CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS’ RELUCTANCE TO HANDLE MAJOR SECOND AMENDMENT ISSUES ENCOURAGES STATES TO DEFY SUPREME COURT RULINGS: THE WOLFORD VS. LOPEZ CASE IS YET ONE MORE DISTRACTION

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS SINCE THE 2022 BRUEN CASE TAKEN UP ONLY A FEW SECOND AMENDMENT CASES AND THOSE IT DOES TAKE UP ARE THE LEAST IMPORTANT: WOLFORD VS. LOPEZ IS ONE OF THOSE.

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS’ RELUCTANCE TO HANDLE MAJOR SECOND AMENDMENT ISSUES ENCOURAGES STATES TO DEFY SUPREME COURT RULINGS: THE WOLFORD VS. LOPEZ CASE IS YET ONE MORE DISTRACTION.

When the Supreme Court granted review of the Hawaii case, Wolford vs. Lopez, 116 F.4th 959 (9th Cir. 2024), cert. granted, No. 24-1046, 222 L. Ed. 2d 1241 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2025), those Americans who cherish the Right of the people to keep and bear arms, along with many Pro-Second Amendment groups, heralded the action as a positive sign that the High Court hadn’t forsaken concern for the continued sanctity and inviolability of our most vital Natural Law Right, as codified in the Second Amendment of our Bill of Rights.

Yet, when viewed in the context of two earlier denials of writs for certiorari, most notably in the cases Antonyuk vs. James, 120 F. 4th 941, cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1900 (April 7, 2025), and Bianchi vs. Brown, 111 F. 4th 438 (4th Cir. 2024), recaptioned Snope vs. Brown, cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1534 (June 2, 2025)—cases involving matters requiring SCOTUS to expound upon, amplify or elaborate on, and clarify the pertinent rulings, reasoning,  and dicta laid out in the High Court’s THREE SECOND AMENDMENT LANDMARK CASES that consistently confounded, disconcerted, and troubled the lower state and federal courts—the Chief Justice, who sets the tone and theme of the Court, did nothing substantive to address those concerns.

More disturbing and mystifying, in those jurisdictions—New York, Hawaii, California, Illinois, and Maryland, among others—the incongruous failure of the Supreme Court to assiduously, and systematically resolve the nebulousness, ambiguity, vagueness, and imprecision hanging over the “HISTORICAL TRADITION” TEST in cases involving A STATE’S IMPINGEMENT OF AN AMERICAN’S EXERCISE OF HIS RIGHT TO ARMED SELF-DEFENSE, has led credence to Associate Justice Thomas’ justifiably angry assertion that, for far too long, the Fundamental, Unalienable, RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, codified in the SECOND AMENDMENT, is simply treated as a “SECOND CLASS RIGHT.” His point is: “THIS CASUAL, DESULTORY, ATTITUDE MUST CHANGE.”

The Associate Justice Clarence Thomas is referencing the Supreme Court’s continuous apathetic treatment of THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, when a significantly important Second Amendment case or controversy comes up for review. But the Justice is making his concern known in a not-so-subtle oblique manner. He is doing this as a matter of deference to the institution of the U.S. SUPREME COURT—THE THIRD BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

The result of this indifferent, if not diffident, manner expressed by SCOTUS (and more to the point, as one may readily infer, by the actions, or inaction, of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JOHN ROBERTS toward Second Amendment cases that come to the Court’s attention via a petition for writ of certiorari) is not lost on the two Senior Associate Justices, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. They are frustrated by the High Court’s failure to resolve important SECOND AMENDMENT ISSUES, nor is this seemingly detached, unconcerned attitude expressed by the High Court, toward the SECOND AMENDMENT, lost on the many stubborn, defiant states.

The standard that SCOTUS first enunciated in HELLER, the “HISTORICAL TRADITION” TEST, which the Court expanded on in BRUEN, replaces the LONG-STANDING but clearly DEFECTIVE “INTEREST BALANCING” STANDARD.

Those Justices that cherish the Right etched in the Second Amendment, no less so than the majority of Americans, had hoped that application of “HISTORICAL TRADITION” would prevent the lower state and appellate courts and the lower federal district courts and the appellate circuit courts, from perfunctorily giving their imprimatur to State actions that plainly infringe Americans’ exercise of their Right to Keep and Bear Arms.

However, given the justifiable perplexity, concerning proper use of the “HISTORICAL TRADITION” TEST, the Court needs to address application of this standard that, as is apparent from a perusal of the SCOTUS decision, and the well-reasoned dissent by Associate Justice Thomas, in UNITED STATES vs. RAHIMI, 602 U.S. 680, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024), requires further elucidation.

In addition, the Supreme Court must chastise those intransigent, stubborn courts that nakedly and brazenly refuse to adhere to the “WEAPONS IN COMMON USE” STANDARD, when giving blanket endorsement of plainly unconstitutional state action, constraining, or banning outright, Americans’ ownership and possession of an entire class of weapons, namely semiautomatic firearms, on the ground that they are “dangerous” and therefore are not weapons in common use. That is a singularly bizarre pronouncement, a clear distortion of the “WEAPONS IN COMMON USE” TEST, PRECISELY BECAUSE SEMIAUTOMATIC WEAPONS ARE IN COMMON USE, BY ANY RATIONAL METRIC, and that is all that Heller requires for such weapons to fall within the core of Second Amendment protection.

Unlike, application of the “HISTORICAL TRADITION” STANDARD, the import of “WEAPONS IN COMMON USE” TEST is CLEAR and CONCISE, COHERENT and CONSISTENT, and COMPREHENSIVE.

Yet many jurisdictions blatantly refuse to adhere to this standard. The issue comes up repeatedly in cases before the Court, where a petitioner challenges extreme restraints on, OR OUTRIGHT BANS ON, possession and ownership of semiautomatic weapons which are weapons in common use.

Some states have imposed extraordinary restrictions on or bans on the possession and ownership of semiautomatic weapons, referring to them as “ASSAULT WEAPONS.”

Yet, the expression, ‘ASSAULT WEAPON,’ is not recognized by either the firearms trade or by the military. The phrase is a fiction, deliberately crafted as a pejorative construction, intentionally and maliciously created to evoke a negative response in the American public.

The military does, however, utilize the phrase ‘ASSAULT RIFLE,’ that the Press, either deliberately or negligently uses synonymously with the phrase, “ASSAULT WEAPONS.” But the former phrase is a military term of art. The latter is nothing more than a propaganda tool crafted for political purposes.

The military phrase, ‘ASSAULT RIFLE” is defined as A SELECTIVE FIRE WEAPON, EMPLOYING AN INTERMEDIATE CARTRIDGE.” The phrase hearkens back almost a century, when this class of military weapon was first designed and manufactured for German troops during the Second World War. The German military referred to this new type of weapon as the “STURMGEWHER.”

But the phrase “ASSAULT WEAPON” means nothing but what the politician or propagandist wishes to make of it.

The phrase is utilized by those virulent Anti-Second Amendment groups seeking to ban civilian use of semiautomatic weapons. The NRA-ILA reported that,

In 1984, a group called Handgun Control, Inc. first used the term “assault weapon” in reference to a rifle in a newspaper advertisement.

Anti-Second Amendment jurisdictions, sympathetic to the goals of groups that seek de facto repeal of the Second Amendment, have begun to selectively abolish classes of weapons and to enlarge the domain of individuals who are not permitted to lawfully own and possess weapons. These groups work with states that share the sympathies of these groups, crafting statutes codes, rules, regulations, and ordinances to accomplish their aims.

The phrase, “ASSAULT WEAPON”, as a propaganda device, is utilized in the Press and social media, and in the literature of Anti-Second Amendment groups to indoctrinate those Americans who are peculiarly susceptible to psychological conditioning. The aim is to create a visceral reaction in the target population, to hate and fear semiautomatic weapons and to grow suspicious of those Americans who own and possess such weapons. Thus, the phrase has developed into a legal term of art, appearing in the penal code of many jurisdictions.

It is likely that the phrase first became a legal term of art in New York when, in 2013, Andrew Cuomo, who was the Governor of New York at the time, connived with the State Legislature to pass what is deceptively called the “NEW YORK SAFE ACT.”

Many other jurisdictions have since jumped on the bandwagon, crafting similar laws.

Americans have not sat idle while our Nation’s most vital Right is wrenched from them. They have filed a slew of challenges, seeking to strike down severe constraints or outright bans on Assault Weapons (a.k.a. semiautomatic weapons). Three major cases have wended their way to the U.S. Supreme Court on this matter. But, in every instance, the Court has denied review of those cases, plainly at the insistence of Chief Justice Roberts. See our discussion of this matter, infra.

The question is, WHY HAS JOHN ROBERTS failed to cast a vote favoring review of these cases?

Plainly, the Chief Justice has refused to grant certiorari because he does not perceive the Right codified in the Second Amendment as worthy of the Court’s time and attention.

Roberts has obviously made his lack of interest, or displeasure, in matters pertaining to the Second Amendment well apparent to the eight associate justices.

