MARYLAND’S FIREARM SAFETY ACT: ATTACKING THE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT THROUGH THE VENEER OF PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY.

MARYLAND’S FIREARM SAFETY ACT: ATTACKING THE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT THROUGH THE VENEER OF PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY.

A Court Of Review Is Blind To Inappropriate, And Unlawful Government Action When A Court Of Review Is Philosophically Predisposed To Inhibit The Right Of The People To Keep And Bear Arms.

KOLBE VS. HOGAN:

PART FIVE

HAD THE DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND REVIEWED MARYLAND’S FIREARM SAFETY ACT AS THE HELLER COURT REQUIRED, THE DISTRICT COURT WOULD HAVE SEEN THROUGH THE CHARADE OF THAT RESTRICTIVE GUN ACT THAT ATTACKS THE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT.THE U.S. SUPREME COURT MAJORITY CAUTIONED, IN HELLER, AGAINST USE OF ANY TRADITIONAL STANDARD OF REVIEW TO TEST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW THAT IMPACTS THE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT.The Arbalest Quarrel continues with its comprehensive, in depth analysis of Kolbe in light of the seminal U.S. Supreme Court Heller case.Realizing the futility of articulating any standard of review for testing the constitutionality of government action that attacks the very core--the very essence--of a fundamental right, the Heller majority realized the need to dispense with all traditional standards of review and all hybrid versions of conventional standards of review in those instances where governmental action—in the Heller case, a total ban on firearms that the public traditionally and commonly uses for self-defense, namely firearms categorized as handguns, be those handguns semiautomatic pistols or single or double action revolvers—attacks the very essence, or core of the right. Justice Breyer, himself, who wrote a dissenting opinion in Heller, realized the conundrum posed in the application of traditional standards of review for testing the constitutionality of government action that is directed to the core of a fundamental right.The dissenting Justice, Stephen Breyer, did realize, perceptively, that application of even a stringent standard, strict scrutiny—no less than application of the most relaxed standard of review, rational basis—would not be a fair standard for a Court to employ to test the lawfulness of a governmental action that is directed to the core of a fundamental right because Courts could still come to the wrong conclusion and effectively destroy a fundamental right. Breyer therefore thought that his novel interest-balancing inquiry would overcome problems associated with conventional standards of review. In support of use of his novel interest-balancing inquiry to test the constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s absolute prohibition on possession of handguns in the District, Justice Breyer said this (and we quote Justice Breyer, at length):“In weighing needs and burdens [utilizing my interest-balancing standard to test the constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s absolute prohibition on possession of handguns in the District] we must take account of the possibility that there are reasonable, but less restrictive, alternatives. Are there other potential measures that might similarly promote the same goals while imposing lesser restrictions [Citation Omitted]? Here I see none. The reason there is no clearly superior, less restrictive alternative to the District’s handgun ban is that the ban’s very objective is to reduce significantly the number of handguns in the District, say, for example, by allowing a law enforcement officer immediately to assume that any handgun he sees is an illegal handgun. And there is no plausible way to achieve that objective other than to ban the guns. It does not help respondent’s [D.C. Government’s] case to describe the District’s objective more generally as an “effort to diminish the dangers associated with guns.” That is because the very attributes that make handguns particularly useful for self-defense are also what make them particularly dangerous. That they are easy to hold and control means that they are easier for children to use [Citation omitted]. That they are maneuverable and permit a free hand likely contributes to the fact that they are by far the firearm of choice for crimes such as rape and robbery [Citations omitted]. This symmetry suggests that any measure less restrictive in respect to the use of handguns for self-defense will, to that same extent, prove less effective in preventing the use of handguns for illicit purposes. If a resident has a handgun in the home that he can use for self-defense, then he has a handgun in the home that he can use to commit suicide or engage in acts of domestic violence [Citations omitted]. If it is indeed the case, as the District believes, that the number of guns contributes to the number of gun-related crimes, accidents, and deaths, then, although there may be less restrictive, less effective substitutes for an outright ban, there is no less restrictive equivalent of an outright ban.”Justice Breyer concludes that no less restrictive means exists to promote the goal of promoting public safety than the District of Columbia’s total ban on handguns promotes and that, under the strict scrutiny standard, a total ban on handguns would therefore pass judicial scrutiny and therefore be found constitutional even though the Second Amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms is clearly burdened. As he says:“The upshot is that the District’s objectives are compelling; its predictive judgments as to its law’s tendency to achieve those objectives are adequately supported; the law does impose a burden upon any self-defense interest that the Amendment seeks to secure; and there is no clear less restrictive alternative. I turn now to the final portion of the ‘permissible regulation’ question: Does the District's law disproportionately burden Amendment-protected interests? Several considerations, taken together, convince me that it does not.”So, is that the end of the inquiry? Does Justice Breyer assert that the D.C. handgun ban is constitutional even though a total ban on possession of handguns clearly burdens, and in a substantial way, the American citizen’s exercise of his or her fundamental right? No. Justice Breyer says that application of his standard is superior to that of application of even a stringent standard like strict scrutiny, for there is a second part to Justice Breyer’s test, even though he has already inferred that the burden on those who seek to exercise their Second Amendment right is substantial." Justice Breyer goes on to say (and once again we quote Justice Breyer at length):“First, the District law is tailored to the life-threatening problems it attempts to address. The law concerns one class of weapons, handguns, leaving residents free to possess shotguns and rifles, along with ammunition. The area that falls within its scope is totally urban [Citation omitted]. That urban area suffers from a serious handgun-fatality problem. The District's law directly aims at that compelling problem. And there is no less restrictive way to achieve the problem-related benefits that it seeks.”“Second, the self-defense interest in maintaining loaded handguns in the home to shoot intruders is not the primary interest, but at most a subsidiary interest, that the Second Amendment seeks to serve. The Second Amendment’s language, while speaking of a ‘Militia,’ says nothing of ‘self-defense.’ As Justice Stevens points out, the Second Amendment;s drafting history shows that the language reflects the Framers' primary, if not exclusive, objective [Citation omitted]. And the majority itself says that ‘the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens' militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right . . . was codified in a written Constitution’ [Citation omitted]. The way in which the Amendment's operative clause seeks to promote that interest--by protecting a right ‘to keep and bear Arms’ may in fact help further an interest in self-defense. But a factual connection falls far short of a primary objective. The Amendment itself tells us that militia preservation was first and foremost in the Framers’ minds. See Miller, 307 U.S., at 178, 59 S. Ct. 816, 83 L. Ed. 1206 (‘With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made,’ and the Amendment ‘must be interpreted and applied with that end in view’).”“Further, any self-defense interest at the time of the framing could not have focused exclusively upon urban-crime-related dangers. Two hundred years ago, most Americans, many living on the frontier, would likely have thought of self-defense primarily in terms of outbreaks of fighting with Indian tribes, rebellions such as Shays' Rebellion, marauders, and crime-related dangers to travelers on the roads, on footpaths, or along waterways [Citation omitted]. Insofar as the Framers focused at all on the tiny fraction of the population living in large cities, they would have been aware that these city dwellers were subject to firearm restrictions that their rural counterparts were not [Citation omitted]. They were likely then to have thought of a right to keep loaded handguns in homes to confront intruders in urban settings as central. And the subsequent development of modern urban police departments, by diminishing the need to keep loaded guns nearby in case of intruders, would have moved any such right even further away from the heart of the Amendment's more basic protective ends [Citation omitted].”