MARYLAND’S FIREARM SAFETY ACT: ATTACKING THE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT THROUGH THE VENEER OF PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY.

MARYLAND’S FIREARM SAFETY ACT: ATTACKING THE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT THROUGH THE VENEER OF PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY.

A Court Of Review Is Blind To Inappropriate, And Unlawful Government Action When A Court Of Review Is Philosophically Predisposed To Inhibit The Right Of The People To Keep And Bear Arms.

KOLBE VS. HOGAN:

PART FIVE

HAD THE DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND REVIEWED MARYLAND’S FIREARM SAFETY ACT AS THE HELLER COURT REQUIRED, THE DISTRICT COURT WOULD HAVE SEEN THROUGH THE CHARADE OF THAT RESTRICTIVE GUN ACT THAT ATTACKS THE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT.THE U.S. SUPREME COURT MAJORITY CAUTIONED, IN HELLER, AGAINST USE OF ANY TRADITIONAL STANDARD OF REVIEW TO TEST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW THAT IMPACTS THE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT.The Arbalest Quarrel continues with its comprehensive, in depth analysis of Kolbe in light of the seminal U.S. Supreme Court Heller case.Realizing the futility of articulating any standard of review for testing the constitutionality of government action that attacks the very core--the very essence--of a fundamental right, the Heller majority realized the need to dispense with all traditional standards of review and all hybrid versions of conventional standards of review in those instances where governmental action—in the Heller case, a total ban on firearms that the public traditionally and commonly uses for self-defense, namely firearms categorized as handguns, be those handguns semiautomatic pistols or single or double action revolvers—attacks the very essence, or core of the right. Justice Breyer, himself, who wrote a dissenting opinion in Heller, realized the conundrum posed in the application of traditional standards of review for testing the constitutionality of government action that is directed to the core of a fundamental right.The dissenting Justice, Stephen Breyer, did realize, perceptively, that application of even a stringent standard, strict scrutiny—no less than application of the most relaxed standard of review, rational basis—would not be a fair standard for a Court to employ to test the lawfulness of a governmental action that is directed to the core of a fundamental right because Courts could still come to the wrong conclusion and effectively destroy a fundamental right. Breyer therefore thought that his novel interest-balancing inquiry would overcome problems associated with conventional standards of review. In support of use of his novel interest-balancing inquiry to test the constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s absolute prohibition on possession of handguns in the District, Justice Breyer said this (and we quote Justice Breyer, at length):“In weighing needs and burdens [utilizing my interest-balancing standard to test the constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s absolute prohibition on possession of handguns in the District] we must take account of the possibility that there are reasonable, but less restrictive, alternatives. Are there other potential measures that might similarly promote the same goals while imposing lesser restrictions [Citation Omitted]? Here I see none. The reason there is no clearly superior, less restrictive alternative to the District’s handgun ban is that the ban’s very objective is to reduce significantly the number of handguns in the District, say, for example, by allowing a law enforcement officer immediately to assume that any handgun he sees is an illegal handgun. And there is no plausible way to achieve that objective other than to ban the guns. It does not help respondent’s [D.C. Government’s] case to describe the District’s objective more generally as an “effort to diminish the dangers associated with guns.” That is because the very attributes that make handguns particularly useful for self-defense are also what make them particularly dangerous. That they are easy to hold and control means that they are easier for children to use [Citation omitted]. That they are maneuverable and permit a free hand likely contributes to the fact that they are by far the firearm of choice for crimes such as rape and robbery [Citations omitted]. This symmetry suggests that any measure less restrictive in respect to the use of handguns for self-defense will, to that same extent, prove less effective in preventing the use of handguns for illicit purposes. If a resident has a handgun in the home that he can use for self-defense, then he has a handgun in the home that he can use to commit suicide or engage in acts of domestic violence [Citations omitted]. If it is indeed the case, as the District believes, that the number of guns contributes to the number of gun-related crimes, accidents, and deaths, then, although there may be less restrictive, less effective substitutes for an outright ban, there is no less restrictive equivalent of an outright ban.”Justice Breyer concludes that no less restrictive means exists to promote the goal of promoting public safety than the District of Columbia’s total ban on handguns promotes and that, under the strict scrutiny standard, a total ban on handguns would therefore pass judicial scrutiny and therefore be found constitutional even though the Second Amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms is clearly burdened. As he says:“The upshot is that the District’s objectives are compelling; its predictive judgments as to its law’s tendency to achieve those objectives are adequately supported; the law does impose a burden upon any self-defense interest that the Amendment seeks to secure; and there is no clear less restrictive alternative. I turn now to the final portion of the ‘permissible regulation’ question: Does the District's law disproportionately burden Amendment-protected interests? Several considerations, taken together, convince me that it does not.”So, is that the end of the inquiry? Does Justice Breyer assert that the D.C. handgun ban is constitutional even though a total ban on possession of handguns clearly burdens, and in a substantial way, the American citizen’s exercise of his or her fundamental right? No. Justice Breyer says that application of his standard is superior to that of application of even a stringent standard like strict scrutiny, for there is a second part to Justice Breyer’s test, even though he has already inferred that the burden on those who seek to exercise their Second Amendment right is substantial." Justice Breyer goes on to say (and once again we quote Justice Breyer at length):“First, the District law is tailored to the life-threatening problems it attempts to address. The law concerns one class of weapons, handguns, leaving residents free to possess shotguns and rifles, along with ammunition. The area that falls within its scope is totally urban [Citation omitted]. That urban area suffers from a serious handgun-fatality problem. The District's law directly aims at that compelling problem. And there is no less restrictive way to achieve the problem-related benefits that it seeks.”“Second, the self-defense interest in maintaining loaded handguns in the home to shoot intruders is not the primary interest, but at most a subsidiary interest, that the Second Amendment seeks to serve. The Second Amendment’s language, while speaking of a ‘Militia,’ says nothing of ‘self-defense.’ As Justice Stevens points out, the Second Amendment;s drafting history shows that the language reflects the Framers' primary, if not exclusive, objective [Citation omitted]. And the majority itself says that ‘the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens' militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right . . . was codified in a written Constitution’ [Citation omitted]. The way in which the Amendment's operative clause seeks to promote that interest--by protecting a right ‘to keep and bear Arms’ may in fact help further an interest in self-defense. But a factual connection falls far short of a primary objective. The Amendment itself tells us that militia preservation was first and foremost in the Framers’ minds. See Miller, 307 U.S., at 178, 59 S. Ct. 816, 83 L. Ed. 1206 (‘With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made,’ and the Amendment ‘must be interpreted and applied with that end in view’).”“Further, any self-defense interest at the time of the framing could not have focused exclusively upon urban-crime-related dangers. Two hundred years ago, most Americans, many living on the frontier, would likely have thought of self-defense primarily in terms of outbreaks of fighting with Indian tribes, rebellions such as Shays' Rebellion, marauders, and crime-related dangers to travelers on the roads, on footpaths, or along waterways [Citation omitted]. Insofar as the Framers focused at all on the tiny fraction of the population living in large cities, they would have been aware that these city dwellers were subject to firearm restrictions that their rural counterparts were not [Citation omitted]. They were likely then to have thought of a right to keep loaded handguns in homes to confront intruders in urban settings as central. And the subsequent development of modern urban police departments, by diminishing the need to keep loaded guns nearby in case of intruders, would have moved any such right even further away from the heart of the Amendment's more basic protective ends [Citation omitted].”“Nor, for that matter, am I aware of any evidence that handguns in particular were central to the Framers’ conception of the Second Amendment. The lists of militia-related weapons in the late-18th-century state statutes appear primarily to refer to other sorts of weapons, muskets in particular.”Justice Breyer continues with his polemic, adding: “Regardless, why would the [Heller] majority require a precise colonial regulatory analogue in order to save a modern gun regulation from constitutional challenge?” The answer to Justice Breyer's question should be obvious to anyone who recognizes the importance of the Second Amendment--as much now, in the present, as then, in the past. The Heller majority felt compelled to respond to antigun critics, including, most notably, those who, like Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens, curiously enough, have, in extrajudicial commentary and publications, made clear their desire to interpose foreign laws foreign jurisprudential values--alien to our unique history, our unique laws, and our unique Constitution--into their own methodological approach to U.S. Supreme Court case analysis and decision-making. Since the laws of Countries such as Great Britain and Australia, for example, have nothing even remotely analogous to our Second Amendment, one should reasonably conclude that anything set forth in the laws and jurisprudence of those Nations would be legally irrelevant to and certainly impossible to reconcile with our own system of laws and jurisprudence should anyone wish to insinuate such laws and jurisprudence into our case law anyway.Justice Breyer concludes his polemic, by asserting essentially the argument we hear ad nauseum from antigun groups. It is this: Americans should leave to “democratically elected officials” of government the power to impose government's will on the rest of us because government knows what’s best for all of us, even unto the veritable destruction of our fundamental rights and liberties. Justice Breyer asserts,“‘As important, the majority’s decision threatens severely to limit the ability of more knowledgeable, democratically elected officials to deal with gun-related problems. The majority says that it leaves the District ‘a variety of tools for combating’ such problems [Citation omitted]. It fails to list even one seemingly adequate replacement for the law it strikes down. I can understand how reasonable individuals can disagree about the merits of strict gun control as a crime-control measure, even in a totally urbanized area. But I cannot understand how one can take from the elected branches of government the right to decide whether to insist upon a handgun-free urban populace in a city now facing a serious crime problem and which, in the future, could well face environmental or other emergencies that threaten the breakdown of law and order.”So it is that Justice Breyer would apply his novel “interest-balancing” inquiry to test the lawfulness, the very constitutionality, of Maryland's Firearm Safety Act, fully believing in and having complete faith in the usefulness of his novel standard for application to governmental actions that attack the core of the Second Amendment. Having, then, utilized his interest-balancing inquiry standard, he seems oblivious to the fact that, even with his preferred new test, no less than with any of the other conventional standards, he, along with anyone else who might be tempted to use his novel approach, would not be prevented from automatically ordaining the result wanted--which means that, notwithstanding Justice Breyer's conviction that his novel test would preclude a foreordained conclusion, a Court that finds the Second Amendment repugnant will still come to the conclusion desired: a finding that governmental action that effectively bans the lawful possession of an entire category of firearms and that negatively impacts the core of the Second Amendment is lawful when, in fact, it isn’t. Indeed, one finds that Justice Breyer was not immune to the fatal flaw that can and often is the bane of all otherwise brilliant Jurists. We find that the fatal flaw that exists is found to reside less in a presumed fault with any conventional or fanciful approach used by a Jurist to test the constitutionality of a governmental action than in the depth of the Jurist's very being. That is to say, the fault, we see, rests, first and foremost, in the Jurist's heart, not in the Jurist's analytical and intellectual acumen. The late Justice Scalia recognized this, which is why he felt it necessary to discard any Judge-made test that might be applied to governmental actions that target the core of a fundamental right. Sadly, Justice Breyer did not see this, even when Justice Scalia pointed out the fatal flaw, which he, tactfully ascribed to Justice Breyer's interest-balancing inquiry, rather than to Justice Breyer, himself.

