 28 USCS § 2106. which grants appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, broad discretion to vacate judgments and remand cases for further proceedings as deemed just under the circumstances. That did not occur. The case that had such promise and that the Supreme Court, (namely Justices Thomas and Alito) had demonstrated acute interest in would end so abruptly.

Had the Supreme Court granted review, Antonyuk vs. James would have been THE FOURTH LANDMARK SECOND AMENDMENT CASE—NO QUESTION ABOUT IT.

The Court had addressed Antonyuk on two separate occasions, and each time the Court had indicated an interest in reviewing it once the Federal Appellate Court—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—had resolved the pressing issues.

Yet, despite Justices Alito’s and Thomas’s demonstration of profound interest in the case, the Court ultimately denied the Plaintiffs’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari—THE SECOND PETITION— the case went nowhere because the Chief Justice evidently considered this Second Amendment case a hot potato, and he wanted no part of it.

To get a handle on why the Chief Justice refused to vote to review Antonyuk (which served as notice to the three “moderate” Trump nominees to refrain from voting to grant review of the case) we must look at why the High Court bothered to grant review of Bruen—a case to which Antonyuk is intricately and inextricably tied.

Of course, the two senior Associate Justices, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito voted to review Bruen.

The question is why did Roberts defer to Thomas and Alito on this, thereby signaling to the three junior “moderate” justices (the Trump nominees), Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney-Barrett, that it is okay for them to vote to cast their votes, favoring review?

To answer that question we must look to an earlier New York case, New York State Rifle and Pistol Association vs. City of New York, NY, 590 U.S. 336, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020). 

In that case, petitioners challenged a New York City rule regarding the transport of firearms outside the City’s environs, claiming it violated the Second Amendment. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to allow transport of firearms to a second home or shooting range outside the city but within the State.

The case commenced in 2013, taking seven years to finally make it up to the U.S. Supreme Court on a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

The U.S. Supreme Court did grant review, on what at first glance did not appear to have the makings of a major Second Amendment case, but Justices Thomas and Alito did not see the case that way.

A hidden issue lay in the depths of the apparent narrow issue begging a major question, namely, under what legal theory can New York lawfully and constitutionally, and, no less rationally, deny the right of an American citizen (who is under no disability preventing him from keeping and bearing arms) from carrying a handgun for self-defense in the public domain?

Plainly, the Chief Justice did not want to deal with that broad-based issue that naturally springs from the visible issue concerning the transporting of a handgun by a licensee who bears a restricted license that does not permit him to gain access to his handgun if threatened while in the public sphere.

The Court first sought to buy time, avoiding a review of the case on the merits.

The Court vacated the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the petitioners to potentially amend their pleadings or develop the record under the new legal framework. The Court also permitted the Petitioners to seek damages even though they had not previously requested such relief.

The State and the City of New York took this maneuver by the Court as a tacit pronouncement to amend State Law and the New York City Codes to allow the Petitioners to transport their handguns to a gun range outside New York City.

The State and the City complied with the unwritten, tacit request of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Having done this, the Court ultimately dismissed the case.

Roberts needed an excuse to dismiss the case without dealing with the substantive merits of the case which, if reviewed, would have yielded the result rendered in Bruen—but two years earlier.

The State provided Roberts and the Liberal-wing of the Court with an escape valve, dubious though it be.

The U.S. Supreme Court having granted certiorari, the State of New York and the City amended their laws and code to give Petitioners the relief sought, henceforth allowing holders of a highly restricted handgun “premise” license to transport their handguns to a shooting range outside the environs of New York City YET, still under STRICT constraints, namely only so long as the licensees kept their handguns in a locked handgun case, and kept the ammunition for the weapon separate from the handguns, rendering the handguns impossible to use for self-defense while the licensees are enroute to the shooting range.

This slight change to the State’s Handgun Law and to the NYC Code ostensibly rendered the case moot, to the satisfaction of Roberts and the Liberal wing of the Court.

The New York City gun transport case is rarely mentioned today. But it deserves a close reading.

Had the Court’s majority not dismissed the case, it likely would have obviated the need for Bruen because the Court would have used the gun transport case as a springboard, ruling the right of the people to keep and bear arms applies outside the home, in the public domain, no less so than inside the home.

Justice Alito’s lengthy dissent (in which Justice Thomas and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined) is extraordinarily detailed. The Justices were denied the opportunity to strengthen the right codified in the Second Amendment to where it should be and should have been all along—exercise of a right to armed self-defense wherever a threat may arise.

Justice Alito explains in clear and precise terms why it is and how it is that the case WAS NOT MOOT. He plainly alludes to the idiocy of the City forbidding the carrying of a handgun for self-defense.