The Chief Justice has scotched review of a Second Amendment case involving the issue of semiautomatic weapons, back in 2015, and he has continued this practice in 2022, and yet once again in 2024. See our discussion infra.

Thus, precedent-setting rulings and reasoning set down in the three Landmark Second Amendment cases continue to be ignored in those jurisdictions that detest our Nation’s most vital Right, WITHOUT WHICH our Nation’s FREE CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC——THE ONLY TRULY FREE REPUBLIC in the world—— and the American People, as the SOLE and SUPREME SOVEREIGN OVER GOVERNMENT, cannot exist.

CONSIDER——  

State and Federal Courts that abhor the Right codified in the Second Amendment and that absolutely detest the idea of an ARMED CITIZENRY have long abused application of “INTEREST-BALANCING, by rubber-stamping State enactments that infringe the Fundamental, Natural Law Right to armed self-defense, whenever challenges to the constitutionality of those enactments come to those lower state and federal courts through complaints and motions.

The crafting of the “HISTORICAL TRADITION” STANDARD and the declaration that WEAPONS IN COMMON USE ARE PROTECTED BY THE SECOND AMENDMENT Iin the LANDMARK HELLER case was supposed to compel those jurisdictions, naturally predisposed to enact laws whittling away at the Fundamental Right to armed self-defense, to alter their deleterious actions.

But, in practice, the seminal Second Amendment cases—that came about well over two hundred years since ratification of the Bill of Rights—have done precious little to convert a SECOND-CLASS RIGHT into a FIRST-CLASS RIGHT.

Recalcitrant jurisdictions continue to issue convoluted opinions that pretend to apply the holdings, reasoning, and dicta of the seminal Second Amendment cases, without doing so, or as exemplified by the decisions coming out of the courts in these jurisdictions, the rulings of the Landmark cases are simply ignored. Unfortunately, these unconstitutional, unconscionable, and brash actions by intransigent, recalcitrant states will continue so long as the U.S. Supreme Court continues to abandon its responsibility to defend the Nation’s most important Natural Law Right, the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms. Unless the Supreme Court changes gears, this Republic will wither and eventually cease to exist.

The result will be noticeable by all Americans as a Free Republic begins to crumble. And the Supreme Court, for its part, will lose status and will be held in contempt for failing to utilize its powerful Article III power to upbraid wayward states and their courts. The Court’s precedents will also lose efficacy. This sad state of affairs is occurring with noticeable speed.

The result of the Court’s actions, or inaction, is that the landmark cases, District of Columbia vs. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), McDonald vs. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S. Ct. 330 (2010), and New York State Rifle & Pistol Association (NYSRPA) vs. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), having slowly atrophied through the failure of the High Court to grant review of the most significant cases, Antonyuk vs. James and Snope vs. Brown, will eventually ossify and ultimately become a “dead letter.”

And all this would come about because the High Court forsakes concern for the SANCTITY AND INVIOLABILITY of our FREE CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC’S MOST VITAL NATURAL LAW RIGHT, “THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS.”

This brings us back to the present Second Amendment case before the Supreme Court, Wolford vs. Lopez. Sure, the High Court has finally taken up a Second Amendment case. But is this elation misplaced? We think so, and our belief isn’t based on the thought that SCOTUS will decide the Wolford case wrongly, meaning that SCOTUS will affirm the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that ruled in favor of the State of Hawaii, against the Wilson Petitioners.

A bad, legally dubious outcome is unlikely. It is unlikely because the conservative wing of the Court—the true conservative wing—comprising two senior Associate Justices, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, and possibly one of the junior Associate justices, Neil Gorsuch—would never proffer votes to review Second Amendment cases if doing so would lead to a decision weakening the Second Amendment Right and undermining the RULINGS and REASONING of the THREE LANDMARK Second Amendment cases.

The sole issue in Wolford is——

“WHETHER THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 9TH CIRCUIT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HAWAII MAY PRESUMPTIVELY PROHIBIT THE CARRY OF HANDGUNS BY LICENSED CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT HOLDERS ON PRIVATE PROPERTY OPEN TO THE PUBLIC UNLESS THE PROPERTY OWNER AFFIRMATIVELY GIVES EXPRESS PERMISSION TO THE HANDGUN CARRIER.

This question, which we feel is a secondary one, begs a couple of preliminary or salient questions, one of which is——

WHETHER A STATE’S USE OF “SENSITIVE PLACE” RESTRICTIONS TO PROHIBIT THE CITIZEN FROM CARRYING A HANDGUN FOR SELF-DEFENSE UNLAWFULLY REINTRODUCES AND IMPLICATES THE INTEREST-BALANCING STANDARD BACK INTO SECOND AMENDMENT ANALYSIS, WHERE A STATE NOT ONLY INFRINGES THE NATURAL LAW RIGHT TO ARMED SELF-DEFENSE BUT INFRINGES FUNDAMENTAL PRIVATE PROPERTY INTERESTS AS WELL, CLAIMING A JUSTIFIABLE USE OF A STATE’S POLICE POWERS UNDER THE TENTH AMENDMENT TO PROMOTE PUBLIC SAFETY REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HAWAII’S ACTION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE HISTORICAL TRADITION TEST, FIRST ARTICULATED IN HELLER AND FURTHER EXPLAINED IN BRUEN.

This question raises two others, ONE OF WHICH IS THE SALIENT ISSUE MENTIONED IN WOLFORD THAT THE COURT DECLINED TO REVIEW.

CONSIDER IN ENTIRETY THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE WOLFORD PETITIONER’ PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI, AND AS REASSERTED IN THE SUPREME COURT’S DOCKET.

In that DOCKET, THE HIGH COURT SAYS,

24-1046 WOLFORD V. LOPEZ

DECISION BELOW: 116 F.4th 959

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-16164

QUESTION PRESENTED:

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 33 (2022), holds that "the Second Amendment guarantees a general right to public carry" of arms, meaning ordinary, law-abiding citizens may "'bear' arms in public for self-defense." In this case, the Ninth Circuit sustained a Hawaii law that makes it a crime for a concealed carry permit holder to carry a handgun on private property unless he has been "given express authorization to carry a firearm on the property by the owner, lessee, operator, or manager of the property." H.R.S. § 134-9.5. That holding is in acknowledged direct conflict with the Second Circuit's holding in Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941 (2d Cir. 2024), a decision that struck down an identical State law in the same procedural posture as this case.

The Ninth Circuit also sustained a multitude of other location bans on carry by permit holders, relying solely on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws. That doctrinal approach is in direct conflict with the Third Circuit's decision in Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police, 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025), the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269 (5th Cir. 2024), the Eighth Circuit's decision in Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677 (8th Cir. 2024), and, most recently, the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in NRA v. Bondi, No. 21-12314, 2025 WL 815734 at *5 (11th Cir. March 14,2025) (en banc), all of which hold that primary focus must be on Founding generation laws and tradition in applying the text, history and tradition test Bruen mandates.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding, in direct conflict with the Second Circuit, that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit the carry of handguns by licensed concealed carry permit holders on private property open to the public unless the property owner affirmatively gives express permission to the handgun carrier?

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in solely relying on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws in applying Bruen's text, history and tradition test in direct conflict with the holdings of the Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits?

LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.

CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025

[EMPHASIS OUR OWN]

NOTE TWO MATTERS: The Petitioners’ reference to the Antonyuk case, and the Court’s decision to strike review of the issue that goes directly to the point in time that a reviewing court must look to when applying the Historical Tradition Test, when searching for a constitutionally permissible analog to support a present state enactment.

ALSO: COMPARE THE SECOND ISSUE TO THE FIRST ISSUE SET FORTH IN THE COURT’S DOCKET IN ANTONYUK VS. JAMES, WHICH THE COURT SUBSEQUENTLY DENIED, WITHOUT COMMENT, ON APRIL 7, 2025:

ISSUE: (1) Whether the proper historical time period for ascertaining the Second Amendment’s original meaning as applied to the states is 1791, rather than 1868; and (2) whether "the people" must convince government officials of their "good moral character" before exercising their Second Amendment right to bear arms.

The first issue in ANTONYUK is essentially the same issue presented in WOLFORD that SCOTUS refuses to entertain. WHY?

The first issue, once again, goes to the specific date that a reviewing court must use when determining whether a proper analog exists that supports a present state action that impacts the Second Amendment.

The second question is also important since the New York Government, under Governor Kathy Hochul, shredded the Bruen ruling by SUBSTITUTING THE “PROPER CAUSE” standard, that the High Court struck down as unconstitutional in Bruen, for “THE “GOOD MORAL CHARACTER” requirement, that served effectively to obliterate the import of the Court’s decision in Bruen.

One would think the U.S. Supreme Court would have taken up Antonyuk if for no other reason than the New York Government’s blatant refusal to adhere to the Court’s rulings, which, as the case comes to the Court from New York, are specifically directed to the New York Handgun Law. That did not happen. And, that fact makes the Supreme Court’s denial of the Antonyuk Petition, doubly perplexing, and more disturbing.