INTEREST-BALANCING INQUIRY ANALYSIS SHOULD NEVER BE USED TO TEST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION THAT ATTACKS THE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS.

What more do we find problematic in Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion? Justice Breyer quibbles when he suggests that the Framers of the Constitution had considered muskets--Americans' early long guns, rather than handguns--as the sorts of weapons that fall under the purview of Second Amendment protection. But, there is really nothing concrete to suggest that the Framers of the Constitution had sought to specify those particular weapons that fall within the core of the Second Amendment protection and those that do not. Had the Framers had any idea that, in the future, there would exist individuals and groups whose repugnance of firearms was so strong and whose efforts to abolish the right to keep and bear arms so emphatic--who would go to such great lengths to abolish that right, working methodically and inexorably to ban first one category of weapons and then another until the entirety of weapons in civilian hands would effectively be banned by Statute, irrespective of the language of the Constitution--then, we suspect, the Framers' codification of the natural and fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms in the Constitution would have been set forth with perspicuity. That the Framers thought the right codified in the Second Amendment so clear and obvious, and the need for it so transparent, they obviously didn't feel further explication in the language of the Amendment necessary.Since Heller had set forth in case law what had previously been set forth in most of the academic articles on the subject—the fact that the right of the people to keep and bear arms is an individual right, not merely a collective right, relegated to one's service in a militia—antigun groups are now forced to attack the fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms, one category of weaponry at a time. That is a slow, tedious process for them and one that antigun groups were, it seems, loathe to contend with but realize now they must contend with. So they are now, once again, since the early 1990's, seeking to ban individual categories of weapons—one category at a time, until all firearms are banned. Exemptions would exist for certain groups such as police and the military. But, those exemptions would be stated with specificity and very narrowly drawn.Antigun groups have found that the appellation, 'assault weapon' is a useful category because they can place a substantially large number of firearms in that makeshift category. The goal of antigun groups is to ban all semiautomatic weapons. So, if they are successful through use of the nomenclature, 'assault weapon,' as a prohibited category of weapons in State Statute, we will see more and more semiautomatic weapons placed in that category until all semiautomatic weapons are banned.The loss of an antigun proponent, Judge Merrick Garland does not sit well with antigun proponents. Judge Garland might have sat on the high Court had the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee capitulated to cajoling from Congressional Democrats and cajoling from the mainstream media. Judge Garland would now sit on the high Court, and Heller might, eventually, be overturned outright. And, had Hillary Clinton, a virulent attack dog, been elected U.S. President, we would see much of the Second Amendment dismantled by Executive fiat. Fortunately, neither one of these two worst cases scenarios came to pass. That doesn't mean that antigun groups and antigun State Legislatures, and antigun members of the U.S. Congress, are not actively working, even as these words are being written, to weaken the Second Amendment. Those Americans who cherish their Bill of Rights and, especially, the sacred Second Amendment, must remain ever vigilant.In reading Heller, one must keep uppermost in mind that Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, not a concurring opinion, where, utilizing his novel interest-balancing inquiry test, he found the District of Columbia’s ban on possession of handguns not to be unconstitutional even though the D.C. handgun ban infringed the very core of, the very essence of the Second Amendment. Yet, for all of his seemingly carefully executed, assiduous remarks, Justice Breyer ultimately “makes” Justice Scalia’s case for the futility of applying any standard of review to what is clearly a facially unconstitutional act. Justice Breyer ultimately presents, quite eloquently, actually, how a seemingly meticulously crafted argument can have absolutely devastating consequences for Americans if Justice Breyer were writing for the Majority in Heller, rather than for the Dissent. The "Pen" can destroy the Bill of Rights even more effectively than a force of arms.As Justice Scalia made eminently clear, albeit tacitly, application of a standard of a conventional standard of review or application of Breyer’s novel interest-balancing inquiry to governmental action that attacks the core of the Second Amendment would still not prevent a Court that is philosophically opposed to the natural, right codified in the Second Amendment from drawing the wrong conclusion--a conclusion a Court wants: namely that an attack on the core of the Second Amendment will nonetheless pass judicial scrutiny, when such governmental action should not--when such governmental action should be struck down, and struck down hard.Indeed, the interest-balancing inquiry test that Justice Breyer devised and used in Heller demonstrates the futility of employing a makeshift standard, any more than any of the conventional standards, because, once having applied his test, Justice Breyer finds--no less than would he find through application of rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny--the result he wants, the result he knew he would obtain: namely that a clearly unconstitutional law—the District of Columbia’s total ban on possession of handguns—is lawful.Consider: if utilization of any test, rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, or Justice Breyer's interest-balancing inquiry test cannot reasonably guarantee a sound conclusion, then perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court should consider dispensing with--scrapping--all of them, certainly where it is clear that governmental action is targeting the very core, the very essence of a fundamental right. A Court should not bother to go through, should not have to go through, numerous intricate, tortuous gyrations, pretending or fooling itself that it is possible to salvage a government action that is designed, on its face, to destroy a fundamental right, codified in the Bill of Rights. For, a government--be it federal, State, or local--can, under no circumstance or set of circumstances, constitutionally, rationally, legitimately, justify burdening the core, the very essence of our Constitutional rights and liberties.How, then, ought a Court of competent jurisdiction proceed? A Court should simply ascertain, first, whether a governmental action is attacking the core of a sacred right. If so, then, that should end the matter. No further analysis is needed. The governmental action should indeed be struck down; must be struck down. There is no need to beat around the bush on this. The Heller Majority Opinion, penned by Justice Scalia, made that point abundantly clear.

PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH OUR ANALYSIS:

Commencing with the U.S. District Court of Maryland opinion, having, as the lower Court, the first look at the case presented to it by Plaintiff, Kolbe, and others, the District Court failed to heed Heller, falling into the same trap that Justice Breyer fell into.The District Court of Maryland could not, though, employ Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing inquiry standard—much as it would have liked to—as that test was one devised by the Dissenting Opinion Justice, not the Majority, and, so, the case analysis presented by the Dissenting Justice in Heller, does not have precedential value.What, then, did the District Court of Maryland do? The District Court of Maryland employed as a standard of review, a fallback—in this case, intermediate scrutiny--and the Court did so on the mistaken belief that the Heller Court Majority’s failure to clearly articulate a test--the failure of the Heller Court's Majority to set forth, convincingly, at least to the satisfaction of the lower District Court of Maryland--a test or standard of review through which a Court might definitively determine, definitively ascertain, the constitutionality of a government action, meant that a lower Court is free to utilize any standard of review it wants, consistent—so it is—with prior rulings, in this instance, Fourth Circuit Court rulings, rulings, then, that precede Heller. The District Court of Maryland then fooled itself into believing it could apply its test reasonably, rationally, judicially, to reach the correct conclusion. But the Court could not do so and did not do so. The District Court reached a wrong conclusion: finding Maryland’s “Firearm Safety Act” to be lawful, constitutional, notwithstanding that implementation of it burdens the exercise of the fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms, and that the government action does so in an extensive, intensive, and inordinately intrusive manner.In asserting the deficiencies inherent in interest-balancing, for ascertaining the moral good of actions, the great German Philosopher, Immanuel Kant, said this: “Woe unto him who searches in the winding paths of the theory of interest-balancing for some technique to uphold the debasing of human dignity.” “The Metaphysics of Morals 141 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991),” as cited in “Essay: In God’s Image: The Religious Imperative Of Equality Under Law,”  99 Colum. L. Rev. 1608, 1624 (October 1999). We continue with our in-depth analysis of the dangerous and horrible Kolbe decision in Part Six of this ongoing series of articles.________________________Copyright © 2017 Roger J Katz (Towne Criour), Stephen L. D’Andrilli (Publius) All Rights Reserved.      

KOLBE VS. HOGAN: WILL THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN A SECOND AMENDMENT CASE PLEASE STAND UP!

PART THREE

THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND EMPLOYED THE WRONG STANDARD OF REVIEW IN FINDING THAT MARYLAND’S DRACONIAN FIREARM SAFETY ACT IS LAWFUL.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in the case, District of Columbia vs. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), wrestled with the legal test to be applied when determining if a law, impacting the Second Amendment, would pass Constitutional muster. The U.S. Supreme Court has, through time, in its great body of case law, developed three salient standards of review, or tests, one of the three which a court of competent jurisdiction must apply when testing the constitutionality of government action. But which test a court must apply to test the constitutionality of a particular government action depends on the nature and importance of the right protected, the extent to which a government--local, State, or federal--infringes that right, and the class of persons impacted by that governmental action.Apart from the high Court's three seminal holdings on the Second Amendment, in Heller, the Heller case is notable for explicating problems associated with all of those standard tests previously employed—and with problems associated with a new one that the dissenting Justice, Stephen Breyer, would like to have applied—when government enacts a law directly impinging on and infringing the very core of the Second Amendment. The late Justice, Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Heller, discussed the problems of each  of these standard tests, concluding that none of the traditional tests, including the balancing of interests test proposed by Justice Breyer, are adequate to protect the core of the Second Amendment, when a government deliberately, unabashedly attacks the very core of it.Justice Scalia began by pointing out that the weakest standard of judicial scrutiny, “rational basis,” should never be used to test the constitutionality of legislation, that, on its face, is directed against the exercise of a fundamental right, especially when legislation negatively impacts the Second Amendment. “Rational basis” is an unacceptable standard to be used because, if it is used, a governmental entity--be that a local, State, or Federal governmental entity—need only demonstrate that the governmental legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Where the Second Amendment is impacted, this generally means that a governmental entity need only demonstrate that the governmental action is rationally related to a legitimate goal such as promoting public safety in order for that governmental entity to successfully defend against a challenge to the constitutionality of the governmental action.Rational basis, as a standard of review, to test the constitutionality of governmental action, where, as here, the Second Amendment is negatively impacted, is categorically inappropriate. Even the left-wing Justice, Stephen Breyer, agreed. As Justice Scalia stated, in Heller, “Justice Breyer correctly notes that this law [Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act] like almost all laws, would pass rational-basis scrutiny. [citation omitted]. But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. [citation omitted]. In those cases, ‘rational basis’ is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the constitutional guarantee.” Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms [citation omitted].” District of Columbia vs. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628, fn.27.Justice Scalia points out clearly, categorically the inappropriateness of rational basis in testing the constitutionality of legislation negatively impacting the Second Amendment. For a Court using that lax standard could easily find that laws that unconstitutionally impinge on and infringe fundamental rights would, nonetheless, pass judicial scrutiny every time unless the governmental action is determined, by a court of competent jurisdiction, to be arbitrary and capricious—a notoriously difficult burden for a challenger to overcome, and something which a Court very rarely finds in governmental actions.On Second Amendment matters, where public safety is always asserted as the, or certainly a, salient reason for restrictive gun legislation, it is highly unlikely that a Court of competent jurisdiction would ever find any restrictive gun legislation—even an absolute gun restriction—to be arbitrary and capricious when public safety is asserted as at least one of the primary bases for the legislation. Of course, drafters of restrictive gun legislation, and the mainstream media that always trumpets such legislation, invariably assert “public safety” as the salient, predicate basis for enacting such legislation in the first place. Courts rarely, if ever, look beyond and behind the assertion to determine whether “public safety” is truly the basis for restrictive gun legislation and not simply a makeweight employed for the specific purpose of defeating any challenge made to it.Thus, a challenger—who, under rational basis, always bears the burden of proof, at the get-go, to demonstrate that a particular government action is unconstitutional—would have a very difficult time, demonstrating, to the satisfaction of a court of review, that such restrictive legislation is, under law, unconstitutional. This means, of course, that, under rational basis, any infringement of an American's fundamental right to keep and bear arms always passes constitutional muster. This isn’t an academic consideration. For New York Courts routinely use rational basis as a standard of review and have found, not unsurprisingly, the New York Safe Act—one of the most restrictive and notorious gun enactments in the Nation, that clearly, negatively impacts the core of the Second Amendment—to pass constitutional muster.But, would application of the highest standard of review, strict scrutiny, defeat restrictive gun legislation that hides behind the cloak of promoting public safety? Justice Scalia didn’t think so, notwithstanding the import of such heightened scrutiny.