Justice Alito’s explication for reviewing the case on the merits is set forth in great part, below, where he alludes to a right to carry a handgun for self-defense in the public sphere. He points out that if a person has the right to transport a handgun when in public, then why can he not carry it for self-defense? Justice Alito shreds the rationale for the New York maintaining delineating several different kinds of license. Such practice of maintaining a plethora of license types still exist in the New York Handgun Law, even after the Bruen rulings.

In his dissent, Justice Alito also discusses the State’s “Proper Cause” standard which the Court struck down as unconstitutional, in the Bruen case.

Justice Alito opines:

In Heller, we held that a District of Columbia rule that effectively prevented a law-abiding citizen from keeping a handgun in the home for purposes of self-defense constituted a core violation of the Second Amendment. 554 U. S., at 635, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637. We based this decision on the scope of the right to keep and bear arms as it was understood at the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment. Id., at 577-605, 628-629, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637. We recognized that history supported the constitutionality of some laws limiting the right to possess a firearm, such as laws banning firearms from certain sensitive locations and prohibiting possession by felons and other dangerous individuals. See id., at 626-627, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637; see also McDonald, 561 U. S., at 787, 904, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894. But history provided no support for laws like the District’s. See 554 U. S., at 629-634, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637.

For a similar reason, 38 N. Y. C. R. R. §5-23 also violated the Second Amendment. We deal here with the same core Second Amendment right, the right to keep a handgun in the home for self-defense. As the Second Circuit “assume[d],” a necessary concomitant of this right is the right to take a gun outside the home for certain purposes. 883 F. 3d, at 58-59. One of these is to take a gun for maintenance or repair, which City law allows. See §5-22(a)(16). Another is to take a gun outside the home in order to transfer ownership lawfully, which the City also allows. §5-26(j). And still another is to take a gun to a range in order to gain and maintain the skill necessary to use it responsibly. As we said in Heller, “‘to bear arms implies something more than the mere keeping [of arms]; it implies the learning to handle and use them in a way that makes those who keep them ready for their efficient use.’” 554 U. S., at 617-618, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (quoting T. Cooley, Constitutional Law 271 (1880)); see also Luis v. UnitedStates, 578 U. S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 194 L. Ed. 2d 256, 272 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“The right to keep and bear arms . . . ‘implies a corresponding right . . . to acquire and maintain proficiency in their use’”); Ezell v. Chicago, 651 F. 3d 684, 704 (CA7 2011) (“[T]he core right wouldn’t mean much without the training and practice that make it effective”).

It is true that a lawful gun owner can sometimes practice at a range using a gun that is owned by and rented at the range. But the same model gun that the person owns may not be available at a range, and in any event each individual gun may have its own characteristics. See Brief for Professors of Second Amendment Law et al. as Amici Curiae 10-12; see also App. 51, 56, 59 (referencing differences across ranges and shooting competitions). Once it is recognized that the right at issue is a concomitant of the same right recognized in Heller, it became incumbent on the City to justify the restrictions its rule imposes, but the City has not done so. It points to no evidence of laws in force around the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment that prevented gun owners from practicing outside city limits. The City argues that municipalities restricted the places within their jurisdiction where a gun could be fired, Brief for Respondents 18, and it observes that the Second Amendment surely does not mean that a New York City resident with a premises license can practice in Central Park or Times Square, id., at 21. That is certainly true, but that is not the question. Petitioners do not claim the right to fire weapons in public places within the City. Instead, they claim they have a right to practice at ranges and competitions  outside the City, and neither the City, the courts below, nor any of the many amici supporting the City have shown that municipalities during the founding era prevented gun owners from taking their guns outside city limits for practice.

If history is not sufficient to show that the New York City ordinance is unconstitutional, any doubt is dispelled by the weakness of the City’s showing that its travel restriction significantly promoted public safety. Although the courts below claimed to apply heightened scrutiny, there was nothing heightened about what they did.

As noted, the City relied entirely on the declaration of Inspector Lunetta, but this declaration provides little support. See supra, at 1531-1532. Some of what Inspector Lunetta asserted was simply not relevant to the justification for drawing a distinction between trips to a range in the City and trips to a range in a neighboring jurisdiction. For example, he stated that persons holding premises licenses “do not always transport their firearms in a locked box carrying ammunition separately, as required by NYPD rules,” but the issue in this case does not concern the storage of a gun on the way to a range. App. 77-78. Similarly, he declared that “[p]remises license holders have not demonstrated proper cause to carry a concealed firearm in public,” id., at 78, but the question before us is not whether petitioners have the right to do what they could if they had carry licenses.

Other statements actually undermine the City’s public safety rationale. Thus, the fact that prosecutors typically do not bring even misdemeanor charges against licensees who carry a weapon in violation of the limitations of their licenses, ibid., does not suggest that the City regards violations as presenting a particularly significant threat to public safety.