THE SUPREME COURT DENIED REVIEW OF ANTONYUK.

THE COURT DID SO WITHOUT ANY COMMENT AT ALL (FROM EITHER JUSTICE THOMAS OR JUSTICE ALITO) WHEN ANTONYUK WAS DESTINED TO BECOME THE FOURTH LANDMARK SECOND AMENDMENT CASE IF SCOTUS HAD GRANTED REVIEW OF PETITIONERS’ PETITION.

OF FURTHER NOTE, THE ISSUE PERTAINING TO CLARIFICATION OF THE HISTORICAL TRADITION TEST WAS THE SALIENT ISSUE IN THE ANTONYUK PETITION. THIS PROBABLY EXPLAINED WHY THE CHIEF JUSTICE DID NOT WANT TO TOUCH THIS CASE.

The curious thing about the HISTORICAL TRADITION TEST that SCOTUS refuses to entertain, is that the issue cannot LOGICALLY, LET ALONE LEGALLY, BE IGNORED.

THIS PARAMOUNT ISSUE SUFFUSES EVERY SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUE INVOLVING THE SECOND AMENDMENT.

The HISTORICAL TRADITION TEST came up, and was discussed at length in the Rahimi case, and it came up in Wolford—as a major matter of discussion DURING THE ORAL ARGUMENT. And, yet, because SCOTUS refuses to deal with HISTORICAL TRADITION as an ISSUE THAT DEMANDS RESOLUTION, any discussion of it must remain one of COURT DICTA, useful but not clearly precedential as the Justices provide their own learned ideas concerning it, but will not be able to assert a decisive ruling on it as Justice Roberts has removed the issue from consideration.

It is off the table as matter to be resolved in a firm ruling or holding. That is a decision ultimately determinative by the John Roberts, as the Chief Justice, notwithstanding that one or more of the other Justices may have influenced the Chief Justice on the matter—likely coming from the liberal wing of the Court.

And there is another issue that goes to the heart of the “SENSITIVE PLACE” RESTRICTION ISSUE, which SCOTUS hasn’t touched upon except in a tangential manner during the Hearing. And the issue will not be resolved when the decision comes down.

That issue which we consider to be a salient one is this:

WHETHER A STATE’S USE OF “SENSITIVE PLACE” RESTRICTIONS TO PROHIBIT THE CITIZEN FROM CARRYING A HANDGUN FOR SELF-DEFENSE UNLAWFULLY REINTRODUCES AND IMPLICATES A DEFUNCT INTEREST-BALANCING STANDARD INTO SECOND AMENDMENT ANALYSIS, WHERE A STATE NOT ONLY INFRINGES THE NATURAL LAW RIGHT TO ARMED SELF-DEFENSE BUT INFRINGES FUNDAMENTAL PRIVATE PROPERTY INTERESTS AS WELL, CLAIMING A JUSTIFIABLE USE OF A STATE’S POLICE POWERS UNDER THE TENTH AMENDMENT TO PROMOTE PUBLIC SAFETY, WHERE A REVIEWING COURT WEIGHS EACH PARTY’S INTERESTS AND ULTIMATELY DECIDES IN FAVOR OF THE STATE OVER THE INDIVIDUAL.

And the above issue raises a further issue, namely——

WHETHER THE EXERCISE OF A STATE’S POLICE POWERS UNDER THE TENTH AMENDMENT, CONFLICTS WITH AN INDIVIDUAL’S NATURAL LAW FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF ARMED SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT.

The question as we have phrased it presumes a preliminary matter that lies at the heart of the matter before the Court even if the Court even gets to the issue whether a State (in this case, Hawaii) can lawfully require a property owner to post signage on private property opened to the public that expressly and positively affirms that——

“FIREARMS ARE ALLOWED ON THIS PROPERTY.”

THIS IS AKIN TO A SIGN PROCLAIMING, “TRESPASSING IS ALLOWED ON THIS PROPERTY.”

Such a message is singularly absurd on its face. It is the flipside of the more usual sign one comes to see on “PRIVATE PROPERTY OPENED TO THE PUBLIC”:

“FIREARMS ARE NOT ALLOWED ON THIS PROPERTY,”

as is the sign:

“TRESPASSING IS NOT ALLOWED ON THIS PROPERTY AND ALL TRESPASSERS WILL BE PROSECUTED.”

Since some standard of review is necessary to resolve the issue, the Supreme Court cannot ignore the issue. Thus, the Historical Tradition test is invoked whether the Court wants to deal with it or not.

Worse, the failure of the Court to allow the Justices to formally review the “HISTORICAL TRADITION” as an issue in the case, to give guidance to itself, so that it can provide guidance to the lower state and federal courts, means that conflicts among the several jurisdictions will continue, and the efficacy of the new standard will be reduced.

Worst of all, the old INTEREST- BALANCING STANDARD raises its ugly head.

Although INTEREST-BALANCING cannot be properly entertained because HELLER effectively struck down the use of that standard in SECOND AMENDMENT cases, it still exists below the surface and infects lower court decisions—even those of the SUPREME COURT—because all actions of the State concerning restrictions on exercise of the right codified in the Second Amendment, ultimately rely on the State’s TENTH AMENDMENT POLICE POWERS.

Thus, courts that abhor an individual’s exercise of his RIGHT to ARMED SELF-DEFENSE cannot help but revert back to using the old INTEREST-BALANCING approach, albeit, deviously, by masking the use of it under whatever point in time in history is convenient for it, and by using whatever historical analog it wishes however dubious, to justify affirming the constitutionality of the State’s action.

Thus, use of “HISTORICAL TRADITION” BECOMES INTEREST-BALANCING ALL OVER AGAIN. IF CLOAKED AS HISTORICAL TRADITION. And application of this old standard cannot help but arise because Chief Justice Roberts refuses to allow SCOTUS to set out the contours of HISTORICAL TRADITION both in terms of the historical point in time a reviewing court is permitted to look at when searching for a suitable analog, and the criteria to be used by a reviewing court to determine if THAT ANALOG is legally and logically sound and thus supports a finding that a state’s action, impacting the individual’s exercise of his fundamental right to keep and bear arms, can withstand constitutional scrutiny.

With SCOTUS failing to define the parameters and contours of the HISTORICAL TRADITION STANDARD, this means the standard is incapable of being employed systematically, and becomes a thing more akin to an ad hoc rule, and THAT, then, INVOKES INTEREST-BALANCING, albeit tacitly (even if the reviewing court refrains from using the specific words ‘interest-balancing’).

Thus, the standard crafted in Heller, “HISTORICAL TRADITION” will fail as a truly effective operational standard that reviewing courts could otherwise employ (including THE HIGHEST COURT IN THE LAND). Thus, a useful standard, to ascertain the constitutionality of a state action impinging on the SECOND AMENDMENT, remains wanting.

Commencing with Rahimi, and moving next to Wolford, the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrates its own confusion concerning the application of the “HISTORICAL TRADITION” STANDARD. And, if the U.S. Supreme Court runs into problems using this standard, one cannot be surprised that the lower courts will run into similar problems. Therefore, there will continue to exist confusion in the various Circuits.

This problem is manifest in the manner in which Hawaii’s Supreme Court approaches Wolford. The Hawaii Supreme Court talks at length about its own history—a history that goes back in time to a period before Hawaii was even a territory of the United States—to justify any enactment of Hawaii that operates as an assault on our Nation’s core belief in the sanctity of the citizen’s right to keep and bear arms. For this sacred Right is not cherished in Hawaii.

To the contrary, this Fundamental, Unalienable, Natural Law Right is anathema to Hawaii. This is reflected in the present law of Hawaii involving Hawaii’s inserting itself into the area of private property, forcing bizarre signage on private property opened to the public, implicating both private property law and the Second Amendment.

The crassness of Hawaii’s position is apparent in its law.

Hawaii abhors “the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms.” And, this crassness is reflected in the idiocy of the State requiring the owner of private property opened to the public to positively affirm that the carrying of firearms id acceptable on one’s private property, in lieu of the obvious, sensical, and common practice throughout the Nation of private property owners posting signs positing, “GUNS NOT ALLOWED ON THESE PREMISES.”

Hawaii requires instead, the nonsensical flipside signage: “GUNS ARE ALLOWED ON THESE PREMISES” (OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT).

This is the point of Justice Alito’s criticism of the Hawaii law which he levels at the Respondent State of Hawaii.

During oral argument, while directing his remarks to the Attorney representing Hawaii, and by first referring to a comment regarding a poll cited by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Alito said,

Justice Sotomayor cited a poll about what the people of Hawaii think about the possession of guns.  I'm not aware of the poll, but let's assume it's correct.  Let's assume that 78 percent or whatever the figure was in the poll that she  cited really don't like guns.

So what then is the big deal about this statute? Why does it matter if store owners and owners of private property that is — that are generally open to the public don't like guns, why is it a big deal to say they want people carrying guns to stay out, just put up a sign?

Why does Hawaii have to have this law?”