WHAT DOES JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY MEAN?

What does review of legislation, under “strict scrutiny,” entail? Under strict scrutiny, a governmental body must show, one, that legislation impinging upon and infringing upon a constitutional right, must serve a “compelling governmental interest” and, two, that the law that ostensibly serves a compelling governmental interest, is, in fact, the least restrictive means government has available to it for achieving its stated goal.Such a test, properly used, would, one might reasonably think, preclude implementation of--or if implemented, would require a Court to strike down--devious  antigun legislation, designed primarily to curtail the legitimate right of gun owners to own and possess firearms by unconstitutionally, and, therefore, unlawfully, divesting them of that right. For, the mere and obviously false and ridiculous assertion by government that restrictive gun legislation is not designed to divest gun owners of their guns--as government doesn’t really wish to deny average law-abiding, rational Americans their right to own and possess firearms--but is designed merely to promote public safety--will not, by itself, satisfy strict scrutiny.The mere trivial claim of government--adequate to satisfy rational basis--is not enough to satisfy strict scrutiny. Such legislation would, it is reasoned, fail such severe judicial scrutiny, time and time again. That, of course, is what application of strict scrutiny is designed to do. But that is not always what happens--especially where legislation impinging on and infringing the right of the people to keep and bear arms exists. Justice Scalia knew this. He wasn’t fooled by the promise that strict scrutiny sought to engender. Justice Scalia saw the fallibility in the test of strict scrutiny—in any test or standard, really, that a Court may be called upon to employ when testing the constitutionality of restrictive gun legislation—even the test of strict scrutiny as applied to test the constitutionality of governmental enactments.Justice Scalia reasoned, in the Heller opinion, that, if the Courts use the most stringent standard, strict scrutiny, then government action, negatively impacting the right of the people to keep and bear arms—a fundamental right as codified under the Second Amendment—could still feasibly pass Constitutional muster.He said in Heller, “Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of one’s home and family,’” [citation omitted] would fail constitutional muster. District of Columbia vs. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628, fn.27.Academicians concur. One legal scholar writes, “Strict scrutiny must be worthy of its name; ‘strict’ should be truly ‘strict,’ not merely ‘significant.’ It should take more than a good college try to satisfy strict scrutiny. Otherwise aspects of liberty encapsulated in fundamental rights will lack the vigor the Supreme Law of the Land should command in a free society. That is why strict scrutiny is ‘the most demanding test known to constitutional law.’” “Making Second Amendment Law with First Amendment Rules: The Five-Tier Free Speech Framework and Public Forum Doctrine in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, Kenneth A. Klukowski, University of Notre Dame Law School, J.D., 93 Nebraska Law Review 429, 444 (2014). The author says, unabashedly, that the courts have “emasculated strict scrutiny.” Certainly, Justice Scalia was aware of this “emasculation” of the strict scrutiny test. It was for this reason that he was skeptical of asserting a standard of review for Second Amendment cases at all. Justice Scalia knew that many courts, federal and State, frown on the very existence of the Second Amendment. Given the chance, judges that despise the Second Amendment would find a restrictive gun law constitutional using any articulated standard of review. Justice Scalia also obviously knew that, to enhance the effectiveness of Heller, it was necessary to make clear to courts of inquiry that outright bans on entire categories of guns that the public has traditionally and commonly used for self-defense are per se unconstitutional. “There are situations in which even strict scrutiny proves insufficient to vindicate constitutional rights. Those are (1) categorical bans on firearms, and (2) firearm confiscations. . . . Per se rulings will . . . take off the table certain questions wherein courts are giving short shrift to the Second Amendment. The Second and Fourth Circuits have held that near-absolute bans on carrying firearms outside the home are constitutional, applying a faux intermediate scrutiny that more resembles rational-basis review.” “Making Second Amendment Law with First Amendment Rules: The Five-Tier Free Speech Framework and Public Forum Doctrine in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 93 Nebraska Law Review at 446-447.

WHAT STANDARD OF REVIEW DID THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND USE IN DECIDING KOLBE?

But, what did the U.S. District Court of the District of Maryland, in Kolbe vs. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d 768; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110976 (D. Md. 2014), do? The lower Court didn’t apply strict scrutiny, nor did it apply rational basis. The U.S. District Court applied another standard of review—intermediate scrutiny, and, having done, the Court, held, not surprisingly, that facially unconstitutional legislation nonetheless passes judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of that legislation--namely, that the Maryland Firearm Safety Act is lawful and consistent with the Second Amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms. Under “intermediate scrutiny,” a standard of review created by the U.S. Supreme Court, that ostensibly falls between the very lax “rational basis” standard and the seemingly strong “strict scrutiny” standard, a Court, using the intermediate scrutiny test, commences by asking whether legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government goal. That of course is the rational basis test; and, under that test, if the government action meets that liberal test, as it almost invariably does, the Court must need go no further in determining the constitutionality of the government action. But, rational basis is only the first step when a Court employs intermediate scrutiny. The Court then proceeds to the next step, and asks whether the legislation is substantially related to the governmental interest in achieving that goal. How did intermediate scrutiny come to pass? Originally, intermediate scrutiny was devised by the U.S. Supreme Court for use in gender discrimination cases. Intermediate scrutiny, though, has increasingly been used by Courts, in lieu of the heightened strict scrutiny, in cases where fundamental rights are at stake—most notably under the First and Second Amendments.Antigun Courts that are generally restrained from using rational basis—apart from the Courts of New York that have systematically gotten away with use of this altogether inapt standard of review—the standard of review of choice of these antigun Courts, tasked with ruling on the constitutionality of a government action that negatively impacts the Second Amendment, is intermediate scrutiny.But there is a problem with this standard of review. The problem with “intermediate scrutiny” is that it is difficult to get a handle on it. What does “substantially related” mean? It means different things to different Courts.Understand, if, as Justice Scalia pointed out in Heller, strict scrutiny is not an appropriate test to be used in testing the constitutionality of government action that infringes the core of the Second Amendment, intermediate scrutiny, as with the lax test, rational basis, is clearly not the appropriate test for a Court to use either. The U.S. District Court of Maryland used the test of intermediate scrutiny, anyway.Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act, operating as a total ban on an entire category of firearms that the law-abiding citizenry traditionally and commonly uses for self-defense—namely, those firearms the State arbitrarily defines as “copycat weapons” or “assault weapons” or “military style weapons” and ammunition magazines classified as “LCM” (Large Capacity Magazines)” commonly used for those weapons—passes constitutional muster on a standard of review the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland decided to use—a standard of review to test the constitutionality of the Maryland Firearm Safety Act that the Heller majority discussed—along with rational basis and strict scrutiny—and summarily rejected.Why did the U.S. District Court of Maryland use a standard of review in clear contravention to Heller in testing the constitutionality of the Maryland Firearm Safety Act—that so blatantly infringes the right of the people to keep and bear arms? What was the U.S. District Court of Maryland thinking? Did the U.S. District Court of Maryland really believe that it could so easily snub the U.S. Supreme Court? What was the reasoning of the U.S. District Court? We deal with these questions in Part Four of this multipart series on Kolbe.__________________________________Copyright © 2017 Roger J Katz (Towne Criour), Stephen L. D’Andrilli (Publius) All Rights Reserved.

A COURT OF LAW THAT REJECTS U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT UNDERMINES THE RULE OF LAW AND UNDERCUTS THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK, ILLINOIS DEFIES U.S. SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS IN HELLER AND MCDONALD AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS BOWS TO THE WILL OF GOVERNMENT IN FRIEDMAN CASE