When all that is irrelevant is brushed aside, what remains are the three arguments noted earlier. First, Inspector Lunetta asserted that the travel restrictions discouraged licensees from taking their guns outside the home, but this is a strange argument for several reasons. It would make sense only if it is less convenient or more expensive to practice at a range in the City, but that contradicts the City’s argument that the seven ranges in the City provide ample opportunity for practice. And discouraging trips to a range contradicts the City’s own rule recommending that licensees practice. Once it is recognized that a reasonable opportunity to practice is part of the very right recognized in Heller, what this justification amounts to is a repudiation of part of what we held in that decision.

Second, Inspector Lunetta claimed that prohibiting trips to out-of-city ranges helps prevent a person who is taking a gun to a range from using it in a fit of rage after an auto accident or some other altercation that occurs along the way. And to bolster this argument, Inspector Lunetta asserted that persons who have met the City’s demanding requirements for obtaining a premises license are just as likely as anyone else to use their guns in a fit of rage. App. 77. If that is so, it does not reflect well on the City’s intensive vetting scheme, see supra, at 1528-1530, and in any event, the assertion is dubious on its face.

More to the point, this argument does not explain why a person headed for a range outside the City is any more likely to engage in such conduct than a person whose destination is a range in the City. There might be something to the argument if ranges in the City were closer than those just outside its borders but the City never attempted to show that. The courts below were incurious about the validity of Inspector Lunetta’s assertion, and given the location of the City’s seven ranges, the assertion is more than dubious. 

Inspector Lunetta’s final justification for the travel restrictions was only marginally stronger. It goes like this. Suppose that a patrol officer stops a premises licensee and finds that this individual is carrying a gun, and suppose that that the licensee says he is taking the gun to a range to practice or is returning from a range. If the range in question is one in the City, the officer will be better able to check the story than if the range is outside the officer’s jurisdiction. App. 79-80.

How strong is this argument? The City presumably has access to records of cases in which licensees were cited for unauthorized possession of guns outside the home, and it failed to provide any evidence that holders of target licenses had used their right to practice at out-of-city ranges as a pretext. And it is dubious that it would be much harder for an officer to check whether a licensee was really headed for an out-of-city range as opposed to one in the City. If a licensee claims to be headed for a range in the City, the officer can check whether the range is open and whether the individual appears to be on a route that plausibly leads to that range. But how much more difficult would it be to do the same thing if the range is in one of the counties that border New York City or across the Hudson River in New Jersey? A phone call would be enough to determine the range’s operating hours, and the route would still be easy to determine: There are only a few bridges and tunnels to New Jersey and just a few main thoroughfares to the neighboring New York counties. A court conducting any form of serious scrutiny would have demanded that the City provide some substantiation for this claim, but nothing like that was provided or demanded.

Would the situation be much different if the individual claimed to be headed home from a range? Once again, it would not be difficult for the officer to check whether the range was or recently had been open. And it is not at all apparent that determining whether a licensee was on a route to his or her residence would be any harder if the range at which the licensee claimed to have practiced was outside the City.

Inspector Lunetta’s declaration stated that ranges in the City are required to keep a record of everyone who practices there, and therefore if a person claims to be coming from a city range, the officer could easily check that story. But the declaration does not state that ranges in nearby jurisdictions do not keep similar records.  It should have been easy enough for the City to check, and a court engaged in any serious form of scrutiny would have questioned the absence of evidence, but no substantiation was provided or demanded below.

In sum, the City’s travel restriction burdened the very right recognized in Heller. History provides no support for a restriction of this type. The City’s public safety arguments were weak on their face, were not substantiated in  any way, and were accepted below with no serious probing. And once we granted review in this case, the City’s public safety concerns evaporated.

We are told that the mode of review in this case is representative of the way Heller has been treated in the lower courts. If that is true, there is cause for concern.

This case is not moot. The City violated petitioners’ Second Amendment right, and we should so hold.”

Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch had painted the Chief Justice in a corner. When another major New York case came up for review, he was compelled to vote to review it. That case is NYSRPA vs. Bruen.

He could not forbear to vote to review it. For, Alito, Thomas and Gorsuch voted to hear it, and, given Brett Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion, in the Gun Transport case, Kavanaugh would be compelled to be the fourth vote. Roberts had to join the majority or come across as a hypocrite.

Hence, either the earlier New York case or the later Bruen case would result in a ruling that would go well beyond the narrow matter concerning the convoluted nature of the New York handgun law with its myriad types of handgun licenses.

The New York State Rifle and Pistol Association required a case that would finally disembowel the century old Handgun Licensing Law, and that case was Bruen.

Roberts could not prevent the four votes necessary to review the case and the New York Government could not so easily amend its Gun Law to deny the majority of New Yorkers who desired to exercise their Second Amendment right to armed self-defense, from doing so. The New York Government would have to begin issuing concealed handgun carry licenses to the majority of people who apply for a handgun carry license.