The Attorney for Respondent State, Mr. Katyal, responded unconvincingly to Justice Alito’s question, and his reply was immediately cut short by Justice Gorsuch.

Mr. Katyal said,

So, I think Hawaii has — like all state legislatures, has the right to put a default rule in that says — that tracks the expectations of its people, . . .”

Mr. Katyal is wrong. He presumes erroneously that state legislatures can enact laws that a majority of people want, or think that they want, because the propagandists and the cultists in the state government, AND in the Press, AN D in social media have effectively brainwashed a sizable percentage of the public to accept a false proposition, short-circuiting use of one’s higher mental faculties that would illustrate the error.

Hawaii has an easier time of it, since, having no tradition of a right of the people to keep and bear arms, the original Hawaiians are predisposed to find both firearms and those people who wish to keep and bear them, as repugnant. Be that as it may, Hawaii is not a separate and distinct Country and hasn’t been for over a century and a half, but it behaves as if it still were an independent country, a monarchy. A majority of Hawaiians may wish to ignore the import of the Second Amendment, but a majority of Hawaiians so wishing the Second Amendment away does not make it so in Hawaii or in any other State or territory of the U.S.

A tyranny of the majority does not trump THE SUPREMACY of the CONSTITUTION, of which the Bill of Rights, codifying many Natural Law Rights, is a major component. And one of the Natural Law Rights expressly set forth in the Bill of Rights is the Right to Armed Self-defense.  

Nonetheless, the Hawaii State Supreme Court insists that Hawaii’s history allows it to override the U.S. CONSTITUTION and FEDERAL LAW, and SUPREME COURT RULINGS, whenever Hawaii feels that a conflict exists between Hawaii’s HISTORICAL TRADITIONS and the U.S. CONSTITUTION, FEDERAL LAW, and SUPREME COURT jurisprudence.

This erroneous position, illustrating a defiant attitude, is demonstrated plainly in another Hawaii case, Wilson vs. Hawaii, 154 Haw. 8. 543 P. 3d 440 (Haw. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 18, 229 L. Ed. 2d 266 (U.S. 2024).

In the first line of the opinion, the Hawaii Supreme Court asserts clearly, concisely and categorically, “Article I, section 17 of the Hawai'i Constitution mirrors the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. We read those words differently than the current United States Supreme Court. We hold that in Hawai'i there is no state constitutional right to carry a firearm in public.”

That one line sums up Hawaii’s incredible position concerning its perceived relationship to the United States. And if Hawaii were applying the HISTORICAL TRADITION TEST, the Court would hold that substantial analogs exist in its own history TO SUPPORT ITS HOLDING. This is where it is incumbent on SCOTUS to make plain that HISTORICAL analogs must have nationwide effect. But then, how does one impute a Hawaii analog pertaining to the right of the people to keep and bear arms to the Nation? Obviously, one cannot, but where has the U.S. Supreme Court expressly ruled on the impact of local historical tradition on its own or other states’ historical traditions, pertaining to the right to armed self-defense?

SCOTUS remains silent on this, except, perhaps, in dicta. And the Chief Justice, Roberts, along, no doubt, with the liberal wing of the Court, seems to be happy to keep matters this way.

Hawaii apparently still considers itself a Monarchy, and that attitude is reflected in its distaste for the Natural Law Right to Armed Self-defense. The Hawaii Supreme Court further states, in the Wilson opinion,

Hawai'i's historical tradition excludes an individual right to possess weapons. Hawai'i prohibited the public carry of lethal weapons — with no exceptions for licensed weapons — from 1833-1896. Unlicensed public carry of firearms has been illegal from 1896 to the present. Hawai'i has never recognized a right to carry deadly weapons in public; not as a Kingdom, Republic, Territory, or State.”

The Hawaii Supreme Court’s negative posture toward this Nation’s core beliefs, as reflected in the Nation’s Bill of Rights is fervently expressed.

Like New York, the Hawaii acknowledges the Bruen case decision but then goes merrily along, crafting mechanisms—once again, like New York—that are meant, in their implementation, to defy, not comply with, the rulings and reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court.

New York’s “Concealed Carry Improvement Act” (CCIA) that is New York’s answer to the Bruen rulings, is at once a brazen blatant action TO DEFY the U.S. Supreme Court and, instead of chastising the New York Government, the Court allows the State to continue its act of defiance.

And, for one to say the High Court correctly denied the Antonyuk Petitioners Petition for Writ of Certiorari, challenging the legality and constitutionality of New York’s CCIA because the case came to the SCOTUS in a non-final condition, is simplistic and doubtful.

The Supreme Court has absolute discretion to take up a case even if it is in an interlocutory state, if the Court so wishes. And there is reason enough for the Court to have reviewed Antonyuk vs. James. The main issues have been fully briefed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had reiterated its decision on remand in a GVR in accordance with Petitioners’ request as set forth in their First Petition to the Court in 2024.

Furthermore, Wolford, too, is still itself, at least in part, in an interlocutory state. So, then, why did the High Court decide to review the Hawaii case, and perfunctorily deny review of Antonyuk, and that of Snope, as well?

The issues in Antonyuk would have resulted in that case becoming the Fourth Landmark Second Amendment case. And the issue in Snope would have resulted in that case becoming the Fifth Landmark Second Amendment case.

Yet the Supreme Court passed on both and, instead, takes up Wolford that is of least significance. Even the Hawaii Wilson case is of significant importance, but the Court denied Petitioner’s Writ of Certiorari in that case too.

The Hawaii Supreme Court’s lengthy prose in Wilson reads more like a historical exposition than a legal opinion.

That case would be an ideal one for the Court to clarify THE HISTORICAL TRADITION TEST and also make plain to Hawaii that the Fundamental Right etched in the Second Amendment is not to be trifled with.

The Hawaii State Supreme Court goes on at length about its own HISTORICAL TRADITION, making plain that, since it never accepted a RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, the U.S. Supreme Court must not impose that Right on the State.

So, then, what is one to make of the fact that Hawaii has included the wording of the Second Amendment in its own Constitution?

The State Supreme Court admits as much, but then says it does not mean what the plain words say it means, essentially, then, de facto erasing the import of the language in its own Constitution. But then, why did the State include the language of the Second Amendment of the Bill of Rights in its State Constitution? There is no explanation for this, which confounds the U.S. Supreme Court. See our discussion infra.

Denying what cannot rationally be denied seems to be a natural propensity of many Courts.

It is curious that, to the best of our knowledge neither one of the parties in Wolford brought up Wilson, nor did Wilson appear in any of the amici briefs. And the U.S. Supreme Court did not mention Wilson during Oral Argument in Wolford. This strikes us as odd.

Perhaps no reference is made to Wilson because John Roberts had limited the Wolford case to the first issue presented—the one involving “SENSITIVE PLACE” RESTRICTIONS, while “HISTORICAL TRADITION” as an issue was to be assiduously avoided, even though it came up constantly during Oral Argument as it couldn’t be ignored.

In any event, the Hawaii Supreme Court had much to say about its history, to demonstrate its emphatic distaste for the notion of an armed citizen. We provide a portion of the State Supreme Court’s Wilson opinion, below.

In 1898, the United States, by joint resolution of Congress, annexed the Republic of Hawai'i, creating the Territory of Hawai'i. Newlands Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 259, 55th Cong. (1898), 30 Stat. 750.

Though the Hawaiian Islands were now ruled by a subjugating nation, Hawai'i continued its historic tradition of strict weapons regulation.

The year before Bruen, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Hawai'i's regulatory framework for firearms, HRS chapter 134. Young v. Hawai'i, 992 F.3d 765, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2021).

Young recounts the history of weapons regulation in Hawai'i through much of the 20th century. . . .”

In Hawai'i, the Aloha Spirit inspires constitutional interpretation. See Sunoco, 153 Hawai'i at 363, 537 P.3d at 1210 (Eddins, J., concurring).

When this court exercises "power on behalf of the people and in fulfillment of [our] responsibilities, obligations, and service to the people" we "may contemplate and reside with the life force and give consideration to the 'Aloha Spirit.'" HRS § 5-7.5(b) (2009).

The spirit of Aloha clashes with a federally-mandated lifestyle that lets citizens walk around with deadly weapons during day-to-day activities.

The history of the Hawaiian Islands does not include a society where armed people move about the community to possibly combat the deadly aims of others. See Haw. Const. art. IX, § 10 ("The law of the splintered paddle . . . shall be a unique and living symbol of the State's concern for public safety.").

The government's interest in reducing firearms violence through reasonable weapons regulations has preserved peace and tranquility in Hawai'i. A free-wheeling right to carry guns in public degrades other constitutional rights.

The right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, encompasses a right to freely and safely move in peace and tranquility. See Haw. Const. art. I, § 2; Haw. Const. art. IX, § 10. Laws regulating firearms in public preserve ordered liberty and advance these rights.

There is no individual right to keep and bear arms under article I, section 17. So, there is no constitutional right to carry a firearm in public for possible self-defense.”