State governments and local governments that enact or establish antigun laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations must comply with the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in District of Columbia vs. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald vs. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). State and local governments are not allowed to take the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court lightly; and they are certainly not permitted to ignore the rulings of the High Court in the Heller and McDonald cases out-of-hand. This is not an option. It may therefore come as a shock to some people and an unpleasant surprise to many that State and local governments often do just that. Many State and local governments, not only ignore, but openly defy the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings in Heller and McDonald. Worse, some federal and State courts, when called upon in lawsuits filed by plaintiffs -- individuals and groups -- to review plaintiffs' challenges to governmental actions, directly and negatively impacting the Second Amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms, often give legitimacy to unconstitutional laws enacted by State legislatures and to unconstitutional ordinances, rules, and regulations adopted by local governments, rather than striking them down as an unconstitutional restraint on the exercise of a fundamental right. Antigun proponents zealots, unsurprisingly and unremarkably, don’t see -- never see -- a problem with this. Indeed, Michael Bloomberg’s antigun group, “Everytown for Gun Safety,” for one -- the antigun political group that Bloomberg created upon leaving office as Mayor of New York City, after serving as its Mayor for twelve years -- is ecstatic over an April, 2015 decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Friedman vs. City of Highland Park, Illinois, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015). Just read the report by the left-wing news commentary site, “AlterNet,” on this. The article, which was posted on December 12, 2015, is titled, “Aggressive Pushback at Evil NRA Is Working; Lives Will Be Saved as a Result.”While the antigun crowd sees reason to applaud any attack on Americans’ Second Amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms, even, and especially, those negative decisions, impacting the Second Amendment, handed down by courts of law -- the institution of last resort, called upon to defend Americans' rights and liberties -- an institution that reasonably would be expected to preserve and defend, assiduously, the fundamental rights and liberties of Americans -- no American, regardless of personal sentiment, or ethical view or political persuasion, should be pleased when the Second Amendment is in fact denigrated. No one should be pleased when the Second Amendment is attacked and denigrated because an attack on the sanctity of any one Amendment of our sacred Bill of Rights is, in essence, an attack on the sanctity of all of them. Political rhetoric should not be given equal weight with – much less lord over -- our system of laws, and political rhetoric should not be used as a wedge to divide the public on matters directly impacting our fundamental rights and liberties, guaranteed to all Americans in our Bill of Rights.Steven Rosenfeld, the author of the aforesaid “Alternet” article obviously disagrees. He argues that curtailment of Americans’ Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, politically motivated, is politically warranted, even if not legally warranted, consistent with antigun rhetoric, spawned in the political world. And, Rosenfeld laments that our Second Amendment right is “bogged-down” in the legal world. So it is that Steven Rosenfeld waxes poetic and exclaims, exuberantly, how wonderful it is when the Second Amendment of our Bill of Rights is denigrated,  and when unconscionable, abhorrent and unconstitutional laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations of States and Cities, that negatively impact our Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, are allowed to flourish -- with the assistance of and, indeed, blessing of those courts of law that write decisions, giving credence to and that sanctify those State and local laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations; and that advance no compelling governmental purpose; and that, in fact, are specifically designed to undermine and defeat Americans’ fundamental rights.Courts that give credence to and that, in effect, sanctify such restrictive and oppressive and unconstitutional "edicts" of government are to be singled out for condemnation. In lieu of rendering decisions that defend and preserve Americans' fundamental rights, such courts of law are to be seen as operating subordinate to, subservient to and merely as an extension of government, rather than as a component of a legitimate, independent institution in its own right, whose singular purpose is as overseer of government and protector of our laws and of our fundamental rights and liberties under the U.S. Constitution.  Case in point: the aforesaid Friedman vs. City of Highland Park, Illinois, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), decided in April of 2015.In the Friedman case the Plaintiff Appellants, including an individual, Ari Friedman, and a group, the Illinois State Rifle Association, brought suit against Defendant Appellee, City of Highland Park, in the State of Illinois. Highland Park had passed an ordinance, prohibiting the possession of “assault weapons” and “large capacity magazines,” namely ammunition magazines that can accept more than ten rounds. The ordinance defines an ‘assault weapon’ as any semiautomatic gun that can accept a ‘large capacity magazine’ and has at least one of five banned features, including, inter alia, a pistol grip without stock; a folding, telescoping stock; a grip for the non-trigger hand; or a barrel shroud. Moreover, the ordinance prohibits the ownership and possession of some firearms by name, such as AR-15s and AK47s.Plaintiff Appellant Friedman lawfully owned a banned rifle and several large capacity magazines, before the ban took effect. The prohibited firearm and magazines are not "grandfathered in" by the ordinance. In that respect, the Highland Park ordinance goes well beyond the highly restrictive and oppressive New York Safe Act, insofar as and particularly as those residents of New York who lawfully owned and possessed firearms defined as 'assault weapons' prior to the effective date of the NY Safe Act, on January 15, 2013, are permitted to retain their weapons so long as they are timely registered in accordance with New York law. In Illinois, though, under the unconscionable City of Highland Park ordinance, Plaintiff Appellant Friedman was forced to surrender his banned weapon and banned ammunition magazines to the government. And had he failed to do so, he would be criminally prosecuted for possessing the very items that were perfectly legal for him to own prior to implementation of the ordinance. Friedman, as a law-abiding citizen dutifully, albeit certainly not happily, surrendered his "assault weapon" in order to avoid certain prosecution, and he wants to own these weapons back.To have any chance of regaining possession of his weapons -- his personal property -- Friedman had no recourse but to file an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, challenging the oppressive ordinance and hoping that the federal court would strike down the restrictive gun ordinance as an unconstitutional infringement on the exercise of a fundamental right. Friedman, along with the Illinois State Rifle Association, that joined him in the lawsuit, argued that the City of Highland Park ordinance was inconsistent with the right of the people to keep and bear arms, guaranteed to all Americans, as an individual right under the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and inconsistent, too, with Supreme Court holdings in Heller and McDonald. The District Court, nonetheless, found in favor of the Defendant Appellee, City of Highland Park, and Plaintiffs thereupon appealed the adverse decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Heller, at the outset of its Opinion, acknowledged that “Heller holds that a law banning the possession of handguns in the home (or making their use in the home infeasible) violates the individual right to keep and bear arms secured by the Second Amendment.” The Seventh Circuit also pointed to the holding of the high Court in the subsequent McDonald case, decided in 2010, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that, “the Second Amendment creates individual rights that can be asserted against state and local governments.” McDonald essentially took the holding of Heller -- which applies to unconstitutional actions of the federal Government impacting the Second Amendment, under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment -- to  unconstitutional actions of State and local governments, impacting the Second Amendment under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Given the clear, cogent, unambiguous, and comprehensive import of these two holdings in Heller and McDonald, the salient issue before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was certainly easy to promulgate and should have been: whether the Highland Park ordinance, that proscribes certain weapons, operates as an unconstitutional constraint on a person’s right to keep and bear arms and, if not, then, whether the ordinance is the least restrictive means available to the City for advancing a compelling governmental purpose. Had the legal issue been set forth in this way, in accordance with the actual holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald, utilizing the appropriate standard of review, namely the stringent strict scrutiny standard, to test the constitutionality of the Highland Park ordinance, the Seventh Circuit Court would have struck down the ordinance as an impermissible constraint on an Americans’ right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment, consistent with the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Heller and McDonald cases. For, under the strict scrutiny test there is no logical, coherent reason for the City of Highland Park to adopt an ordinance, negatively impinging upon and infringing a fundamental right that mandates a wholesale ban on an entire category of firearms, firearms that had been, prior to adoption of the ordinance, perfectly legal for law-abiding residents of the City to own and possess -- namely and specifically firearms that the City arbitrarily defines as impermissible “assault weapons" and on ammunition magazines that happen to hold more than ten rounds. And, the government proffered no empirically and legally sound reason for the ban. Yet, the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the strict scrutiny test to the Highland Park ordinance even though, the City ordinance, on its face, impinged upon and infringed a fundamental right, and, indeed, the ordinance was specifically designed to do so.*In its decision the Seventh Circuit also dismissed, inexplicably, the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald, giving nothing but lip-service to them, through the mere act of reciting the holdings in the Court’s opinion, but failing, utterly, in adhering to them. In fact, not only did the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals fail to apply – as it should have done – a strict scrutiny standard of review to an ordinance impacting a fundamental right, the Court really failed to apply any standard of review in assessing the constitutionality of the Highland Park ordinance. Instead, notwithstanding the clear import and purport of the High Court’s holdings in Heller and McDonald and, notwithstanding that the Seventh Court of Appeals had before it, for its review, an ordinance directly, and emphatically, and categorically impacting a fundamental right, under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Seventh Circuit upheld the City of Highland Park ordinance. In permitting an unconstitutional local ordinance to stand, rather than striking it down, the Court of Appeals relied not on actual holdings of the high Court in Heller and McDonald, but on dicta in those cases, arguing that, because the high Court did not – according to the Seventh Circuit’s faulty reasoning – define the scope of the Second Amendment in its entirety, the Seventh Circuit was free to read into Heller and McDonald essentially whatever it wanted to.Curiously, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied a “political” rationale to its decision, foregoing, altogether, application of the appropriate legal standard of review, and this becomes evident in the issue that the Court framed for itself and thereupon sought to resolve, namely: “whether the ordinance leaves residents of Highland Park ample means to exercise the ‘inherent right of self-defense’ that the Second Amendment protects.” The legal issue, that the Court framed for itself in this odd way, totally ignores the fact that many of Highland Park residents desire to hold onto an entire category of weapons and magazines that were and are perfectly legal to own and possess under the Second Amendment, consistent with the holdings in Heller and McDonald, where the U.S. Supreme Court made absolutely clear that government laws and ordinances that ban, wholesale, entire categories of weapons, are patently illegal.By constructing the legal issue in the way that it did, the Seventh Circuit not only took away the freedom of the people to own and possess firearms that they previously had lawful access to but deliberately and defiantly refused to consider the constitutionality of the City ordinance at all in light of the Second Amendment and in light of the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald. In the issue that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals devised for itself, the Court insinuated politics into the issue, and in the resolution of the issue that the Seventh Circuit constructed for itself, the Court begged in the question the very answer it sought.The Seventh Circuit surmised that, because the City of Highland Park did not prohibit all weapons, the City could prohibit some of them – including an entire category of weapons that had been perfectly lawful to own and possess prior to adoption of the City ordinance – and that the City could, in fact, prohibit, perfunctorily, without cause, those weapons and weapons' paraphernalia, such as – what the City deemed to be – high capacity ammunition magazines, as it wished. In the issue that the Court devised for itself to resolve, the Seventh Circuit didn't even need to listen to and consider the absurd arguments that the City put forth ostensibly in support of its wholesale gun ban. The Court included the rationale of the City government in its Opinion, to give seeming weight to its decision. But it was all empty "effect," for the Court had ipso facto decided that, so long as the City of Highland Park left its residents with the means to own and possess at least one kind of firearm -- whatever firearm the City deigned to allow its law-abiding citizens to possess -- say an antique Blunderbuss -- virtually all other firearms could lawfully be, and eventually would be, banned. In fact the Court's reasoning leaves the door open for just that result: eventual adoption of yet further gun bans.The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's decision is grounded not only on faulty legal reasoning, but on faulty logical  reasoning -- reasoning truly at odds with the principles of sound logic and reasoning that is, at once, at odds with the holding in Heller. The Heller holding entails, by logical implication, that bans on entire categories of weapons are impermissible absent a clear and compelling reason for government to do so and this means that a government is not permitted to ban entire categories of weapons unless the court of review satisfies itself that a particular governmental law, or ordinance, or rule, or regulation is the least restrictive means available for advancing a compelling governmental interest.Moreover, The Heller holding that constrains the federal government from enacting laws that constitutionally impinge upon and infringe the Second Amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms applies to the States and local governments through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in accordance with the holding in McDonald. Thus, neither the federal Government, nor State and local governments, are permitted to infringe the Second Amendment’s right of the people to keep and bear arms absent extremely stringent scrutiny of the laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations by a reviewing court of competent jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit failed, utterly, in performing its legal duties. Let's take a closer look at the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Friedman to see more precisely where faults in the Court's legal and logical reasoning rest.The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Friedman is faulty, first, because the holdings of Heller and McDonald make abundantly clear that choice of weapons – those that have been available to Americans in the past – should continue to be available to Americans in the present, and into the future, absent a compelling reason set forth by government, to the satisfaction of the reviewing court, that establishes a lawful need to preclude ownership and possession of those weapons. In that regard, it is not for government to decide which firearms to permit Americans to continue to own and possess and which ones must be surrendered, based on mere personal predilections of government. That the City of Highland Park would do so – that it would dare to do so – amounts to an unconstitutional taking of property and serves at once to denigrate the import and purport of the holdings in Heller and McDonald because the ordinance amounts to a ban on an entire category of firearms and ammunition magazines absent any showing by the City of Highland Park that the City has in fact a compelling reason to do adopt such bans and absent any showing on the part of the City that the language of the ordinance as adopted is the least restrictive means available to the City  to advance a compelling local governmental interest -- which is to say that the compelling governmental interest is so critical that the government is justified in infringing a fundamental right – the right of the people to keep and bear arms. This is the strict scrutiny test.