After Oral Argument in Bruen, which took place in November 2021, New York Governor Hochul and the Democrat-Party controlled Legislature in Albany went to work to devise a workaround that would salvage the draconian handgun licensing regime. They had seven months to craft a serviceable workaround which the Senate in Albany passed and Governor Hochul signed in Law, literally one week after publication of the Bruen decision on June 23, 2022.

New York would issue a multitude of concealed handgun carry licenses, but the Government would take its good time in processing an applicant’s application. The Government would also create a new law out of whole cloth limiting the areas in the public domain where an applicant can carry a firearm lawfully for self-defense.

This radical workaround of the Gun Law would transform what had once been an unrestricted concealed carry license that only few New Yorkers could obtain under the old “Proper Cause” standard, to a highly restricted concealed handgun carry licenses since the State, and especially the City of New York would convert into a patchwork quilt of lawful carry versus unlawful carry zones that would be very difficult to navigate through.

Within a couple of weeks of enactment of the amendments to the State’s Handgun Law (referred to as the “Concealed Improvement Carry Act), which took effect on September 1, 2022, the NYSRPA and one individual, Ivan Antonyuk would file suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. That first case, referred to as Antonyuk I, for convenience, was dismissed without prejudice due to a standing issue.

The Court ruled that the NYSRPA did not have standing to challenge the “CCIA.” The Court intimated that the individual, Ivan Antonyuk, did have standing to challenge the State’s amendments to its Handgun Law, Antonyuk refiled the case, adding several other individuals as Party Plaintiffs, as well. That case is referred to colloquially by the Courts, as Antonyuk II.

The principal Defendant in the case is the Superintendent of the New York State Police.

Through time, new Superintendents were appointed by the Governor of New York, Kathy Hochul. And the caption of the Antonyuk case would change to recite the current Superintendent.

The case was pegged to be the next major Second Amendment case.

Yet, there would be no FOURTH landmark Second Amendment case. Chief Justice Roberts would see to that. There was no way he could weasel around it other than to deny review outright, with no reason given. And, surprisingly, Justices Thomas and Alito provided no dissenting opinion. We can only surmise that Roberts wanted no written remonstrations from those two Justices.

Roberts had effectively silenced them. And, if the two senior Justices could be effectively silenced, then the junior Justice Gorsuch was not going make waves.

Roberts had had enough. Notwithstanding that New York Governor Kathy Hochul had unconstitutionally contravened the Bruen rulings, effectively not only salvaging but strengthening an unconstitutional State handgun law, Justice Roberts would not allow review of a case, Antonyuk vs. James that plainly laid out not only the failure of the State to abide by the Court’s rulings but had done so in a blatantly defiant and transparently visible manner, therefore demonstrating her contempt for the Court’s Article III authority.

Evidently, Justice Roberts would rather stomach a State Government nakedly defy the Court than strengthen the Second Amendment, in the present political climate. That much is clear.

Curiously, very few news articles or commentary exist on the High Court’s denial of certiorari in Antonyuk and, of those few that point to the interlocutory (non-final) nature of the case, none bother to consider that the U.S. Supreme Court is not constrained from taking up a case that is in a non-final form first as a matter of right—the Court is not bound by any rule that it has itself created.

Thus, Supreme Court Rules are guidelines by which it decides to be bound or not. Concerning the present case, involving non-final orders, the U.S. Supreme Court has the authority to grant review of a writ of certiorari in cases where the judgment is not final, but this is subject to specific conditions. Under , 28 USCS § 1257 the Court may review the judgment of the highest court of a state even if the state-court proceedings are not yet complete, provided that the federal claim has been finally decided and further review of the federal issue cannot be had regardless of the ultimate outcome of the case. However, the Court will dismiss a writ of certiorari for lack of jurisdiction if the state court's decision is not final and does not fall within the limited set of situations where finality is found as to the federal issue, such as when the case is remanded for further proceedings .
Additionally, under  USCS Supreme Ct R 11 the Court may grant a writ of certiorari to review a case pending in a U.S. court of appeals before judgment is entered, but only if the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination . USCS Supreme Ct R 11. This rule underscores the Court's discretion in granting certiorari for non-final cases, emphasizing the need for compelling reasons or significant public interest.

In conclusion, while the U.S. Supreme Court can grant review of a writ of certiorari in non-final cases, it does so under limited circumstances, such as when the federal issue is conclusively decided or when the case involves matters of imperative public importance.  