“Nor, for that matter, am I aware of any evidence that handguns in particular were central to the Framers’ conception of the Second Amendment. The lists of militia-related weapons in the late-18th-century state statutes appear primarily to refer to other sorts of weapons, muskets in particular.”Justice Breyer continues with his polemic, adding: “Regardless, why would the [Heller] majority require a precise colonial regulatory analogue in order to save a modern gun regulation from constitutional challenge?” The answer to Justice Breyer's question should be obvious to anyone who recognizes the importance of the Second Amendment--as much now, in the present, as then, in the past. The Heller majority felt compelled to respond to antigun critics, including, most notably, those who, like Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens, curiously enough, have, in extrajudicial commentary and publications, made clear their desire to interpose foreign laws foreign jurisprudential values--alien to our unique history, our unique laws, and our unique Constitution--into their own methodological approach to U.S. Supreme Court case analysis and decision-making. Since the laws of Countries such as Great Britain and Australia, for example, have nothing even remotely analogous to our Second Amendment, one should reasonably conclude that anything set forth in the laws and jurisprudence of those Nations would be legally irrelevant to and certainly impossible to reconcile with our own system of laws and jurisprudence should anyone wish to insinuate such laws and jurisprudence into our case law anyway.Justice Breyer concludes his polemic, by asserting essentially the argument we hear ad nauseum from antigun groups. It is this: Americans should leave to “democratically elected officials” of government the power to impose government's will on the rest of us because government knows what’s best for all of us, even unto the veritable destruction of our fundamental rights and liberties. Justice Breyer asserts,“‘As important, the majority’s decision threatens severely to limit the ability of more knowledgeable, democratically elected officials to deal with gun-related problems. The majority says that it leaves the District ‘a variety of tools for combating’ such problems [Citation omitted]. It fails to list even one seemingly adequate replacement for the law it strikes down. I can understand how reasonable individuals can disagree about the merits of strict gun control as a crime-control measure, even in a totally urbanized area. But I cannot understand how one can take from the elected branches of government the right to decide whether to insist upon a handgun-free urban populace in a city now facing a serious crime problem and which, in the future, could well face environmental or other emergencies that threaten the breakdown of law and order.”So it is that Justice Breyer would apply his novel “interest-balancing” inquiry to test the lawfulness, the very constitutionality, of Maryland's Firearm Safety Act, fully believing in and having complete faith in the usefulness of his novel standard for application to governmental actions that attack the core of the Second Amendment. Having, then, utilized his interest-balancing inquiry standard, he seems oblivious to the fact that, even with his preferred new test, no less than with any of the other conventional standards, he, along with anyone else who might be tempted to use his novel approach, would not be prevented from automatically ordaining the result wanted--which means that, notwithstanding Justice Breyer's conviction that his novel test would preclude a foreordained conclusion, a Court that finds the Second Amendment repugnant will still come to the conclusion desired: a finding that governmental action that effectively bans the lawful possession of an entire category of firearms and that negatively impacts the core of the Second Amendment is lawful when, in fact, it isn’t. Indeed, one finds that Justice Breyer was not immune to the fatal flaw that can and often is the bane of all otherwise brilliant Jurists. We find that the fatal flaw that exists is found to reside less in a presumed fault with any conventional or fanciful approach used by a Jurist to test the constitutionality of a governmental action than in the depth of the Jurist's very being. That is to say, the fault, we see, rests, first and foremost, in the Jurist's heart, not in the Jurist's analytical and intellectual acumen. The late Justice Scalia recognized this, which is why he felt it necessary to discard any Judge-made test that might be applied to governmental actions that target the core of a fundamental right. Sadly, Justice Breyer did not see this, even when Justice Scalia pointed out the fatal flaw, which he, tactfully ascribed to Justice Breyer's interest-balancing inquiry, rather than to Justice Breyer, himself.