The facts of this Supreme Court case are as follows:

In December 2017, at about 11:00 p.m., Flyin Hawaiian Zipline owner Duane Ting saw men on his fenced-in property via video surveillance. Ting reported the matter to the Maui Police Department. Officers headed to Ting's property. Meanwhile Ting, driving an all-terrain vehicle, corralled Wilson and his three companions. Armed with an AR-15 assault rifle, he detained them until the police arrived. Then Wilson volunteered to the officers: "I have a weapon in my front waist band." The police lifted his shirt. Wilson had a Phoenix Arms .22 LR caliber pistol, loaded with ten rounds of .22 caliber ammunition. A records check reported that the pistol was unregistered in Hawai'i, and Wilson had not obtained or applied for a permit to own a handgun. Wilson told the police that he legally bought the gun in Florida in 2013.”

Wilson argues that Hawaii’s laws violate his right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside his home.”

Wilson had not applied for a carry license, likely because acquiring a valid license to carry was, prior to Bruen, and now, after, Bruen, still extraordinarily difficult to acquire in Hawaii.

Hawaii's handgun carry statute, codified as, HRS § 134-9. governs the issuance of licenses to carry concealed or unconcealed pistols or revolvers within the state.

The statute requires applicants to meet specific criteria, including completing a training course, being the registered owner of the firearm, and demonstrating compliance with federal, state, and county firearm laws. The statute also provides for administrative and judicial review in cases of license denial . HRS § 134-9. Hence, Hawaii’s Handgun Carry Statute is much like New York’s and likely was modeled on New York’s Statute following Bruen, which is inconsistent with Bruen and insults the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Hawaii Supreme Court in Wilson argues that its statute HRS § 134-9 does not violate the Second Amendment because states retain the authority to require licenses for public carry, provided the licensing process is consistent with historical firearm regulations State v. Wilson, 154 Haw. 8. But that is circular reasoning.

Even if one assumes for sake of argument that State licensing of firearms generally, and handguns particularly, can withstand constitutional scrutiny, Hawaii argues its interpretation restricting handgun carry is necessary and is consistent with HRS § 134-9, which restricts carrying firearms on private property without express authorization which is presently contested under Wolford, and must also be read in line with HRS § 134-25, which limits the transport of firearms outside specific circumstances and THAT raises the ghost of the New York City Handgun Transport case.

Thus, while Bruen invalidated discretionary "may-issue" licensing regimes, Hawaii's HRS § 134-9 remains in effect, subject to ongoing legal challenges and interpretations.

The statute's compatibility with the Second Amendment hinges on whether its requirements align with the historical tradition of firearm regulation as articulated in Bruen, BUT THEY DON’T.

The Plaintiff Petitioner Wilson filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari after the Hawaii Supreme Court vacated the decision and returned the case to the Circuit Court.

Concerning Bruen, the Hawaii Supreme Court, in Wilson, stated,

Bruen snubs federalism principles. Still, the United States Supreme Court does not strip states of all sovereignty to pass traditional police power laws designed to protect people. Wilson has standing to challenge HRS § 134-25(a) and § 134-27(a). But those laws do not violate his federal constitutional rights.”

The Hawaii Supreme Court continues,

We hold that the text and purpose of the Hawai'i Constitution, and Hawai'i's historical tradition of firearm regulation, do not support a constitutional right to carry deadly weapons in public.

We conclude that HRS § 134-25 and § 134-27 do not violate Wilson's right to keep and bear arms under article I, section 17 of the Hawai'i Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Since Wilson lacks standing to challenge HRS § 134-9, we do not take up his Second Amendment challenge to that law.

Although the State Supreme Court returned the case to the lower Circuit Court to resolve issues involving the application of certain statutes, the Hawaii Supreme Court did not address the Plaintiff Petitioner’s Second Amendment issue, which the U.S. Supreme Court makes a point of remarking on. But then, what explains the U.S. Supreme Court’s next action regarding the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari?

The Supreme Court denied the Petition. Although each of the Justices agreed to the denial, if reluctantly, Thomas wrote a lengthy comment, joined by Justice Alito, and Justice Gorsuch included his own comment.

But perusing those comments, it seems that these three Justices should have written dissents for the failure to grant the petition, rather than agree to the denial of certiorari, for their comments seem to belie their action in agreeing to the denial of the Petition. Rather, the Justices a strong desire to have reviewed the case.

Justice Thomas writes in principal part,

Wilson persuaded the Circuit Court to dismiss his unlicensed-carry charges. The Circuit Court recognized that Hawaii’s near-total restrictions on public carry could not be squared with Bruen, and it accordingly held that prosecuting Wilson for unlicensed carry would violate the Second Amendment and the parallel provision in Article I, §17, of the Hawaii Constitution.

The Hawaii Supreme Court disagreed. See 154 Haw. 8, 543 P. 3d 440. It spent the bulk of its opinion explaining why the Hawaii Constitution does not confer an individual right to bear arms, with analysis that doubled as a critique of this Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence. The court specifically took aim at our focus on original meaning. See id., at 19-23, 543 P. 3d, at 451-455. Bemoaning the policy consequences, the court asserted that an originalist interpretation of the Second Amendment “disables the states’ responsibility to protect public safety, reduce gun violence, and safeguard peaceful public movement,” by putting firearms restrictions “mostly out of bounds.” Id., at 22, 543 P. 3d, at 454. And, it denigrated the need for public carry in particular, rejecting as un-Hawaiian “a federally-mandated lifestyle that lets citizens walk around with deadly weapons.” Id., at 27, 543 P. 3d, at 459. On the Hawaii Supreme Court’s view, a sounder approach to constitutional interpretation would give due regard to the “spirit of Aloha” and would preclude any individual right to bear arms, or at least subject it to “levels of scrutiny and public safety balancing tests.” Id., at 21, 27, 543 P. 3d, at 453, 459.

Remarkably, the Hawaii Supreme Court’s recognition of the “federally-mandated” right to public carry disappeared when it turned to Wilson’s Second Amendment defense. There, the court invoked state standing law to avoid any meaningful Second Amendment analysis. It held that, because Wilson had not applied for a license and had not been charged with violating the licensing statute itself (which was not a criminal statute), he lacked standing to challenge the particulars of the licensing regime. Id., at 12-13, 543 P. 3d, at 444-445. Instead, he could argue only that the Second Amendment categorically forbids state licensing regimes. Because that is not the case, the court held, Hawaii’s prohibitions on unlicensed carry “do not graze Wilson’s Second Amendment right.” Id., at 27, 543 P. 3d, at 459.

The decision below is the latest example of a lower court “fail[ing] to afford the Second Amendment the respect due an enumerated constitutional right.” Silvester v. Becerra, 583 U. S. 1139, 1140, 138 S. Ct. 945, 200 L. Ed. 2d 293 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). As this Court has repeatedly emphasized, “[t]he constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense is not ‘a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.’” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 70, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (quoting McDonald, 561 U. S., at 780, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (plurality opinion)). So, the Hawaii Supreme Court cannot single out the Second Amendment for disfavor, even if it does not believe that “right is really worth insisting upon.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 634, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008).

By invoking state standing law to dodge Wilson’s constitutional challenge, the Hawaii Supreme Court failed to give the Second Amendment its due regard. To be sure, a state-law standing determination ordinarily is an adequate and independent state ground precluding our review. But, as this Court has elsewhere recognized, only “constitutionally proper” rules can create adequate and independent state grounds. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U. S. 413, 421, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1044 (2013).

The Hawaii Supreme Court should have asked the threshold question whether the Second Amendment allows state standing law to restrict the defenses that criminal defendants facing firearms-related charges may raise. The answer is “no,” as our case law on constitutional challenges to licensing regimes makes clear.

A defendant can always raise unconstitutionality as a defense “where a statute is invalid upon its face and an attempt is made to enforce its penalties in violation of constitutional right.” Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, 562, 51 S. Ct. 582, 75 L. Ed. 1264 (1931). A “long line of precedent” confirms this point. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U. S. 750, 755-757, 108 S. Ct. 2138, 100 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988) (collecting cases).

Thus, a state-law holding that a defendant “lacked standing to attack the constitutionality of the ordinance because [he] made no attempt to secure a permit under it” is “not an adequate nonfederal ground of decision” where the “ordinance . . . on its face violates the Constitution.” Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 319, 78 S. Ct. 277, 2 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1958). This is true where, as here, an individual waits to raise the issue until “he is prosecuted for failure to procure” a license. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940). And, it is true even if the defendant’s “conduct could be proscribed by a properly drawn statute.” Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 56, 85 S. Ct. 734, 13 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1965).

Our rejection of state procedural restrictions on the invocation of constitutional defenses follows from the fact that constitutional rights are “self-executing prohibitions on governmental action.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 524, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 138 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1997). A constitutional violation accrues the moment the government undertakes an unconstitutional act. For example, a violation of the Takings Clause occurs “at the time of the taking.” Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 194, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 204 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2019). And, the availability of state-law compensation remedies cannot delay or undo the accrual of a takings claim. See id., at 193-194, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 204 L. Ed. 2d 558.