*The Seventh Circuit did not consider strict scrutiny criteria at all when rendering its decision, and it should have done so. It simply allowed the City of Highland Park to assert an ad hoc assortment and array of non-empirical declarations of the usual sort developed by and utilized by antigun proponents to further a personal social and political agenda: de facto repeal of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to force our unique Constitution toe the line with those of other Western nations -- nations whose history and culture are markedly different from our own.The Supreme Court, in Heller, made abundantly clear that the District of Columbia could not ban an entire category of firearms. In Heller, the District of Columbia attempted, unlawfully, to ban all handguns from the hands of the District of Columbia populace. The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance as unconscionably broad and an unconstitutional infringement of the Second amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms. Similarly, and by logical implication, then, the City of Highland Park could not constitutionally mandate a wholesale ban on so-called “assault weapons” and on magazines that happen to hold more than ten rounds of ammunition. Certainly the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals could not allow the Highland Park ordinance to stand without first applying strict scrutiny to the City’s infringement of a fundamental right. The Seventh Circuit devised a makeshift standard of review, relying on political considerations to arrive at the "political" decision it wanted. The Court  failed to apply the appropriate standard of review – or any recognized legal standard of review, for that matter. This amounts to prejudicial error, subjecting its decision to remand for further consideration, requiring application of the appropriate standard of review. The Seventh Circuit devised a makeshift standard to arrive at the "political" decision it wanted.Second, in affirming the decision of the lower, District Court, the Seventh Circuit made the dubious assertion that, “the best way to evaluate the relation between assault weapons, crime, and self-defense is through the political process and scholarly debate, not by parsing ambiguous passages in the Supreme Court’s opinions.” But, there is nothing in the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Heller and McDonald cases that are ambiguous, and there is nothing in those decisions that suggest that a court of review can or should consider political matters when rendering a legal decision, impacting a fundamental right. Certainly, the Seventh Circuit did not point to any ambiguities in the Justices’ text, and there is nothing in the Supreme Court holdings that so much as intimate that political considerations are merited when testing the constitutionality of a governmental law, ordinance, rule or regulation. The Seventh Circuit simply made a bald and bold pronouncement.The best way for a court of review – in fact the only lawful way for a court of review – to review a governmental law, or ordinance, or rule, or regulation that impinges on and infringes a fundamental right is for that court of review to demand that the government that enacts or adopts such a law, or ordinance, or rule, or regulation, sets forth, in the first instance and to the complete satisfaction of the reviewing court, the government's legal argument, supporting the government's  contention that a given law, ordinance, rule, or regulation is, in that government's contention is constitutional. The government necessarily has a heavy legal burden to carry for a court of law must assume that any such law, ordinance, rule, or regulation that negatively impacts a fundamental right is unconstitutional. A court of law, reviewing such governmental law, ordinance, rule, or regulation, negatively impacting an American's fundamental right, has no discretion in the matter. The reviewing court must apply the strict scrutiny standard to test whether the governmental action can stand or be struck down. Moreover, and importantly, judicial deference to the political process is not a legally tenable basis or mechanism through which to test whether a law, or ordinance, or rule, or regulation that is clearly directed to and impacts a fundamental right is permitted to stand. The matter before the court is a purely legal one, and it is one that goes directly to the constitutionality of the law or ordinance. Political concerns are of no moment, or consequence in the reviewing court’s determination.The issue of the constitutionality of a law, or ordinance, or rule, or regulation that impinges upon and infringes a fundamental right is solely and precisely and absolutely a legal issue, not a political one. Deference to political concerns has no place, where, as here, in the Friedman case, an ordinance directly impacts a fundamental right, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was wrong in opining that there is one.Furthermore, and it bears repeating, where fundamental rights are at stake, government is under a heavy burden to justify any restriction on an American’s exercise of a fundamental right. That means, once again, that a governmental law, or ordinance, or rule, or regulation  is presumed, from the get-go, to be unconstitutional, when a court of review begins its analysis of the impact of a law or ordinance on a fundamental right, such as the right of the people to keep and bear arms, and the burden of proof is on the government to demonstrate that a given law or ordinance is in fact constitutional. If a court of review finds that the government has failed to meet its burden, which is to say, that the court of review finds that the law or ordinance is, prima facie, unconstitutional, then that court of review must strike down the offending statute or ordinance. It has no choice in the matter, regardless of what it may otherwise wish to do. But suppose the court of review finds that the government has met its burden of proof and that the court finds the offending statute or ordinance to be facially constitutional. That doesn’t end the matter under the standard of strict scrutiny. That doesn't mean that the governmental law, ordinance, rule, or regulation is permitted to stand. For, even if the government, in the first instance, is able to carry the heavy burden of proof and demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that the law or ordinance is not facially unconstitutional, the matter doesn’t end there. Strict scrutiny embraces a two-part test. The court of review must then decide whether a given law or ordinance that is ostensibly constitutional is, for all that, still, in the government’s adoption of that statute or ordinance, or rule, or regulation, the least restrictive means available to the government by which to advance a compelling governmental purpose. If so and only if the court  of review finds to its satisfaction that an oppressive law or ordinance that impacts a fundamental right is the least restrictive means available to that government to enable it to advance a compelling governmental purpose, can the court of review then and only then allow the oppressive law or ordinance to stand. Otherwise the court must strike down the offending law, or ordinance, or rule, or regulation. In that judicial review of a State law or local governmental ordinance, rule, or regulation impacting a fundamental right, no deference is to be given to the political process. When a court of competent jurisdiction is called upon to review the constitutionality of laws, ordinances, rules, or regulations that impact fundamental rights, consideration of political issues, social issues and the political process are wholly inappropriate. Governmental laws and ordinances and rules and regulations impacting fundamental rights are most serious. An analysis of them involves the application of law, not politics, and courts of review are called upon to make a legal assessment  of them. Matters impacting fundamental rights are never to be left to the wishes or to the wants or to the will of government. And, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is absolutely wrong to assert that they can be and, for that matter, ought to be, left to government. And, by failing to apply the legal standard of strict scrutiny to an ordinance that directly impinges upon and infringes a fundamental right, the Seventh Circuit reduced itself to a servile vessel of government, giving deference to government action, where it should never have done so.Third, in its deferential, even obsequious regard for government, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals added that, “the central role of representative democracy is no less part of the Constitution than is the Second Amendment: when there is no definitive constitutional rule, matters are left to the legislative process.” This is patently false. The matter before the Seventh Circuit has nothing to do here with public policy any more than it has to do with the political process. The matter before the Court in the Friedman case has everything to do with the City government’s creation of  and adoption of an ordinance directly and negatively impacting a fundamental right. And, a definitive constitutional rule, established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller, does exist, contrary to the Seventh Circuit's assertion that there is none. The Seventh Circuit simply decided to ignore the Supreme Court’s clear and categorical and cogent holding. The Seventh Circuit’s argument in the Friedman case is not a direct and perceptive and critical review of a governmental ordinance, directly impinging upon and infringing the fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms, but an unconscionable digression from its duty to review, critically, the constitutionality of the Highland Park ordinance. The Seventh Circuit altogether ignores its duty, a that duty rests squarely on testing the constitutionality of the Highland Park ordinance in light of the holdings in Heller and McDonald.Fourth, the Seventh Circuit said, “another constitutional principle is relevant: The Constitution establishes a federal republic where local differences are cherished as elements of liberty, rather than eliminated in search for national uniformity.” Even so, where, as here, the exercise of a fundamental right is at stake, the assertion of such a principle in this instance amounts to nothing more than rhetorical flourish, not sound legal reasoning. The Court’s assertion is not sound and has absolutely no relevance here because, once again, where a fundamental right is at stake, the application of that right – the right of the people to keep and bear arms – applies “across the board,” that is to say, nationally – and the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Heller and McDonald cases make this point poignant, clear, categorical, and unequivocal. “Local differences” are absolutely beside the point where fundamental rights, as set forth in our Bill of Rights, are at stake.The Seventh Circuit simply and erroneously sets up a peripheral straw man issue and ignores the salient one which goes to the very heart of the import of the Second Amendment: whether the City of Highland Park Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face and, were it not so, then, whether that ordinance is, nonetheless, the least restrictive means available to the City of Highland Park for advancing a compelling governmental interest. By failing to consider the impact of the City of Highland Park ordinance on the fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms, the Seventh Circuit improperly reduced a serious constitutional issue before it to one of mere public policy, political process, and local political and social concerns. Such analysis by a court of review might be adequate to address some minimal social concern or political matter, but not one that goes to the heart of our rights and liberties under the U.S. Constitution, namely and specifically, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, under the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.In his lengthy dissent, Judge Manion asserted, in his opening remarks, that “by prohibiting a class of weapons commonly used throughout the country, Highland Park’s ordinance infringes upon the rights of its citizens to keep weapons in their homes for the purpose of defending themselves, their families, and their property. Both the ordinance and this court’s opinion upholding it are directly at odds with the central holdings of Heller and McDonald: that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home.” The dissenting Judge also noted that Plaintiff Appellant Friedman did, in fact, lawfully keep in his home, for self-defense, the weapons and ammunition magazines that the ordinance now bans, and that Friedman was compelled to surrender them to the authorities or face a misdemeanor conviction that is punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of between $500.00 and $1,000.00. The City of Highland Park ordinance thus forces a law-abiding citizen either to forsake his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms or to become a misdemeanant, end up in jail, pay a fine, and probably never again be able to own or possess any firearm.Once the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, finding for the Defendant Appellee, City of Highland Park, against Plaintiff Appellants, Friedman and the Illinois State Rifle Association, the Appellants petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan all were in attendance to consider the writ of certiorari. A majority of Justices denied the writ. Justices Thomas and Scalia were so incensed at the refusal to grant the petition for writ that Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, admonished their brethren in a dissent.In his opening remarks, Justice Thomas wrote, “‘[O]ur central holding in’ District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 (2008), was ‘that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home.’ And in McDonald, we recognized that the Sec­ond Amendment applies fully against the States as well as the Federal Government. Id., at 750; id., at 805 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Despite these holdings, several Courts of Appeals including the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the decision below—have upheld categorical bans on firearms that millions of Americans commonly own for lawful purposes. See 784 F. 3d 406, 410–412 (2015). Because noncompliance with our Second Amendment precedents warrants this Court’s attention as much as any of our precedents, I would grant certiorari in this case.” It is abundantly clear that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has failed in its duty to carefully review a governmental ordinance that, on its face, amounts to a deliberate, audacious, callous, caustic, and defiant attack, not only on the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but on clear and unambiguous holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald that directly apply to the Friedman case and inform the Court how to review an ordinance that impacts the fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms. By failing to consider the import and purport of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings in Heller and McDonald, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in its holding in Friedman improperly and defiantly ignored the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald.The Seventh Circuit has capitulated to local government; ignored the directives of the U.S. Supreme Court; failed to apply the appropriate legal standard when testing the constitutionality of a law or ordinance, infringing a fundamental right; reduced a serious constitutional issue to a mere administrative one; saw fit to prostate itself before a mere local government, raising that government to the level of potentate; made itself, wittingly or not, into a subservient ally of antigun groups; and allowed its status as an independent trier of law and fact to play a subordinate role to political forces. In ceding its own, critical judicial role, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has demonstrated a callous disregard of its duties and joined with government in undermining the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It is most unfortunate that the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices paid no heed to the remonstrations of Justices Thomas and Scalia. In denying the Friedman Appellants' petition for writ of certiorari, the majority of Justices allowed a clearly unsound and deeply offensive ruling of the Seventh Circuit to stand, unchallenged.The adverse and legally and logically unsound decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Friedman, coupled with the failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to grant Appellants' petition for writ sets a bad precedent. Had the Justices, instead, granted the petition and determined to review the decision of the Seventh Circuit, then, thereafter, federal, State, and local governments and, too, federal and State courts would be placed on notice that the holdings of Heller and McDonald are not to be taken lightly. What has transpired in the Friedman case will only embolden antigun groups and their allies in government and in courts friendly to their political objectives to take further steps and ever more daring and outrageous steps to undercut the fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms. Erosion of our remaining rights and liberties, as set forth in our Bill of Rights will, as well, follow suit.Indeed, when one takes the time to pause and consider what has, of late, been occurring in our Nation, one becomes immediately aware that the destruction of our Bill of Rights -- most prominently, our First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, along with our sacred Second Amendment -- is already well underway.____________________________________