Again, the Supreme Court may grant a writ of certiorari to review a case pending in a U.S. court of appeals before judgment is entered, but only if the case is of "imperative public importance" and justifies deviation from normal appellate practice. This is outlined in Rule 11 of the Supreme Court Rules and . USCS Supreme Ct R 11, 28 USCS § 2101.
If the Second Circuit is refusing to issue a final order for improper purposes, such as delaying resolution to allow continued enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional law, the plaintiff may argue that the case meets the criteria for immediate review under the collateral order doctrine or that it presents an issue of imperative public importance warranting Supreme Court intervention. However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that federal courts should generally avoid interfering with state court proceedings unless exceptional circumstances, such as bad faith or irreparable harm, are demonstrated.

First, the major issues have been fully briefed by both parties in Antonyuk, and several amici briefs have also weighed in.

Second, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has consistently sought, unconscionably, to delay final resolution of the case. Justice Alito has specifically warned the Government against delaying resolution of Antonyuk, and his warning was as much aimed at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals as it was at the Governor Hochul’s Office.

In the Harrel vs. Raoul case, referred to, supra, Alito says that he would have granted certiorari. And Thomas drafted a lengthy dissent referring to the Friedman case as a rationale for taking up Harrel. And he points out, at the end of his opinion that,

These petitions arise from a preliminary injunction, and the Seventh Circuit stressed that its merits analysis was merely “a preliminary look at the subject.” 85 F. 4th, at 1197. But, if the Seventh Circuit ultimately allows Illinois to ban America’s most common civilian rifle, we can—and should—review that decision once the cases reach a final judgment. The Court must not permit ‘the Seventh Circuit [to] relegat[e] the Second Amendment to a second-class right.’ Friedman, 577 U. S., at 1043, 136 S. Ct. 447, 193 L. Ed. 2d 483 (opinion of Thomas, J.).

Thomas made clear that if the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the State’s ban on semiautomatic rifles in common use, then the High Court would review the case and strike down the Illinois law.

Alito, for his part, would not delay review, but grant the petitions outright notwithstanding the interlocutory order.

When courts obviously intentionally delay final resolution of a case, then the Supreme Court must weigh in. To allow lower courts to use preliminary injunctions as a delaying tactic does a disservice to the administration of justice that Americans deserve.

If there should be any doubt as to the tactics of the Second Circuit in the Antonyuk case, one may simply look at the status of the case.

The U.S. Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs writ of certiorari in late April 2025.

In accordance with High Court procedure, the Clerk of the Supreme Court sends the case down to the court from where the appeal was taken. In the Antonyuk case, Plaintiffs took their appeal from the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

In accordance with the Court’s own rules of procedure, if the case is under a preliminary injunction issued by the lower U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, the Federal Appellate Court is dutybound to remand the case to the trial court for further action.

To our knowledge this has never happened. It appears the case still sits at the Appellate Court. If there is some reason for the delay, the Court has an obligation to make the reason known to the parties. That, too, has not happened.

But, after six months, why is the case still in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit? We would like to know.

We would also like to know why attorneys for the Plaintiffs have not contacted the Federal Appellate Court to ascertain why the District Court still has not received the case so that it can undertake a trial on the merits.

And, if counsel for Plaintiff Petitioners have contacted the Second Circuit to ascertain the reason for the delay in remanding the case to the District Court, and the Second Circuit has failed to provide a reason for the delay, then why haven’t Plaintiff Petitioners’ counsel not contacted the U.S. Supreme Court to spur the Second Circuit into action?

Plaintiffs did that once before and long ago, and Justice Alito, at the time, warned the Respondent Government (and by extension the Second Circuit), not to delay prosecution of the case. Yet, to date, nothing has happened to move the case along. And counsel for the Plaintiff Petitioners seems to have decided to allow Antonyuk to die. That is the only inference we can reasonably draw. But, what, then, explains counsel’s failure to act?

The most important case to come down the pike since Bruen—and which happens to be a case that stems directly from Bruen lies in stasis. There is fault aplenty to go around.

The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari but did not do so. And, having denied review, the Second Circuit ought to have sent the case back to the District Court for a trial on the merits. But that never happened. And counsel for the Plaintiff Petitioners (Gun Owners of America) have not troubled themselves to ascertain what the holdup is, at the Second Circuit. Why is that?

It is ridiculous to plow ahead with brand new cases, when Antonyuk, that should have been the Fourth Landmark case, lies dead in the water, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms lies severely weakened in the process as Anti-Second Amendment jurisdictions continue to run roughshod over our Nation’s most vital right.

Lastly, and in the alternative to the claim that no final order has materialized, the Second Circuit’s lengthy opinion in Antonyuk vs. James, 120 F.4th 941 (2nd Cir. 2024), the issues have been resolved, and the Second Circuit decision is final.

The Second Circuit said this:

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the injunction in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion. In summary, we uphold the district court's injunctions with respect to N.Y. Penal L. § 400.00(1)(o)(iv) (social media disclosure) and N.Y. Penal L. § 265.01-d (restricted locations) as applied to private property held open to the general public. We vacate the injunction in all other respects, having concluded either that the district court lacked jurisdiction because no plaintiff had Article III standing to challenge the laws or that the challenged laws do not violate the Constitution on their face.