The same principles apply to the Second Amendment. That Amendment is similarly self-executing, and a State transgresses it  as soon as the State implements  a licensing regime that is inconsistent with the Nation’s “historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 17, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387. Judicial review of a license denial may be one way that an individual can challenge state overreach. But, because the constitutional violation occurs as soon as an individual’s right to bear arms is inhibited, States cannot mandate that would-be gun owners go through an unconstitutional licensing process before they may invoke their Second Amendment rights. Any other rule would impermissibly demote the Second Amendment “to the status of a poor relation” among constitutional rights. Knick, 588 U. S., at 189, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 204 L. Ed. 2d 558 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Had the Hawaii Supreme Court followed its duty to consider the merits of Wilson’s defense, the licensing scheme’s unconstitutionality should have been apparent. We have made clear that the Second Amendment is a right “guaranteed to all Americans,” whose exercise cannot be conditioned on a showing of “special need.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 70-71, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet, in restricting license eligibility to Hawaiians with “‘exceptional case[s],’” or who otherwise could show special “urgency” or “need,” the Hawaii regime did just that. Hawaii’s onerous restrictions closely paralleled those in the New York regime we held unconstitutional in Bruen. See id., at 13-15, and n. 2, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387; see also id., at 79, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (recognizing that Bruen’s holding applied to all States with “‘may-issue’ regimes”); Young v. Hawaii, 45 F. 4th 1087, 1092 (CA9 2022) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“we need not conduct the [Bruen] inquiry now because the Supreme Court has already done it for us”).

Gorsuch elicited similar comments and concerns with the handling of the case by the Hawaii Supreme Court.

So, then, why didn’t the Court take up the Wilson case, on the Second Amendment issue?

Hawaii’s distaste for the right of the people to keep and bear arms is only matched by its utter contempt for the Second Amendment and for Supreme Court Second Amendment Heller, McDonald, and Bruen jurisprudence.  The same distaste for the Right codified in the Second Amendment is exemplified in New York jurisprudence, reflecting its own history, antithetical to the right to armed self-defense.

It is interesting that Hawaii cites for support to New York case law to support its own historical disdain for the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms.

We reiterate that none of the Wolford Parties’ Briefs and none of the amici briefs mention the Wilson case, and the Wilson case never arose during Oral Argument.

That is perplexing especially since the Hawaii “sensitive place” restriction statute, essentially denies a citizen the right to carry in vast tracts of public lands as well as in private lands opened to the public, in the absence of an affirmative grant to carry by the property owner.

Hawaii, like New York, is plainly carrying on the aim of denying Americans the right to carry a handgun for self-defense, outside the home, although Hawaii, unlike New York, does not cloak its disdain for Bruen and for the Second Amendment generally.

New York for its part has devised its strategies, deviously and deceitfully, aimed at defeating Bruen, pretending to be compliant with it. However, even a cursory inspection shows those strategies have numerous holes in them reducing the State’s “Concealed Carry Improvement Act” into an implausible charade.

But, since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has placed its imprimatur on the CCIA, and the Supreme Court has refused to grant review of the case on the Antonyuk Petitioner’s Petition for review, despite indicating in the two years of litigation that it sought to take the case up, the New York State Government doesn’t care what anyone might happen to think about the inanity of the Government’s amendments to its Handgun Law.

As long as the Government can enforce the CCIA, that is the only thing of importance to the Government. It has effectively won the fight against those Americans—residing or working in the State—who have expended substantial time and inordinate amounts of money in the attempt to tear the State’s unconscionable unconstitutional Handgun Licensing Regime edifice down.

The Antonyuk case is presently back at the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, where it had started back in 2022. The case is in the discovery stage. It will take years before it wends its way back to the High Court, if it happens at all, as we have learned through a discussion we have had with attorneys for the Antonyuk Petitioners.

And, even then, in 2029, or later, would the Court grant review of the Antonyuk Petitioners’ PETITION—THE THIRD PETITION—IF IT WERE FILED?

In the interim, what will the U.S. Supreme Court do. if anything, with the HISTORICAL TRADITION TEST, and with the concept laid out in Heller, of “WEAPONS IN COMMON USE”? Anything? Nothing?

And, given that the Historical Tradition standard requires further explication and clarification, without which it is impossible for a reviewing Court, including the Supreme Court itself, to ascertain how to utilize it effectively, there is little in the area OF SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED UNLESS SCOTUS TAKES UP THE ISSUES FIRST MENTIONED IN HELLER, AND FURTHER EXPANDED UPON IN BRUEN.

Chief Justice John Roberts has rendered Supreme Court Second Amendment case law jurisprudence to a matter of simply tinkering around the edges. That is as far as he will go but that isn’t nearly far enough to protect the sanctity and inviolability of the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms. What this signifies is a slow death for our Nation’s most vital Right. For it is only through the constancy of this Right and Americans exercise of it that the American people remain the sole and supreme sovereign and arbiter over Government.

If the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to use its Article III authority to consciously and definitively protect this vital Natural Law Right, from unconstitutional onslaught by vindictive State and Federal Government intrusion into and interference with this Right, then the People must, in the last instance, rely on themselves to protect their unalienable, eternal right.

The founders of our Republic likely assumed that, ultimately, a FREE REPUBLIC, must be maintained by THE AMERICAN PEOPLE themselves, just as it was they who had to take up arms against a Tyrant. The People cannot rely on Government, State or Federal, to protect THE REPUBLIC, for it is in the nature of GOVERNMENT, to broaden its control over the populace, over “THE COMMON MAN.” THUS, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SO, and the founders of our Free Republic knew that TRUTH WELL. In our Nation, at least, of all the nations on Earth, we have a true BILL OF RIGHTS.

THE FRAMERS UNDERSTOOD THAT NATURAL LAW RIGHTS ARE PREEXISTENT IN MAN. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT CREATE THESE RIGHTS. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT LAWFULLY BESTOW THESE RIGHTS ON MAN, NOR RESCIND THEM FROM MAN. AND, OF ALL THE RIGHTS, ONE RIGHT, IN PARTICULAR, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS EXISTS BOTH AS AN ETERNAL RIGHT AND AN INSURMOUNTABLE POWER. ALL TYRANNIES KNOW THIS. AND EVEN A FREE CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC IS NOT IMMUNE FROM A FALL INTO TYRANNY. FOR TYRANNY IS THE NATURAL STATE OF GOVERNMENT.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES CAN FORESTALL THE INEXORABLE AND INEVITABLE SLIDE OF THE REPUBLIC INTO TYRANNY, BUT IT CANNOT ALONE PREVENT TYRANNY FROM ARISING. ONLY A WELL-ARMED, WELL EQUIPPED AND WELL -TRAINED ARMED CITIZENRY THAT ALSO HAS THE WILL TO RESIST TYRANNY, CAN TYRANNY BE KEPT INDEFINITELY AT BAY. IF GOVERNMENT DARES TO TAKE WHAT, WE THE PEOPLE GAVE TO GOVERNMENT—OUR CONSENT THAT GOVERNMENT MAY EXIST SO LONG AS IT WORKS TO SERVE OUR BEST INTERESTS, AND NOT ITS OWN, WILL WE DEIGN TO ALLOW IT TO CONTINUE. OTHERWISE, WE WON’T. IT IS BOTH OUR RIGHT AND DUTY TO DENY TYRANNY TO PREVAIL. We, Americans had hoped that one BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, AT LEAST, THE THIRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT—THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, WOULD, AS INDEPENDENT OF TERM LIMITS, GIVE THEMSELVES TO BEST SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE BY TAKING UP CASES AND CONTROVERSIES AND RENDERING OPINIONS THAT SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE TRUE FOUNDATION OF OUR REPUBLIC—A TRUE BILL OF RIGHTS, COMPRISING CODIFICATION OF GOD-GIVEN ETERNAL LAWS THAT EXISTED BEFORE THE CRAFTING OF THE ARTIFICE OF GOVERNMENT AND WILL WEATHER THE BEST AND WORST OF ADMINISTRATIONS THAT COME TO INHABIT OUR STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS—BUT ONLY SO LONG AS THE AMERICAN PEOPLE MAKE PLAIN TO THOSE THAT SERVE IN GOVERNMENT WHO WOULD USURP POWER RESIDING IN THE PEOPLE AND THOSE FORCES OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT THAT, TOO, SEEK TO SUBVERT THE WILL AND POWER AND CHARACTER OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

WE HAD HOPED THAT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT WOULD STAND WITH US, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, IN PRESERVING OUR BILL OF RIGHTS, ESPECIALLY, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS. UNFORTUNATELY, IT IS PLAIN TO US THAT THIS CHIEF JUSTICE HAS LITTLE REGARD FOR THE WELL-BEING OF OUR MOST SACRED AND VITAL RIGHT.