INTEREST-BALANCING INQUIRY ANALYSIS SHOULD NEVER BE USED TO TEST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION THAT ATTACKS THE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS.

What more do we find problematic in Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion? Justice Breyer quibbles when he suggests that the Framers of the Constitution had considered muskets--Americans' early long guns, rather than handguns--as the sorts of weapons that fall under the purview of Second Amendment protection. But, there is really nothing concrete to suggest that the Framers of the Constitution had sought to specify those particular weapons that fall within the core of the Second Amendment protection and those that do not. Had the Framers had any idea that, in the future, there would exist individuals and groups whose repugnance of firearms was so strong and whose efforts to abolish the right to keep and bear arms so emphatic--who would go to such great lengths to abolish that right, working methodically and inexorably to ban first one category of weapons and then another until the entirety of weapons in civilian hands would effectively be banned by Statute, irrespective of the language of the Constitution--then, we suspect, the Framers' codification of the natural and fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms in the Constitution would have been set forth with perspicuity. That the Framers thought the right codified in the Second Amendment so clear and obvious, and the need for it so transparent, they obviously didn't feel further explication in the language of the Amendment necessary.Since Heller had set forth in case law what had previously been set forth in most of the academic articles on the subject—the fact that the right of the people to keep and bear arms is an individual right, not merely a collective right, relegated to one's service in a militia—antigun groups are now forced to attack the fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms, one category of weaponry at a time. That is a slow, tedious process for them and one that antigun groups were, it seems, loathe to contend with but realize now they must contend with. So they are now, once again, since the early 1990's, seeking to ban individual categories of weapons—one category at a time, until all firearms are banned. Exemptions would exist for certain groups such as police and the military. But, those exemptions would be stated with specificity and very narrowly drawn.Antigun groups have found that the appellation, 'assault weapon' is a useful category because they can place a substantially large number of firearms in that makeshift category. The goal of antigun groups is to ban all semiautomatic weapons. So, if they are successful through use of the nomenclature, 'assault weapon,' as a prohibited category of weapons in State Statute, we will see more and more semiautomatic weapons placed in that category until all semiautomatic weapons are banned.The loss of an antigun proponent, Judge Merrick Garland does not sit well with antigun proponents. Judge Garland might have sat on the high Court had the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee capitulated to cajoling from Congressional Democrats and cajoling from the mainstream media. Judge Garland would now sit on the high Court, and Heller might, eventually, be overturned outright. And, had Hillary Clinton, a virulent attack dog, been elected U.S. President, we would see much of the Second Amendment dismantled by Executive fiat. Fortunately, neither one of these two worst cases scenarios came to pass. That doesn't mean that antigun groups and antigun State Legislatures, and antigun members of the U.S. Congress, are not actively working, even as these words are being written, to weaken the Second Amendment. Those Americans who cherish their Bill of Rights and, especially, the sacred Second Amendment, must remain ever vigilant.In reading Heller, one must keep uppermost in mind that Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, not a concurring opinion, where, utilizing his novel interest-balancing inquiry test, he found the District of Columbia’s ban on possession of handguns not to be unconstitutional even though the D.C. handgun ban infringed the very core of, the very essence of the Second Amendment. Yet, for all of his seemingly carefully executed, assiduous remarks, Justice Breyer ultimately “makes” Justice Scalia’s case for the futility of applying any standard of review to what is clearly a facially unconstitutional act. Justice Breyer ultimately presents, quite eloquently, actually, how a seemingly meticulously crafted argument can have absolutely devastating consequences for Americans if Justice Breyer were writing for the Majority in Heller, rather than for the Dissent. The "Pen" can destroy the Bill of Rights even more effectively than a force of arms.As Justice Scalia made eminently clear, albeit tacitly, application of a standard of a conventional standard of review or application of Breyer’s novel interest-balancing inquiry to governmental action that attacks the core of the Second Amendment would still not prevent a Court that is philosophically opposed to the natural, right codified in the Second Amendment from drawing the wrong conclusion--a conclusion a Court wants: namely that an attack on the core of the Second Amendment will nonetheless pass judicial scrutiny, when such governmental action should not--when such governmental action should be struck down, and struck down hard.Indeed, the interest-balancing inquiry test that Justice Breyer devised and used in Heller demonstrates the futility of employing a makeshift standard, any more than any of the conventional standards, because, once having applied his test, Justice Breyer finds--no less than would he find through application of rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny--the result he wants, the result he knew he would obtain: namely that a clearly unconstitutional law—the District of Columbia’s total ban on possession of handguns—is lawful.Consider: if utilization of any test, rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, or Justice Breyer's interest-balancing inquiry test cannot reasonably guarantee a sound conclusion, then perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court should consider dispensing with--scrapping--all of them, certainly where it is clear that governmental action is targeting the very core, the very essence of a fundamental right. A Court should not bother to go through, should not have to go through, numerous intricate, tortuous gyrations, pretending or fooling itself that it is possible to salvage a government action that is designed, on its face, to destroy a fundamental right, codified in the Bill of Rights. For, a government--be it federal, State, or local--can, under no circumstance or set of circumstances, constitutionally, rationally, legitimately, justify burdening the core, the very essence of our Constitutional rights and liberties.How, then, ought a Court of competent jurisdiction proceed? A Court should simply ascertain, first, whether a governmental action is attacking the core of a sacred right. If so, then, that should end the matter. No further analysis is needed. The governmental action should indeed be struck down; must be struck down. There is no need to beat around the bush on this. The Heller Majority Opinion, penned by Justice Scalia, made that point abundantly clear.

PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH OUR ANALYSIS:

Commencing with the U.S. District Court of Maryland opinion, having, as the lower Court, the first look at the case presented to it by Plaintiff, Kolbe, and others, the District Court failed to heed Heller, falling into the same trap that Justice Breyer fell into.The District Court of Maryland could not, though, employ Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing inquiry standard—much as it would have liked to—as that test was one devised by the Dissenting Opinion Justice, not the Majority, and, so, the case analysis presented by the Dissenting Justice in Heller, does not have precedential value.What, then, did the District Court of Maryland do? The District Court of Maryland employed as a standard of review, a fallback—in this case, intermediate scrutiny--and the Court did so on the mistaken belief that the Heller Court Majority’s failure to clearly articulate a test--the failure of the Heller Court's Majority to set forth, convincingly, at least to the satisfaction of the lower District Court of Maryland--a test or standard of review through which a Court might definitively determine, definitively ascertain, the constitutionality of a government action, meant that a lower Court is free to utilize any standard of review it wants, consistent—so it is—with prior rulings, in this instance, Fourth Circuit Court rulings, rulings, then, that precede Heller. The District Court of Maryland then fooled itself into believing it could apply its test reasonably, rationally, judicially, to reach the correct conclusion. But the Court could not do so and did not do so. The District Court reached a wrong conclusion: finding Maryland’s “Firearm Safety Act” to be lawful, constitutional, notwithstanding that implementation of it burdens the exercise of the fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms, and that the government action does so in an extensive, intensive, and inordinately intrusive manner.In asserting the deficiencies inherent in interest-balancing, for ascertaining the moral good of actions, the great German Philosopher, Immanuel Kant, said this: “Woe unto him who searches in the winding paths of the theory of interest-balancing for some technique to uphold the debasing of human dignity.” “The Metaphysics of Morals 141 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991),” as cited in “Essay: In God’s Image: The Religious Imperative Of Equality Under Law,”  99 Colum. L. Rev. 1608, 1624 (October 1999). We continue with our in-depth analysis of the dangerous and horrible Kolbe decision in Part Six of this ongoing series of articles.________________________Copyright © 2017 Roger J Katz (Towne Criour), Stephen L. D’Andrilli (Publius) All Rights Reserved.      

VOISINE: A SECOND AMENDMENT CASE THAT ISN'T?