*UPDATE AND CLARIFICATION:

Reviewing this post, we must clarify the points made in our analysis of strict scrutiny as a standard of review in Second Amendment cases. In our jurisprudence, where fundamental rights are at stake, such as exercise of one's Second Amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms, governments must apply the least restrictive means to accomplish their goals. And, Courts will use strict scrutiny to assess the constitutionality of laws, impacting fundamental rights, when a challenge is made as to the constitutionality of them.The U.S. Supreme Court in Heller did not, though, articulate a specific standard of review a court must use when assessing the constitutionality of a law when a constitutional challenge to a law impacting the Second Amendment is raised, apart from stating that the most liberal standard of judicial review, rational basis as a means test, is altogether inappropriate for means testing. It is not clear that the Highland Park Court used any standard of review but merely and essentially rubber stamped government edit. If the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied any standard of review, in Friedman vs. Highland Park, then, tacitly, the Court applied "rational basis," the lowest most deferential standard of review. But, The U.S. Supreme Court in Heller pointedly remarked that rational basis was never the correct standard of review in Second Amendment cases and can never be appropriately applied in any Second Amendment case.That the  high Court did not apply a standard of review in Heller though was probably due to the fact that the Court found the District of Columbia's total ban on handguns to be facially, per se, invalid. The law was designed to destroy the core value of the Second Amendment and therefore had to be struck down as a blatant example of a law that was unconstitutional. So, the high Court found it unnecessary to apply strict scrutiny.For those laws, infringing the Second Amendment right that do not, on their face, appear to be invalid, then, arguably, consistent with Heller, heightened scrutiny of such law must be invoked and applied by a court of review.Strict scrutiny, as a means test, is, traditionally, the most durable and most stringent standard of heightened security a court or judicial review can apply, when deciding the constitutionality of a law. Yet, some Courts--those obviously antithetical to the Second Amendment-- have, through the failure of the Heller Court to articulate a definitive standard of review, tended to apply an intermediate scrutiny test or, as in the Friedman vs. Highland Park case, a rational basis, if a standard of review was applied by a Court at all, if only tacitly. Again, rational basis is not an appropriate standard for means testing a law infringing upon the Second Amendment in any circumstance. Curiously, rational basis is used by New York Courts and is used by those Courts with regularity to justify the NY Safe Act and to justify any other restrictive gun law that the New York State Legislature and other governmental bodies in New York implement. Under strict scrutiny or even under intermediate scrutiny, it is unlikely that New York's draconian gun laws would stand. New York Courts know this, and that may explain why they rigidly adhere to application of an incorrect, liberal standard of review at all.[separator type="medium" style="normal" align="left"margin-bottom="25" margin_top="5"] Copyright © 2015 Roger J Katz (Towne Criour), Stephen L. D’Andrilli (Publius) All Rights Reserved.