John Roberts has demonstrated, through the failure to grant review of significant Second Amendment cases that the “HISTORICAL TRADITION TEST” will remain, for the foreseeable future, in a state of stasis, with no further definitive, amplification, explication, and clarification of it. And such discussion of it by the Court in those Second Amendment cases the Court does grant review on, will remain at best, dicta. There will be no formal ruling by the Court.

This is more than unfortunate. It is both disconcerting and distressful. The nebulousness of the Historical Tradition Test became manifest in the Rahimi case.

Heller had pointed to the use of the historical tradition standard to replace “interest balancing,” but said little about it. Bruen then laid out a few broad contours for it, but left out many details, as the Justices realized this was a standard that would require fuller development.

But, as Roberts is reluctant to grant review of Second Amendment cases, and those cases it will deign to review do not deal directly with the standard, in a meticulous and comprehensive fashion, detailing clearly the way in which lower reviewing courts are expected to employ it, it then becomes hardly better than the standard it replaces, and INTEREST-BALANCING will once again arise, if only tacitly, as we pointed out in this essay, supra.

Jurisdictions that detest the exercise of the Natural Law Right to armed self-defense will continue to find a historical analog, however dubious that allows a state to continue to constrain the exercise of THE RIGHT TO ARMED SELF-DEFENSE.

We suggest a few of the questions that the Supreme Court should resolve to answer if the Court does, in time to come, accept review of the issue requesting assiduous amplification, and clarification of the “HISTORICAL TRADITION” STANDARD on a petition for writ of certiorari:

• What constitutes a constitutionally acceptable historical analog?

•  What period of time is a reviewing court to look at in determining whether a present state action is consistent with past historical practice?

• Does a reviewing court look to past historical practice only within its own jurisdiction, or outside it? And, if outside one’s jurisdiction, is it sufficient to find just one analog that occurs in one locality in the grand expanse of the Country, or must there be a historical analog that encompasses a majority of the Country?

• But how extensive or expansive must that past historical tradition be for a reviewing court to consider it a suitable analog, justifying a reviewing court to find a state action impacting the Second Amendment to be considered lawful and constitutional?

• And, if a reviewing court must look for a past historical analog, what constitutes a proper “fit” between a present state action impacting exercise of the Second Amendment and a past historical practice?

What is true regarding use of historical tradition generally to ascertain if a given present State action impacting the exercise of the Right codified in the Second Amendment is constitutional may also be helpful when considering when ascertaining whether particular classes of weaponry fall with the core of the Second Amendment’s protection. See, e.g., C. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 773 (1993).

Much as we use history to determine which modern “arms” are protected by the Second Amendment, so too does history guide our consideration of modern regulations that were unimaginable at the founding.

When confronting such present-day firearm regulations, this historical inquiry that courts must conduct will often involve reasoning by analogy—a commonplace task for any lawyer or judge. Like all analogical reasoning, determining whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation requires a determination of whether the two regulations are “relevantly similar.”

And because “[e]verything is similar in infinite ways to everything else,” id., at 774, one needs “some metric enabling the analogizer to assess which similarities are important and which are not,” F. Schauer & B. Spellman, Analogy, Expertise, and Experience, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 254 (2017). For instance, a green truck and a green hat are relevantly similar if one’s metric is “things that are green.” See ibid.  They are not relevantly similar if the applicable metric is “things you can wear.”

While we do not now provide an exhaustive survey of the features that render regulations relevantly similar under the Second Amendment, we do think that Heller and McDonald point toward at least two metrics: how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense. As we stated in Heller and repeated in McDonald, “individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment right.” McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637); see also id., at 628, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (“the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right”). Therefore, whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified are “‘central’” considerations when engaging in an analogical inquiry. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637).

To be clear, analogical reasoning under the Second Amendment is neither a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory blank check. On the one hand, courts should not “uphold every modern law that remotely resembles a historical analogue,” because doing so “risk[s] endorsing outliers that our ancestors would never have accepted.” Drummond v. Robinson, 9 F. 4th 217, 226 (CA3 2021). On the other hand, analogical reasoning requires only that the government identify a well-established and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin. So even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.

Consider, for example, Heller’s discussion of “longstanding” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” 554 U. S., at 626, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637. Although the historical record yields relatively few 18th- and 19th-century “sensitive places” where weapons were altogether prohibited—e.g., legislative assemblies, polling places, and courthouses—we are also aware of no disputes regarding the lawfulness of such prohibitions. See D. Kopel & J. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine, 13 Charleston L. Rev. 205, 229-236, 244-247 (2018); see also Brief for Independent Institute as Amicus Curiae 11-17. We therefore can assume it settled that these locations were “sensitive places” where arms carrying could be prohibited consistent with the Second Amendment. And courts can use analogies to those historical regulations of “sensitive places” to determine that modern regulations prohibiting the carry of firearms in new and analogous sensitive places are constitutionally permissible.”

SUMMARY OF SALIENT POINTS OF THIS ESSAY

As we pointed out in our discussion, supra, the issue concerning the date in history to be scrutinized was raised as an issue in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Antonyuk vs. James, but the Court denied the Petition without comment, in April 2025.

The issue was also raised in the present Wolford case, but the Chief Justice scrubbed the issue from consideration by the Justices although it is a preliminary question to be resolved, and the historical tradition test came up during oral argument, anyway. However, without clarification as to how to employ this standard, any decision by a reviewing Court, including the Supreme Court, becomes ad hoc, and a poor basis for establishing precedent.

And, as we also pointed out in this essay, and in our previous essay on Wolford, the Petitioners presented two questions in their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

The first question goes to the constitutionality of Hawaii’s prohibition on the carrying of handguns by “licensed carry permit holders on private property open to the public unless the property owner affirmatively gives express permission to the handgun carrier.”

Yet it is the second question that is much more important to the Court’s jurisprudence since it requires the Court to clarify the application of the historical tradition test first articulated in Heller, and further discussed in Bruen but requiring further explication.

The Wolford Petitioners posed the question as follows:

“Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in solely relying on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws in applying Bruen’s text, history and tradition test in direct conflict with the holdings of the Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits?”

The Second question is the more pressing one because it goes to the standard of review that lower state and federal courts must use when ascertaining whether a state action is constitutional.

This new standard of review first articulated in Heller replaces the prior test, requiring a reviewing court to balance the state’s action constraining exercise of the Natural Law Right to armed self-defense against an individual’s exercise of that right free from government intrusion. That previous standard of review, crafted by the Supreme Court, referred to generally as “means-end” scrutiny, involving the balancing of interests, those of the state vs. the Rights of the individual, is more subjective than objective and allows, even encourages, a reviewing court to substitute its own predilections for neutral judicial reasoning. Likely, a Court may not even know that it is substituting the rational outcome for one that rests deep within the subconscious of the Court’s own being.

THUS, “INTEREST BALANCING” FAILS AS A STANDARD THROUGH WHICH A COURT CAN ASCERTAIN WHETHER A STATE’S ACTION OUTWEIGHS THE INDIVIDUAL’S EXERCISE OF HIS SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS.

The outcome almost always is preordained, favoring state action over the individual’s unrestrained exercise of a God-given right.

In Heller, the Court first articulated use of a new standard of review that did away with interest-balancing. The Court referred to it as “HISTORICAL TRADITION.” Desiring to craft an objective standard, In Bruen, the Court explicated a few of the basic contours of the application of “Historical Tradition.”

Justice Thomas, writing for the majority in Bruen, said,

In keeping with Heller, we hold that when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest [In other words, NO “MEANS-END SCRUTINY”].

Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s “unqualified command.”

The Second Question stated in the Wolford Petitioners’ Petition asks for clarification of the “Historical Tradition” test. Yet, the Supreme Court does not mention this question in the issue to be reviewed by the Court.

The Court erased the question from review, without explanation. This issue is no small matter. It is paramount to proper analysis of a challenge to state action impacting the fundamental right to armed self-defense.

The Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, John Roberts, obviously does not support our Natural Law Right, codified in the Second Amendment. If he did, he would have made that desire known to the other eight Justices. Roberts would have voted to hear the Antonyuk and Snope cases. Roberts, along with the votes of Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch, would have incentivized the other two Trump nominees, Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney-Barrett, to join in. The decisions coming out of the Court in those foundational cases would have been pivotal to any Second Amendment case going forward.

The decisions in Antonyuk and James would have provided clear, unambiguous, decisive notice to those ANTI-AMERICAN MARXIST GLOBALIST FORCES, operating both at home and abroad that detest America’s armed citizenry. Had the U.S. Supreme Court granted review of those cases, the rulings in Antonyuk and Snope, would have buttressed the previous three Landmark cases. All five landmark cases would, together, provide strong support for THE SANCTITY AND PRESERVATION OF THE NATURAL LAW RIGHT OF ARMED SELF-DEFENSE NOT ONLY AGAINST PREDATORY MAN BUT AGAINST A PREDATORY TYRANNICAL GOVERNMENT. And, while the former is presumed, it was specifically to provide a warning to the fledgling Federal Government, that the Framers—especially THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, among the FRAMERS—who insisted on express recitation of the most critical NATURAL LAW RIGHTS—THE MOST VITAL BEING THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS.