What remains of the case to be remanded? Nothing that we can see, and that would explain why, after six months, this Federal Court has not remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The opinion of the Second Circuit is detailed but also convoluted. The U.S. Supreme Court, for its part, hasn’t sought to decipher the case.

There are only two issues, and as to those issues, the Second Circuit has rendered a final order or otherwise, an order that is conclusive as to the issues that Petitioners brought before the Supreme Court. One issue goes to the historical tradition tes, to ascertain the date a court is to utilize in determining whether a Government action is analogous to an earlier similar regulation. The other issue goes to the propriety of using “moral character” as the touchstone by which a handgun licensing authority ascertains appropriatness for issuance using the criterium of “dangerousness.”

In their Memorandum in support of Petitioners’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari, they assert, in the Section dealing with the Questions for review, the attorneys for the Antonyuk Petitioners say this,

Moments after this Court issued N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), striking down New York’s discretionary firearms licensing regime, state politicians decried the decision as “reprehensible,” vowing to resist the “insanity” of “gun culture” that “possessed . . . the Supreme Court.” Rather than following Bruen, New York enacted a “Concealed Carry Improvement Act” that makes it more difficult to bear arms than before Bruen was decided. A panel of the Second Circuit upheld much of this law in an opinion this Court vacated in light of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). But on remand, the panel doubled down, reissuing a nearly identical opinion and dismissing Rahimi as having “little direct bearing on our conclusions.” Relying almost entirely on a few late-19th-century outlier laws rather than Founding-era practice, the panel again affirmed New York’s requirement of “good moral character” as a precondition to public carry, along with most of its gun bans in all manner of nonsensitive public places. These holdings clearly contravene Bruen’s rejection of discretionary “suitability” assessments and warning not to declare all of Manhattan a “sensitive place.” The questions presented are: 1. Whether the proper historical time period for ascertaining the Second Amendment’s original meaning as applied to the states is 1791, rather than 1868; and 2. Whether “the people” must convince government officials of their “good moral character” before exercising their Second Amendment right to bear arms.

A salient issue goes to the historical date to be used in determining the constitutionality of the New York Government’s entire Licensing Regime.

The Petitioners argue that,

Although acknowledging “an ongoing scholarly debate on whether courts should primarily rely on the prevailing understanding” when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, or when the Second Amendment was ratified in 1791, Bruen ultimately left the question unresolved “because . . . the public understanding . . . in both 1791 and 1868 was . . . the same. . . .” Bruen at 37-38. Yet Justice Barrett anticipated that this question “might make a difference in another case,” explaining that “1791 is the benchmark” and “Reconstruction-era history” alone is “simply too late” and “too little.” Id. at 82 (Barrett, J., concurring). Cautioning the lower courts, Justice Barrett rejected any “freewheeling reliance on historical practice from the mid-to-late 19th century. . . .” Id. at 83. But following Bruen, the lower courts have failed to coalesce on this temporal question and, like Bruen, Rahimi did not “resolv[e] the dispute.” Rahimi at 692 n.1. And like Justice Barrett in Bruen, Justice Jackson called the temporal question an “[e]xtremely pertinent inquir[y]” which “await[s] resolution. . . .” Id. at 746 n.4 (Jackson, J., concurring). Indeed, there is a multi-way circuit split on the question, and the district courts are in disarray, with divergent approaches continuing to multiply as to which historical sources to use. This case presents an excellent vehicle for this Court to resolve the debate between 1791 and 1868, which presents at all stages of litigation. Below, the panel relied – almost exclusively – on historical laws enacted well after the Second Amendment’s ratification, with the earliest being nearly half a century after the Founding. Strikingly, Bruen considered and rejected each of the three earlier purported analogues the panel did reference. Thus, the panel’s singular focus on mid-to-late 19th-century sources was outcome-determinative in this case because, “apart from a handful of late-19th-century jurisdictions” (Bruen at 38), no historical tradition exists to justify the CCIA. Resolution of the temporal question not only will correct the panel’s errors below, but also will provide critical guidance to innumerable lower courts analyzing similar challenges.