JUSTICE THOMAS SPEAKS OUT IN THE VOISINE CASE

UNITED STATES VERSUS VOISINE

PART 1: PRELIMINARY REMARKS

This is the first of a multi-part series article on the most important Second Amendment case to come before the U.S. Supreme Court since the two seminal Second Amendment cases: District of Columbia vs. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008) and McDonald vs. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 320, 177 L. Ed.2d 894, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5523 (2010).  Two points must be made apropos of this remark before we undertake a comprehensive analysis of the Voisine case, at this juncture, up through the legal argument that goes to the matter whether the present case is properly considered a Second Amendment case at all; and the other point goes to the matter concerning the extent to which lower courts, throughout the Country, whether State or Federal, and the extent to which State Legislatures throughout the Country adhere to the holdings and to the reasoning of the majority opinions in the two cases. The late Justice Antonin Scalia penned the majority oAnyone who keeps abreast of the U. S. Supreme Court knows that Justice Clarence Thomas broke a ten-year silence when he posed questions to counsel during oral argument on February 29, 2016 in the case United States vs. Voisine, No. 14-10154 (S. Ct. Dec. 17, 2015). The other seven Justices retained an austere demeanor. But they must surely have been surprised at Justice Thomas’ uncharacteristic lack of reticence. The Press, for its part, was noticeably, and understandably, thunderstruck.One may speculate why Justice Thomas chose to take part in the questioning of counsel in this case, at this time. Not improbably, Justice Thomas did so, in part, out of deep respect for the memory of Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia would have had much to say in Voisine as the case touches on two landmark Second Amendment cases: District of Columbia vs. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald vs. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). “Heller holds that a law banning the possession of handguns in the home (or making their use in the home infeasible) violates the individual right to keep and bear arms secured by the Second Amendment.”In the subsequent McDonald case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, “the Second Amendment creates individual rights that can be asserted against state and local governments.” Together, the two cases strengthen the Second Amendment more so than any previous holding of the high Court. The two cases constrain local, State and federal governments from whittling away at Americans’ fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms in their individual capacity.Justice Scalia wrote the Majority Opinion in Heller, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the Opinion for the Majority in McDonald, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy. Not surprisingly, the liberal wing of the Court, comprising Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer dissented, and they did so strenuously.Now, contrary to common belief, the U.S. Supreme Court, does not have to accept and, indeed, does not accept every case that happens to come before it. No one can appeal an adverse decision to the U.S. Supreme Court as a matter of right. Indeed, the Supreme Court grants A Petitioner’s writ of certiorari in only a few cases in any given term. And, in the Court’s information sheet, presented to those who seek to have their case heard, the Court says clearly, even bluntly, that “review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion.”Generally, the high Court will agree to hear a case where there is disagreement and conflict among the various federal Circuit Courts of Appeal. This often takes years to develop. Even so, many cases that the high Court does agree to hear often involve arcane legal issues, very narrow in scope, that are difficult for the non-lawyer to grasp, and, so, quite understandably, difficult for anyone but a lawyer to appreciate. The Voisine case may, at first glance, appear to be just such a case. It isn’t.To be sure there is a complex, arcane issue here, but there is also a straight-forward Second Amendment issue as well. The Second Amendment issue would have been given no consideration at all but for Justice Thomas’ interjection. Be thankful that Justice Thomas spoke up during oral argument. This is not theatrics as presented by the mainstream media. Justice Thomas' questions and remarks were precise, well-honed, to the point and surely took the U.S. Government off guard.In the Opinion to be handed down in another month or so it is unlikely that the Court will not give the Second Amendment issue at least some consideration and will do so precisely because of, one, Justice Thomas’ questions to counsel for Respondent, U.S. Government, two, counsel's responses to the Court, and, three, Justice Thomas' comments. If no other Justice mentions the Second Amendment in the Majority's Opinion, or in a concurring or dissenting Opinion, Justice Thomas most certainly will.Now, a salient issue in Voisine does involve the meaning to be given a word phrase in one particular section of a lengthy federal Statute. Nonetheless, as we heretofore explained, the Voisine case is the first Supreme Court case to be heard by the high Court that does impact the Second Amendment. In fact, Petitioners did timely and properly raise a Second Amendment claim in their Briefs to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. And that claim was preserved; and that issue was ripe for review by the U.S. Supreme Court when it granted Petitioners’ Writ of Certiorari. Moreover, while the Second Amendment issue was set forth with particularity as a salient issue in Petitioners’ Brief, the Second Amendment claim was not set forth as an issue in the Government’s own Brief in Opposition to the Brief of Petitioners. And the Government, in its Brief in Opposition to the Brief of Petitioners, addressed Petitioners’ Second Amendment claim only perfunctorily, giving little thought to it, seemingly in deference to and happily therefor to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's treatment of it, for the First Circuit dismissed Petitioners' Second Amendment claim outright.In fact during oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Second