THE NEW YORK TIMES’ CALL FOR NATIONAL GUN CONFISCATION IS LEGALLY INSUPPORTABLE AND MORALLY INSUFFERABLE

THE NEW YORK TIMES RESURRECTS FEINSTEIN'S MONSTER

The antigun groups have now made clear beyond any doubt their singular goal: remove firearms from the hands of Americans, nationally. In a rare editorial, appearing on the front page of the Saturday, December 5, 2015 edition of The New York Times, titled, “The Gun Epidemic,” the Times editorial staff presents its arguments for massive gun confiscation, at the national level. The New York Times – a vehicle of international socialist and globalist interests – is intent on divesting Americans of their sacred right to keep and bear arms. Simultaneously, the Times is clearly and unconscionably setting the stage for a Clinton Presidency in 2016.The San Bernardino shooting incident, carried out by Islamic extremists – foreign invaders, whose allegiance, as the Times reports, are to the Islamic State – should be a clarion call to arms to all Americans. Instead, the Times uses this despicable attack by the Islamic State on innocent American citizens as a pretext for disarming all Americans. Treating this invasion on our shores as simply one more mass shooting, without regard to the motivation behind it, the Times calls for a massive, gun confiscation program at the national level. The rationale given for this unprecedented call for gun confiscation is reduction of gun violence – the same platitude voiced over and over by those individuals and groups intent on divesting Americans of their natural birthright and denying to Americans the right of self-defense, notwithstanding that the Federal Government either cannot adequately protect Americans from mass shootings -- whether or not these attacks are random or carefully planned and organized -- or the Government simply will not do so, despite constant assertions and assertions to the contrary.Since President Barack Obama refuses, incongruously, to seal our borders despite clear evidence of an attack in our Country by Islamic radicals, and since he continues to allow into our Country those of the Islamic faith, who are impossible to vet, one must wonder whether Obama is intentionally jeopardizing the security of the American people, to keep the American public off-guard, consistent with international globalist and international socialist interests and objectives, in preparation for America’s integration into a unified Socialist State at some point in the not too distant future. If so, the salient reason for the NY Times’ call for a program of massive gun confiscation has little, if anything, to do with reducing gun violence in this Country -- from whatever source -- and has everything to do with destruction of America’s sovereignty and subjugation of its citizenry. A massive gun confiscation program on the national stage would certainly hasten the accomplishment of that goal, paving the way for repeal of America’s Constitution, and, therefore, repeal of a critical portion of the Constitution -- America's Bill of Rights. Thus, would we see the international globalists and socialists smoothing the transition for the Nation's incorporation into a unified mega-international Socialist Order. And, the American people would be given a new constitution sans any mention of a right, existent in the people, to keep and bear arms.To Americans who see the United States as an independent sovereign Nation, beholding to and dependent on no other nation, and who place their faith in their Bill of Rights and, particularly, on the strength of the Second Amendment within the Bill of Rights, such acts of gun violence, committed by criminals, lunatics, and, of late, by Islamic jihadists, there bespeaks a need for a strong citizenry, and that means an armed citizenry, not a disarmed, weakened one. But, a disarmed, weakened citizenry is clearly and specifically what the federal government has in mind for Americans. President Barack Obama has made that point many times and more incessantly -- with an air of urgency in recent days. Lest there be any doubt about this -- about the intention of wealthy, powerful, ruthless interests behind this effort to disarm the American citizenry, who use the mainstream news media to confound Americans and who proclaim that the only answer to this onslaught of gun violence in America is for American citizens to place their blind faith in and allegiance to the federal government, rather than to place faith in themselves and to take personal responsibility for defense of self and family -- suggesting, then, that the federal government -- and only the federal government can and, more to the point, is  warranted and permitted to protect them -- one ought to stop and consider the import of the following two remarks, appearing in the sixth paragraph of the NY Times front page, editorial: “It is not necessary to debate the peculiar wording of the Second Amendment. No right is unlimited and immune from reasonable regulation.”  The average person may not be quick to catch this, but there is an oblique message in these two assertions – both of which are utterly damning to American sensibilities, to the autonomy of the individual, to the sanctity of Americans’ Second Amendment, and certainly divisive, as the editorial can and is probably meant to tear the public apart, for The New York Times' assertions do most assuredly play to the sentiments of antigun proponents and zealots, even as those same sentiments will anger, and rightly so, every other American. So let us parse those assertions.The NY Times says the language of the Second Amendment is “peculiar.” Yet, the Times’ use of the word, ‘peculiar,’ to describe the language of the Second Amendment, is itself peculiar. The meaning of the independent clause in the Second Amendment – “the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed” – is straightforward, cogent, clear, and certainly not “peculiar” to the American people. Indeed, that The New York Times would use the word, ‘peculiar,’ to describe the Second Amendment at all, suggests that the newspaper does not reflect America’s interests but, rather, the interests of the international socialists and globalists, intent on dismantling the Second Amendment in particular and dismantling the nine other Amendments, generally, which depend on the Second Amendment, ultimately, for their preservation. For, only to foreign governments whose history is unlike ours and whose constitutions are devoid of any mention of an inalienable right of the people to keep and bear arms would America's Second Amendment possibly look "peculiar." But for an American newspaper to use that adjective to describe the Second Amendment, that should give the public pause.Take a look at the constitution of any other Western nation. Even if a constitution talks about firearms in the hands of the citizenry at all -- and very few constitutions do -- no constitution but that of the United States places that right squarely in the hands of the citizenry itself. In no other nation on this Earth does the right to keep and bear arms reside in the People. Rather, that right resides exclusively in the State. In those Western Countries that the New York Times clearly emulates, namely, France, England, and Norway, which the Times mentions in its editorial, the constitutions of those Countries do not respect the inalienable right of their citizens to keep and bear weapons in their own defense and as a means to secure their individual rights and liberties. Therefore, Countries such as France, England, and Norway, unlike the United States, clearly do not recognize that the citizens, themselves, are the ultimate guardians of their own rights and liberties, and so their citizens do not have the inalienable right to defend themselves with the most effective means available for doing so – that provided by a firearm; nor do those Countries recognize, in their people, the right of their people to secure their own rights and liberties through firearms, if the need should ever arise.Indeed, the Times admits, “that determined killers obtained weapons illegally in places like France, England, and Norway that have strict gun laws. Yes they did.” But, in that very admission, the Times follows up with the singularly bizarre assertion, “But at least those Countries are trying.” Really, “trying?” What are those Countries trying to do through strict gun laws? The Times' assertion is incoherent. If those Countries are trying to provide safe havens for Islamic foreign invaders, and convert their citizenry into a flock of defenseless sheep, then those Countries are certainly succeeding! Must the U.S. follow the lead of those Countries? The New York Times says, unequivocally, “yes.” The language of our Second Amendment, however, manifestly counters the Times’ assertion with an emphatic, “no!”The New York Times also says, “No right is unlimited and immune from reasonable regulation.” This, too, is a particularly odd and outrageous remark as it denigrates our jurisprudence.First, the right of the people to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right, expressly set forth in the language of our Country’s Bill of Rights. The New York Times cannot reasonably deny the truth of that assertion. And, as a fundamental right, the right of the people to keep and bear arms is deserving of something more than some protection. As a fundamental right, the right of the people to keep and bear arms is deserving of the strongest possible protection. Second, to say that a fundamental right is not unlimited, namely, absolute, is merely a legal platitude. The Times is incorrect to suggest, as it does, that the Government can employ whatever regulation of the right it wants, whenever it wants, simply because no right, even a fundamental right, is not absolute.Second, the Times says that the right of the people to keep and bear arms is subject to “reasonable regulation.” Understand, the New York Times is making a legal pronouncement, here, not merely – as most readers are inclined to see it – a colorful, somewhat innocuous, editorial remark. The Times is tacitly invoking a criterion of judicial review that many State courts use in order to determine whether a State law – regulating gun possession and gun ownership, say -- can withstand judicial scrutiny. The Times is asserting, albeit cryptically, that this standard of judicial review, ‘reasonable regulation,’ should apply, across the board, without exception, to each and every legal challenge a complainant may bring to the constitutionality of a federal or state gun law restriction. But, there is a serious problem with this. The problem is that the criterion of  ‘reasonable regulation’ is a very weak standard, virtually indistinguishable from the ‘rational basis test’ which many State courts, such as those in New York, the home of the New York Times, routinely use to test the constitutionality of their State's own draconian gun laws.Under both the ‘reasonable regulation’ standard and ‘rational basis test,’ State courts simply look to see whether a particular law is rationally related to a particular governmental purpose. In effect, this weak standard of review hamstrings Courts and allows States to impose draconian gun laws on the public. The New York Safe Act, which is one of the most restrictive gun measures in the Nation, when compared to the gun measures of any other jurisdiction in the United States, passes judicial scrutiny in New York precisely because the New York State Government need only assert – and need not argue – that the NY Safe Act is rationally directed to a legitimate government purpose – say, reduction in gun violence. If the New York Safe Act were challenged in a court of competent jurisdiction in New York – and of course various provisions of the Act, as well as the Act in its entirety, have been challenged in New York courts since enactment of the NY Safe Act – that court of competent jurisdiction is only permitted to decide whether the  Safe Act is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. In applying that standard of judicial review -- rational basis -- a court must give considerable deference to a legislative action. So, unless the law is clearly arbitrary on its face or clearly has no relationship at all to the matter for which it ostensibly was enacted, which is to say, that the government cannot demonstrate that the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, the law will be upheld. So, under either the rational basis test or the reasonable regulation standard, the latter of which the Times makes specific reference to in its front page editorial, a court of competent jurisdiction is prohibited from going further in its scrutiny of the constitutionality of the law or governmental regulation. So, under the rational basis test a law can be very broad in scope and overreach its stated objective. That is of no consequence to the basic question of the constitutionality of it under either the rational basis test or under the essentially identical reasonable regulation standard. And the result is – as the NY Safe Act clearly demonstrates – that extraordinarily draconian gun laws pass constitutional muster. This is perverse. And, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia vs. Heller (2008), the NY Safe Act flies in the face of the high Court’s holding because New York courts continue to use a relaxed standard of review in testing the constitutionality of the NY Safe Act, notwithstanding that the Act has a highly corrosive effect on a fundamental right: the right of the people to keep and bear arms.Gun ownership and gun possession is a fundamental right. Even antigun proponents and zealots cannot reasonably deny the legal certainty of that fact. Legislation that impacts the fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms demands extraordinary judicial scrutiny, not weakened, relaxed scrutiny. State courts and federal courts are, under our jurisprudence, expected to utilize the strict scrutiny test where fundamental rights are impacted. Can the New York Safe Act withstand judicial scrutiny under a strict scrutiny criterion? The answer is clearly, “no.” Under a strict scrutiny criterion, the State Government has the burden of showing that the NY Safe Act, which places inordinate restrictions on a citizen’s fundamental right to keep and bear arms, is nonetheless necessary to satisfy a compelling State interest – in this case: the compelling interest of the State to reduce gun violence. But, importantly, under the strict scrutiny test, the constitutionality of the law or governmental regulation under review is not presumed, unlike the constitutionality of a law or governmental regulation would be presumed under the rational basis test, or under that test's functional equivalent, the reasonable regulation standard. Therefore, the burden of proof for the State of New York is a difficult one under strict scrutiny would be exceedingly difficult to overcome. Under either the rational basis test or “reasonable regulation” standard, on the other hand, a court of review in New York is legally required to presume, in the first instance, that a law or regulation is constitutional, hence valid. So, under the rational basis test or “reasonable regulation” standard, the New York State Government is able, very easily, to enact draconian gun laws that, just as easily, pass constitutional muster. This explains why challenges to various provisions of the Safe Act – except in one or two instances – fail, and this explains why challenges to the Safe Act in its entirety have, to date, also failed. And, this explains why draconian gun laws, such as the New York Safe Act, are able to exist and continue to exist at all. And, critically, this also clearly explains why The New York Times expresses a desire for courts of competent jurisdiction to use a relaxed standard of judicial review when testing the constitutionality of a draconian State or federal gun law or governmental regulation.Through application of the rational basis test or reasonable regulation standard, New York, and any other State, and, for that matter, Congress itself, can enact gun laws that infringe the fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms, and such laws will still, almost invariably, pass a constitutional challenge. And that is why, traditionally at least, our jurisprudence respects challenges to laws that impact fundamental rights such as the right of the people  to keep and bear arms, requiring State and federal governments to overcome an extremely difficult standard of judicial review if their restrictive gun laws are to be held constitutional and, therefore, to survive challenges to their constitutionality. This means that the burden of proof is on the government to prove that a law or regulation is constitutional. But, under either the rational basis test or "reasonable regulation" standard that the NY Times refers to in its editorial, the burden rests with the challenger, in the first instance, to show that a particular law or governmental regulation is, in fact, unconstitutional. Under strict scrutiny, the burden rests squarely on the government to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the law or regulation is, in fact, constitutional. That is a crucial difference and explains why the New York Times not only asks for enactment of extremely restrictive gun laws on the national stage but, as well, explains why the Times would mandate use of a relaxed standard of review once the laws were challenged in federal court, and the constitutionality of those laws would be challenged. Under a relaxed standard of judicial review, such draconian gun laws would very likely survive a court challenge, testing the laws' constitutionality. Thus, the Times calls for use of the "reasonable regulation" standard of judicial review.But, if a New York State or New York federal court of competent jurisdiction applies strict scrutiny, say, to the New York Safe Act, for example, as it should, in lieu of the rational basis test, the New York State Government must prove to the Court’s satisfaction that the NY Safe Act furthers a compelling government interest. But that doesn’t end the inquiry. Strict scrutiny embraces a two-part