Although Bruen found it unnecessary to definitively resolve the temporal “scholarly debate,” that does not mean the lower courts lack guidance. Indeed, Heller, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), Bruen, and Rahimi each demonstrate that the Second Amendment should be construed as originally understood in 1791. To the extent that earlier or later sources are utilized, it is only to confirm a tradition that existed at the Founding. As Bruen stated, this is the Court’s “general[] assum[ption].” Id. at 37. Heller explained that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them....” Id. at 634-35; see also at 614 (post-Civil War “discussions took place 75 years after the ratification of the Second Amendment,” and thus “do not provide as much insight into its original meaning as earlier sources.”). Therefore, after primarily examining Founding-era sources (id. at 582-603), the Court considered sources “through the end of the 19th century” only to confirm what already had been established (id. at 605-19). Thus, in Heller, as in Bruen, the tradition of both time periods was “the same. . . .” Bruen at 38. McDonald provides further confirmation, rejecting “‘the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights. . . . ’” Id. at 765. Like Heller, McDonald examined “[e]vidence from the period immediately following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,” but only because it “confirms that the right to keep and bear arms was considered fundamental.” Id. at 776; see also at 780.

Bruen further confirmed that 1791 is the focal point for Second Amendment interpretation. First, the Court described the Second Amendment as being “‘intended to endure for ages to come,’” noting that “its meaning is fixed according to the understandings of those who ratified it. . . .” Id. at 28. Second, the Court reaffirmed that constitutional rights have the same meaning “against the States . . . as against the Federal Government.” Id. at 37. Third, the Court noted that “we have generally assumed that the scope of the protection applicable to the . . . States is pegged to . . . 1791.” Id. Fourth, the Court again made clear that 19th-century history “‘do[es] not provide as much insight into [] original meaning as earlier sources.’” Id. at 36. And fifth, the Court explained that, to the extent 19th-century evidence is to be consulted at all, it only provides “‘mere confirmation of what the Court thought had already been established.’” Id. at 37. Rahimi, too, focused entirely on 1791, undermining the notion that Bruen was somehow “exceptional.” App.44; cf. Rahimi at 714 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“following exactly the path we described in Bruen”). As Rahimi explained, “[s]ince the founding, our Nation’s firearm laws have” supported temporary disarmament based on individualized dangerousness. Id. at 690 (emphasis added). Indeed, Rahimi’s Founding-era focus was pervasive, extending to both concurrences and dissent. See, e.g., id. at 710 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“‘admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding’”); id. at 705 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing issues “‘persist[ing] since the 18th century’”); id. at 737 (Barrett, J., concurring) (Second Amendment’s “meaning . . . is fixed at the time of its ratification”); id. at 750 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting “a general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century”). This Court’s precedents thus provide unwavering confirmation that the Second Amendment is to be understood based on the original “public understanding of the right” when it was adopted in 1791. Yet despite seemingly widespread agreement among the Justices, the panel read Rahimi differently, claiming it had “little direct bearing on our conclusion[]” that 1868 is a focal point of Second Amendment analysis. App.7, 46-47 n.16.

If Bruen left any questions unanswered, Rahimi laid them to rest. Contrary to the panel’s insistence that Bruen was an “exceptional” case warranting uniquely heightened historical stringency, Rahimi confirmed that Bruen simply “explain[s]” the “appropriate analysis. . . .” Id. at 692; see also at 714 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“following exactly the path we described in Bruen”). Thus, Bruen and Rahimi establish the norm, and do not “permit a ‘more nuanced approach’” whenever a court declares a challenged regulation to be “less exceptional.” App.41.9 But the panel read Rahimi differently, casting it aside as having “little direct bearing” despite being the reason behind this Court’s remand. App.7. To reach this strange conclusion, the panel minimized (or ignored) much of this Court’s latest pronouncement. First, the panel limited Rahimi to its facts, claiming the regulation examined in Rahimi is “quite different” from the CCIA and never “addressed” the issues presented here. App.7. Second, conceding that Rahimi nevertheless might provide some guidance, the panel summarily concluded that “Rahimi is consonant with the [approach] applied” previously. App.8. How the panel’s focus on Reconstruction could be “consonant” with Rahimi’s focus on the founding, the panel never explained. And third, while Rahimi rejected the notion that only those deemed “responsible” have Second Amendment rights, the panel repeatedly discounted that statement as mere “dictum.” Rahimi at 701; App.68 n.26, 71 n.30.

Viewing Bruen’s methodology as applicable only to “exceptional” challenges, and Rahimi’s guidance as mere “dictum” with “little direct bearing,” the panel charted its own course, engaging in precisely the sort of “freewheeling reliance on historical practice from the mid-to-late 19th century” that this Court implicitly – and Justice Barrett explicitly – rejected. Bruen at 83 (Barrett, J., concurring); Rahimi at 738 (Barrett, J., concurring).

 The bottom line here is that the CCIA is a chimera with no rational or legal basis upon which to stand. But the import and implication of Petitioners’ argument goes beyond the State’s amendments to its Handgun Law. Since the date of ratification of the Bill of Rights (1791) is the predicate date upon which the State’s licensing regime is grounded, the entirety of the New York licensing “may issue” scheme must be cast aside. The Petitioners argue,

Finally, Rahimi helps to explain Bruen’s endorsement of the constitutionality of “shall-issue” licensing regimes. As noted above, see supra note 40, licensing schemes as such developed after the Civil War, and thus could be argued to lack precedent at the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment. However, as we have also explained above, we regard evidence of the tradition of firearms regulation from around the time that the Fourteenth Amendment made the protection of the right to bear arms binding on the States as likewise significant. But even if we do not, Rahimi strongly suggests that what matters in the search for historical antecedents of modern firearms regulations is the substance of the regulation, rather than the form.