Amendment was only mentioned twice and that occurred toward the end of oral argument when Justice Thomas brought the issue up. Justice Thomas did so, in part, as we said earlier, because Justice Scalia certainly would have done so had he lived. And, Justice Scalia would have done so for a very good reason, quite apart from and notwithstanding the otherwise cursory treatment of the Second Amendment issue by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Court. For Voisine is the first case to come before the Supreme Court that implicates the Second Amendment, however obliquely or tangentially, or seemingly cursorily since the high Court decided the Heller case in 2008 and, subsequently, Heller's important progeny, the McDonald case in 2010, over one-half decade ago.Although the other Justices took great pains to avoid entertaining the Second Amendment issue in Voisine – preferring to address, alone, the meaning attached to a few words in one federal Statute – Justice Thomas would not let the matter rest, much to the satisfaction of Petitioners, who clearly sought to have their Second Amendment issue heard, and much to the chagrin of Respondent, the United States Government, that sought to keep the Second Amendment issue moot.Moreover, by querying Government’s counsel on Petitioners’ Second Amendment claim, Justice Thomas may have been initiating a not so subtle payback to other Justices for a snubbing that both he and Justice Scalia suffered at the hands of those other Justices. For, both Justices Scalia and Thomas were more than a trifle perturbed that the majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Friedman vs. City of Highland Park, Illinois, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015). The Seventh Circuit in Friedman clearly manifested its contempt for the high Court’s holdings in Heller and McDonald. Justices Scalia and Thomas clearly wanted, and had expected, the high Court to grant certiorari in Friedman and, by failing to do so, Justices Scalia and Thomas expressed their righteous indignation by drafting a dissenting opinion in Friedman -- an unusual occurrence.Very rarely do Justices explain their reason for refusing to grant a writ of certiorari in a case. Even more rarely will one find a dissenting opinion written by a Justice, expressing disfavor in the failure of the majority of Justices to grant the writ in a case.Surely, had the Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s writ of certiorari in Friedman, Justices Scalia and Thomas would have taken the Seventh Circuit to task for patently ignoring the Heller and McDonald holdings. The Arbalest Quarrel discusses the Friedman case at length in the article, titled, “A Court Of Law That Rejects U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Undermines The Rule Of Law And Undercuts The U.S. Constitution,” posted on December 14, 2015.  For our discussion of Friedman and its importance to the Heller and McDonald cases, readers are encouraged to read our article.In spirit Justice Scalia was certainly in attendance during oral argument in Voisine. Since the Supreme Court would not entertain the Friedman case which was a direct and audacious attack by a United States Circuit Court of Appeals on the clear and cogent holdings in Heller and McDonald, Justice Thomas, on behalf of Justice Scalia, clearly intended to raise and, so, did raise Petitioner’s Second Amendment issue in Voisine – a case that the U.S. Supreme Court did decide to entertain.From the get-go it had been clear that no other Justice would weigh in on the Second Amendment implications of Voisine, and take the Government to task. Justice Thomas made certain that Justice Scalia’s disdain for a federal Government that cares not one whit for the sanctity of the Second Amendment would dare not go unchallenged.Americans who understand and can appreciate the importance of our Bill of Rights as the foundation of a free Republic and who can, in particular, understand and appreciate the importance of the Second Amendment as a critical check on the accumulation of power by the Federal Government, and by improvident State governments as well, will do well to ponder the Nation's incredible loss. Justice Scalia, together with Justice Thomas, made adamantly clear that the right of the people to keep and bear arms is an individual right unconnected to a person’s participation in a militia. The Heller decision rankles several Justices on the Supreme Court and many Globalists, both in this Country and outside it, as well, who are working quietly but incessantly and inexorably in the shadows, intent on undercutting America’s Bill of Rights, generally, and undermining America’s Second Amendment, particularly.We know, without doubt, that President Obama – or her royal Majesty, Queen Hillary Rodham Clinton – seek to nominate to the highest Court of the Land, a person who would chomp at the bit to reverse Heller and McDonald on the ground that, for them, the cases are discordant. They are discordant to these judges and to powerful, ruthless individuals because they happen to strengthen rather than weaken America’s Bill of Rights.In Part 2 of this Article, we will deal in depth, with the legal issues in Voisine and you will come to understand, one, why the high Court, apart from Justice Thomas, does not wish to deal with the impact that a negative decision in Voisine would have on the Second Amendment and, two, how it is that a specific question posed by Justice Thomas to counsel for the U.S. Government elicited from counsel a most remarkable, illuminating, and, in fact, frightening comment. You will come to see why a negative holding in Voisine does have negative implications for our Second Amendment.So it is that the mainstream media would much rather keep the dire implications of Voisine in the shadows. We, on the other hand, intend to bring the implications out, for all to see, into the light of day. In so doing, we trust we will help keep the memory of Justice Scalia alive, and in keeping Justice Scalia’s memory alive, preserve, as well, the holdings in Heller and McDonald that bespeak Justice Scalia’s devotion to the import of the Second Amendment. Ever mindful, then, are we of those who are hell-bent in destroying it.[separator type="medium" style="normal" align="left"margin-bottom="25" margin_top="5"] Copyright © 2015 Roger J Katz (Towne Criour), Stephen L. D’Andrilli (Publius) All Rights Reserved.