test. Assuming the Government can prove to the satisfaction of the court that the New York Safe Act does serve a compelling State interest, the State Government must then show that the NY Safe Act is narrowly tailored to meet that objective – say, reduction of gun violence. That means the Government must prove to the satisfaction of the court, that the NY Safe Act is the least restrictive means available to the Government for reducing gun violence in the State even if the State  can show that the Act is directed to satisfying a compelling State interest. If and only if the reviewing court is satisfied that the NY Safe Act amounts to the least restrictive means available to the Government for reducing gun violence will that court of review hold the Act constitutional. Otherwise, it will not do so, and cannot legally do so. Application of strict scrutiny to a law or governmental regulation is very difficult for a government to overcome. Application of the standard of strict scrutiny is meant to be difficult to overcome when a restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right is at stake.Challenges to fundamental rights are meant to fail precisely because preservation of the fundamental rights of the American people is itself fundamental to preservation of a free Republic. And a free Republic cannot long endure if State and federal governments can, virtually at will, enact laws that tend to undercut and negate the Bill of Rights. Hence, it is highly unlikely that the New York Safe Act would survive judicial review under a strict scrutiny test. Since the NY Safe Act directly impacts a fundamental right it is presumed from the get-go, that the Act is constitutionally invalid. Thus the burden on a State government or on the federal government to show that a draconian gun law is legally required is considerable, and necessarily so. A reviewing court is likely to see the NY Safe Act as the charade and subterfuge it really is: an underhanded attempt to undercut and negate the efficacy of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, under the guise of protecting the public from gun violence.Clearly, for the New York State Government to argue that denying to thousands of law-abiding New York residents access to large categories of firearms is the least restrictive means available to it for reducing gun violence is neither logically sound nor legally defensible. It is therefore highly unlikely that the NY Safe Act could withstand judicial scrutiny under a strict scrutiny standard. Thus, to say that no right – even a fundamental right – is not absolute, is not to suggest that a government can essentially regulate the right away whenever it so wishes. And, The New York Times is wrong in suggesting that it can.Now it is one thing for courts in New York to apply a weak standard of judicial review that allows for the existence of draconian gun laws, negatively impacting the fundamental right of the people to keep and bear arms; it is quite another to suggest that such a weak judicial standard should be applied across the board. Yet, this is precisely what the NY Times is asking for: that Congress should enact laws denying to tens of millions of law-abiding Americans the right to own and possess entire categories of firearms and that, if anyone should challenge the constitutionality of such a law, then a court of competent jurisdiction should be required to apply a relaxed standard of review, namely ‘reasonable regulation,’ which would virtually guarantee that an unconstitutional law would pass constitutional muster when it should not and would not if challenged under the strict scrutiny test.As you may recall, Democrats attempted, essentially, to expand the NY Safe Act nationally in 2013. The "illustrious," Dianne Feinstein, Democratic Party Senator from California, introduced a bill, in 2013, in the Senate, to ban so-called “assault weapons” and so-called “high capacity ammunition magazines.” Her bill, “The Assault Weapons Ban of 2013,” included 157 kinds of firearms that the American public would no longer be able to lawfully own and possess. And Americans could no longer own and possess ammunition magazines that held more than 10 cartridges, if that bill became law. Feinstein's “Assault Weapons Ban of 2013" was meant to resurrect the earlier “Assault Weapons Ban of 1994,” which banned 19 weapons and, in fact, to expand upon “The Assault Weapons of 1994,” which expired in accordance with its sunset provision in 2004. Fortunately, attempts by antigun Senators to renew the law, failed. And, Feinstein’s new 2013 bill could never gain traction. It failed by a vote of the Senate, 40 to 60, in April of 2013. Now, through despicable hubris and subterfuge on the part of a newspaper, The New York Times, that newspaper is attempting to resurrect Feinstein’s own dead antigun bill, using “fear," together with sleight-of-hand, to encourage the American public to take action against its own best self-interest – in effect calling upon the public to contact Congress to bring Feinstein’s Monster, “The Assault Weapons Ban of 2013,” back to life in the form of an “Assault Weapons Ban of 2016.”If there is any doubt about the New York Times’ deplorable intentions actions, attacking the right of the people to keep and bear arms, the Times makes the point that: “certain kinds of weapons . . . and certain kinds of ammunition must be outlawed for civilian ownership. It is possible to define those guns in a clear and effective way and, yes, it would require Americans who own those kinds of weapons to give them up. . . .” This is essentially Feinstein’s: “Assault Weapons Ban of 2013.” Now, under a strict scrutiny standard of review, Feinstein’s resurrected antigun bill, as a draconian antigun law – essentially the New York Safe Act, applied nationally (assuming for purpose of argument that  an assault weapons ban could succeed, at all, in 2016, when the Act failed in 2013) -- would almost certainly be struck down by federal courts, once challenged, and it would be challenged. But, under a relaxed “reasonable regulation” standard or under its functional equivalent, the “rational basis” test, such a law would more easily pass judicial scrutiny. This is why the New York Times presses for both an assault weapons ban and, at once, deviously, insists upon a relaxed legal standard of review, so that the Government can legally require Americans who own “certain kinds of weapons” – and one can fill in the blank as to what those weapons are, although the list would probably and eventually be extended to encompass all of them – to surrender them to government authorities and if such overreaching law were challenged in federal court, such challenge would almost certainly fail.The Times adds, piously, that Americans must give up their weapons "for the good of their fellow citizens.” In other words, the Times is saying that, for the “good” of the Collective, as defined by the puppet masters of Government, the sanctity and autonomy of each individual American must be forfeited. Of course, this will not make Americans safer. In fact it will make Americans substantially less safe as American citizens will be more prone to gun violence by sociopathic Islamic jihadists, psychopathic criminals and criminal gangs, and assorted lunatics. No doubt, the Times had substantial assistance from a phalanx of antigun lawyers to assist it when drafting its front page editorial.And, keep in mind that, if the New York Times is suggesting that, in the very act of dispossessing Americans of their firearms, thereby dismantling the Second Amendment, the Government is in some bizarre manner doing something beneficial for Americans, it is abundantly clear the Times is actually doing something quite contrary to the seemingly benign act of disarming Americans. The New York Times is actually targeting all Americans – hence, resurrection of Feinstein’s Monster. Clearly, the desire of the Times editorial staff is to target the millions of  law-abiding, sane, rational American gun owners – not simply Islamic jihadists, criminals and lunatics. For, in this same front page editorial, the Times asserts, that any American who wants those weapons, which the Times calls “weapons of war,”  must be corralled and considered criminally suspect. The Times asserts in the flamboyant, typically pious manner of the antigun zealot: “It is a moral outrage and a national disgrace that people can legally purchase weapons designed specifically to kill with brutal speed and efficiency. These are weapons of war, barely modified and deliberately marketed as tools of macho vigilantism and even insurrection.” Ergo, if an American would want such a weapon, much less insist on owning and possessing such a weapon, there must be something seriously wrong with that individual. Thus, The New York Times is targeting essentially all Americans. This is a frontal assault on the Second Amendment itself – a frontal assault on the exercise of a fundamental right of every law-abiding American. The only outrage and national disgrace here is The New York Times itself that would undercut our Free Republic and undermine the Bill of Rights that is the bedrock of our Free Republic.If the Second Amendment is frontally assaulted by the very Government -- the federal Government that is supposed to defend and preserve it, since it is a component of our Constitution – indeed a fundamental part of it -- then the People must defend it because  a quiet coup d’etat of the federal government is already underway. Thus, The New York Times isn’t preventing insurrection, it is fomenting it, inviting it, daring Americans to take arms against the very federal Government that was created to serve the People, as that same federal Government  now boldly asserts its dominion over the People – with the devout blessing of, and encouragement of, a member of the “Fourth Estate,” that the founders had themselves blessed with protection through the language of the First Amendment, guaranteeing the freedom of the Press. That same Press is now working with the federal  Government -- not as a check against it but as a tool of it -- against the American people.The New York Times has, in its front page editorial, insidiously suggested, through a very thin veil, that any American who would fight to preserve that “peculiar” Second Amendment is an American who must be treated no differently than a lunatic, criminal, or Islamic jihadist. And, as if the incendiary nature of that front page editorial were not enough, the Times continues feeding the American public with copious amounts of nonsensical fodder inside that same Saturday, December 5, 2015 edition.In another article, appearing on page 5 of the Saturday edition of the New York Times, the newspaper cites to Hillary Clinton and President Barack Obama’s emulation of Australia’s gun laws. The New York times says, “President Obama has cited the country’s gun laws as a model for the United States, calling Australia a nation ‘like ours.’” The newspaper also mentions Clinton’s statement that “the Australian approach is ‘worth considering.’” Actually, Australia is anything but a nation like ours. In our article posted on December 1, 2015, in the Arbalest Quarrel, and which was also posted in Ammoland Shooting Sports News in condensed summary, we emphasized that Clinton’s support for a national gun confiscation program, if actually implemented, would be patently illegal. The mainstream news media did not, at that time, give wide coverage of her remarks at last month’s Town Hall Meeting in Keene, New Hampshire, as Clinton’s remarks were seen as too farfetched even for the mainstream news media, as her remarks show a callous disregard and disrespect for the U.S. Constitution – this coming from a person with legal training who was educated at an elite university – and most Americans would clearly take serious exception with those remark if they were subject to widespread coverage and her chances of securing the U.S. Presidency in 2016 would be jeopardized. The mainstream news media did not, apparently, wish to ruin Clinton’s chances. Apparently, the New York Times, as one mainstream news media source, has, almost two months since that Town Hall meeting, reconsidered and decided to fully support Clinton’s position on gun ownership and possession, extreme as it is and trust that, by adopting that extreme position, itself, make it appear less extreme to the American people. Of course, The Times is well aware that it is actively creating dissension in the American populace, but it is betting that most Americans will side with Clinton on Second Amendment issues. Supposedly, public addresses by the current U.S. President will also serve to make assaults on the Second Amendment less “off-putting” to most Americans. At least that is the grand design of the international globalists and socialists, who control the mainstream media and who pull the strings of many Government Officials, including those of the present U.S. President, Barack Obama.The Times newspaper is clearly setting the stage for a Clinton Presidency. But that Presidency will pave the way for the dismantling of the U.S. Constitution by way of a full frontal assault on the Second Amendment. A Republican Congress would never allow the Second Amendment to be defeated. But, assuming arguendo, Congress were to enact a law requiring confiscation of guns on an unprecedented scale, the law would not withstand judicial review under a strict scrutiny standard. The U.S. Supreme Court would be the last Branch of Government called upon to protect the U.S. Constitution. For, if federal courts applied a lesser standard of scrutiny to a massive national gun confiscation law, such as ‘reasonable regulation,’ that the New York Times is asking for, Congress would be defying the U.S. Supreme Court which has the last word on the constitutionality of a Congressional Act. For a massive gun confiscation scheme would effectively nullify the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in the 2008 Heller case and, so, would be unconstitutional on its face. That, the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court would not allow.For this reason, in yet a third article appearing in the Saturday edition of the NY Times, there is posed the possibility of the U.S. President defying both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court by imposing a massive gun confiscation scheme through executive order. Of course the NY Times would like to see this but even the Times recognizes that such an action by a U.S. President would be patently illegal. Still, if Barack Obama dared to do that – attack the Second Amendment head-on – such unilateral action by the Chief  Executive, who is not reluctant to use executive orders would, in this instance, amount to an impeachable offense. But, if the Democrats take control of Congress and if Clinton secures the “Oval Office,” then Americans have much to worry about. For Clinton would certainly make several federal district court and appellate court appointments and U.S. Supreme Court nominations and such people, whom she would appoint to the federal courts and nominate to the highest Court of the Land would generally support unconstitutional executive orders, designed to weaken the Second Amendment. Ultimately, a Clinton Presidency could very well pave the way for de facto, revocation of the Second Amendment, if not outright repeal of it. Other rights under the Bill of Rights would fall like dominos.If the New York Times would manifest a concern over an assault on the First Amendment’s Freedom of the Press, it is disheartening that it would demonstrate such a callous disregard for the Second. The Bill of Rights is not to be thought of like so many flavors of ice cream. One doesn’t pick and choose which ones to approve of and which ones to disapprove of. Thus, one must ask the publishers and editors of the New York Times, who, in this front page editorial, have attacked the Second Amendment without even a semblance of restraint: "have you lost your minds?" They may think that the American public is behind them on this. The Times is clearly directing its attention to the frightened and ignorant among us, who see in a Clinton Presidency what the Times says the public needs: protection that only Big Government can provide. What the Times fails to see, though, is that, if most Americans perceive a threat to their sacred rights and liberties, they will defend those rights and liberties at whatever cost, not merely from lunatics, criminals, and foreign invaders, but from an overreaching government itself. Indeed, the threat to the rights and liberties of the American People posed by the federal government itself is significantly more dangerous – infinitely more dangerous – than acts of gun violence perpetrated by lunatics, criminals and, of late, from radicalized Islamic sociopaths. The New York Times is hoping and trusting that most Americans do not -- and will not -- realize what it is they are being asked to sacrifice in the name of feigned security.So it is that the real threat to America is becoming increasingly plain to most Americans. That threat is posed by powerful, ruthless individuals and groups – the international globalists and socialists – both inside this Country and abroad, who seek to take control of the federal government from the American People, to pave the way for an International Socialist State, and they are using, through the New York Times newspaper, the bugaboo of Islamic jihadists to frighten the American public into forsaking its sacred rights and liberties. The New York Times is obviously the sounding board that gives voice to the propaganda such powerful, ruthless individuals and groups seek to use against the American People – that the People will give up their rights and liberties, unknowingly, through subterfuge, possibly, and, if that fails, then through coercion. As these un-American interests so dare to bring America to its knees, there will be a day of reckoning. And that day of reckoning is fast approaching.[separator type="medium" style="normal" align="left"margin-bottom="25" margin_top="5"] Copyright © 2015 Roger J Katz (Towne Criour), Stephen L. D’Andrilli (Publius) All Rights Reserved.