There are no historical antecedents supporting New York’s CCIA. As with the use of “Proper Cause,” there is nothing in the language of the Second Amendment to support a broad “may issue” licensing scheme such as the one New York had cemented in the early 1900s, and which continues today under a moral character requirement that is inherently subjective and amounts to inherent and unacceptable subjective evaluation on the part of the licensing authority.

Chief Justice Roberts doesn’t want to touch any part of this, and, so, Petitioners’ Writ of Certiorari was denied out-of-hand.

The Court would argue as Court jurisprudence dictates that the denial of Certiorari does not connote a decision pro or con on the merits.

Still, the impact of failure to grant review means that the State is allowed to continue to enforce the CCIA and, in that, the State has won.

The Second Circuit won’t remand the case to the District Court even though it says it will, and attorneys for the Plaintiff Petitioners won’t hold the New York Hochul Government accountable. Failure of the Court to grant the Second Petition as it did the first and remand the case to the Second Circuit with instructions as to how to proceed is a dead letter.

The Roberts Court is done with Antonyuk. This has nothing to do with interlocutory matters. From a perusal of the Second Circuit decision, there is no tenable interlocutory matter. And even if there were a non-final issue to be resolved, it is difficult to decipher what that non-final issue is.

The Second Circuit has intentionally obfuscated any notion of an open issue.

This Second Circuit decision illustrates bad faith in the handling of the case and irreparable harm to the Petitioners, both of which meet the necessary condition of exceptional circumstances, established by the Court for reviewing Antonyuk vs. James, as well as presenting matters of imperative public importance warranting Supreme Court intervention. The irony here is that the issues are too imperative such that the Chief Justice seeks to avoid a strong public backlash among the Anti-Second Amendment crowd. Beyond that concern, Roberts is not ideologically motivated to defend the Second Amendment.

He will allow Second Amendment cases to be reviewed so long as the Court only need tinker around the edges of a challenge to state court action impinging upon the right of the people to keep and bear arms. But major cases, apropos of Heller, Bruen, and McDonald will be ignored. Antonyuk, unfortunately, is one of those cases. Anti-Second Amendment jurisdictions have taken notice of the Court’s reticence and will continue to take advantage of that hesitation.

If Antonyuk is to be resurrected, then it must come from the the Plaintiff Petitioners themselves. But, there is a statute of limitations that must be met. And that time limitation has long since expired.

A party may request the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider its denial of a petition for certiorari under specific circumstances and through limited procedural mechanisms. According to Rule 44 of the Supreme Court Rules, a petition for rehearing of an order denying certiorari must be filed within 25 days of the denial and must be based on "intervening circumstances of a substantial or controlling effect" or other substantial grounds not previously presented.

And the petition must comply with strict procedural requirements, including certification of good faith and adherence to filing rules.

The Court will not grant such a petition without extraordinary circumstances and typically requires a response before granting rehearing . USCS Supreme Ct R 44.

The Court has also clarified that a motion for rehearing does not automatically suspend the denial order. A petitioner must apply to an individual Justice for suspension, and the likelihood of the Court reconsidering its position must be reasonable. Additionally, the Court does not allow extensions of time for filing a petition for rehearing of an order denying certiorari, as such orders are not considered judgments or decisions on the merits.

In rare cases, the Court may reconsider its denial of certiorari if subsequent developments cast doubt on the original decision.

Thus, while the U.S. Supreme Court provides a narrow avenue for reconsidering the denial of certiorari through a petition for rehearing, such petitions are subject to stringent procedural rules and are rarely granted unless extraordinary circumstances or significant new developments justify reconsideration.

Antonyuk vs. James is dead. So are the “assault weapons” cases.

A U.S. Supreme Court that lacks jurists with the fortitude and stature of Justices Thomas, Alito, and the late eminent Justice Scalia, will continue to deny review of challenges to state action that infringe the core of the Second Amendment Right. There are no other Justices on the Court like the senior Conservative-Wing Justices.

Of the three, only two remain, and the Trump nominees apparently do not have strength of will and who cherish the Nation’s Bill of Rights like the two true Conservative-wing Justices, Thomas and Alito, and they are getting up there in age.

This, unfortunately, is the disturbing reality of the situation, and the Right cemented in the Second Amendment and those who would exercise that Right can expect little support from the U.S. SUPREME COURT. The American people are on their own.

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