Surely, the Chief Justice knew well what major rulings in Supreme Court Second Amendment cases would mean, and his reticence in having the Court review the major Second Amendment issues that have recently come before it, is on plain display. The Chief Justice sets the theme and tone of the Court and that Court will carefully, daintily select for review only those Second Amendment cases THAT DO NOT EXPAND UPON, EXPLICATE, AND CLARIFY THE FIRST THREE FOUNDATIONAL SECOND AMENDMENT CASES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY.

The actions of the Chief Justice make clear that he does not want the Supreme Court to strengthen the Second Amendment Right, thus inviting tyranny down the road.

The portents are not promising, as lower courts, antithetical to the RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, render opinions inconsistent with the rulings of Heller, McDonald, and Bruen. These courts have taken their cue from the High Court—aware that, unlike Associate Justices Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, the Chief Justice, John Roberts, is not a proponent of the Second Amendment even as he has previously voted—decidedly reluctantly—with the majority Justices in the THREE LANDMARK CASES.

Those jurisdictions that demonstrate a decisive antipathy toward the Second Amendment are encouraged to enact laws that are inconsistent with the rulings and reasoning of Heller, McDonald, and Bruen, and the courts of those jurisdictions will rubber-stamp those unconstitutional actions of government.

And the U.S. Supreme Court itself will not be spared the resulting injury to the institution, as the Court undermines its own Article III Authority. Apart, from taking no substantive action to expound and expand upon the HISTORICAL TRADITION STANDARD, the Court will also forbear making plain the import and purport of the legal concept, WEAPONS IN COMMON USE, as first articulated in Heller.

Justice Roberts has made patently clear he will continue to forbid review of any case posing the salient question——

WHETHER SEMIAUTOMATIC WEAPONS FALL WITHIN THE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTION.

Chief Justice Roberts will forbid review of such cases that come before the Court because he knows the answer to it, and he does not want the Court to issue a ruling on it.

Semiautomatic weapons are a class of weapons in common use.

Weapons in common use fall within the core protection of the Natural Law Right expressed in the Second Amendment.

Roberts knows that several jurisdictions fervently oppose such weapons in the hands of the civilian citizen population.

The reluctance of the High Court to deal with this issue is not lost on those Anti-Second Amendment states that wish to ban and have banned possession of these weapons, even as those bans are wholly inconsistent with the reasoning of Heller.

The Trump nominees to the High Court—those who are ostensibly members of the conservative-wing, must join with the Senior Justices, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, to convince the Chief Justice, John Roberts, to grant review of those cases that come before it challenging Government and State action that constrains or that denies outright the citizen’s ownership and possession of semiautomatic weapons. By failing to deal with this major Second Amendment issue, the Court not only encourages states to defy Court precedent and the plain meaning of the Second Amendment but encourages Progressives and Globalists who want to ban civilian citizen ownership and possession to class attempt to shoehorn semiautomatic weapons into the National Firearms Act (NFA), thereby expanding the NFA which must not be expanded.

To the contrary, the NFA and other Federal Statutes that infringe exercise of the Natural Law Right to armed self-defense must be struck down by the Court as facially unconstitutional as the Federal Government has no lawful authority to enact laws infringing our most vital Natural Law Right.

Their long existence (historical tradition?) doesn’t make such laws constitutionally consistent with the Bill of Rights.

By failing to review these questions, the Court has shown that its willingness to forbear review of unconstitutional governmental action, whether State or Federal.

The Roberts Court has denied review of all cases posing this question, going back to the principal case, Friedman vs. City of Highland, 577 U.S. 1039, 136 S. Ct. 447 (Dec. 7, 2015).

Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, who was alive at the time, joined Justice Thomas in Thomas’ vigorous dissent for the Court’s refusal to take up the case.

Another major challenge to the constitutionality of a state act banning civilian citizen possession of semiautomatic weapons, designated “assault weapons,” wended its way to the Supreme Court in 2024. The case is Harrel vs. Raoul, 144 S. Ct. 2491 (July 2, 2024).

Curiously, the Harrel case, like the 2015 Friedman case came out of Illinois.

The Friedman case involved a city ordinance, banning the acquisition and the possession of semiautomatic weapons referred to by the provocative phrase, “assault weapons.”

Because the Supreme Court denied review of the Friedman case, thereby striking down a City ordinance as inconsistent with the reasoning in Heller that firearms in common use fall under the core protection of the Second Amendment, the Illinois Government must have figured it could piggy-back off Friedman and ban the possession of  “assault weapons” throughout the State.

And Illinois did just that—making possession of semiautomatic weapons, designated as “assault weapons,” a felony throughout Illinois, and so these weapons, although they had been in common use, no longer remain so, in Illinois. Quite an interesting way for a state to craft a loophole around the concept of “WEAPONS IN COMMON USE.” The state just bans them. And, by sleight of hand such weapons are no longer in common use.

This is what happens whenever SCOTUS fails to take definitive action to safeguard the fundamental right that is codified in the Second Amendment, and fails, as well, to support its prior SECOND AMENDMENT RULINGS. States taken advantage of such dereliction of the Supreme Court’s responsibilities.

Unfortunately, Justice Scalia was not alive at the time the Harrel case came up for review at the Supreme Court, for he together with Justices Thomas and Alito, could demand an accounting from Roberts, for the Court’s having failed to take up Friedman back in 2015.

The three Justices would have presented a powerful force within the U.S. Supreme Court, sufficient to break down Justice Robert’s resistance in having constantly delayed an accounting of the critical Second Amendment issues that have come before the Court.   

Meanwhile, Anti-Second Amendment jurisdictions have taken due notice of Roberts’ continued forbearance, and have acted brazenly in defiance of Heller, McDonald, and Bruen.

The failure of the Court to grant review of Antonyuk vs. James, and Snope vs. Brown, and Wilson vs. Hawaii, means that intransigent states will continue to offend the Second Amendment right.

And, as Hawaii, New York, California, Illinois, and Maryland show, these states and others like them will only grow more and more brazen in time, demonstrating their contempt of the Court and of the Constitution.

Thus, this reticence of SCOTUS in handling Second Amendment cases has dire consequences, weakening the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence, injuring the reputation of the Court, and undermining the Court’s Article III authority.

And, yet, the Americans who cherish their Second Amendment right will accept breadcrumbs as the Roberts Court deigns to take up any Second Amendment case—even one, like Wolford—that tinkers around the edges of the Second Amendment rather than emphatically, plainly  clamping down on those states that continue to play games with application of the Second Amendment law.

Why is it that Americans are content with SCOTUS granting review of the least important Second Amendment cases?

It is, we have found, a curious propensity of many Americans who cherish our most Vital Fundamental Natural Law Right—the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms—to applaud the Supreme Court when it deigns to grant a petition for writ of certiorari in a Second Amendment case, whatever the nature of the case, and to view that case irrespective of what has gone before.

It took the High Court well over 200 hundred years, after ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, to assert an obvious fact and write it into law—proclaiming that the Right to armed self-defense is after all an individual right, no less so than other vital Rights, including inter alia, the Right of Free Speech, the Freedom of Association (that is subsumed in Freedom of Speech), the Right to own property which implies the exclusive use and Enjoyment of  one’s Personal Property, implied in the “takings clause” of the Fifth Amendment, and the Right codified in the Fourth Amendment, namely, the Right to be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.

HOWEVER, ONLY THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS OPERATES AS A TRUE POWER, AS WELL AS A RIGHT, THAT CAN REPEL THE ENCROACHING TYRANNY OF GOVERNMENT.

WHEN THE SUPREME COURT FOR WELL OVER A HUNDRED YEARS FAILED TO ASSERT CLEARLY, WHAT THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT LAYS BARE, THE HELLER CASE CAME ALONG IN THE FIRST DECADE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, HOLDING THAT THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IS—LIKE ALL THE OTHER FUNDAMENTAL, UNALIENABLE, ETERNAL RIGHTS—AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT, NOT A COLLECTIVE RIGHT.

AND, WHEN SOME STATES KICKED, CLAIMING THAT THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS OPERATES AS A PROHIBITION AGAINST FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE ON THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT, THE MCDONALD CASE, TWO YEARS LATER, RULED THAT THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS APPLIES TO THE STATES, NO LESS THAN IT DOES TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

AND STILL JURISDICTIONS DISPLAYING ANTIPATHY TOWARD THE RIGHT CODIFIED IN THE SECOND AMENDMENT, DEMURRED ARGUING THAT THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS EXISTS ONLY WITHIN THE CONFINES OF ONE’S HOME, AND NOT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. IT TOOK TWELVE YEARS, BUT THE RULINGS IN BRUEN MADE PLAIN THAT THE INDIVIDUAL’S RIGHT TO ARMED SELF-DEFENSE DOES NOT STOP AT THE DOORSTEP TO ONE’S HOME BUT EXTENDS TO THE PUBLIC ARENA.

These Three cases, Heller vs. District of Columbia (2008), City of Chicago vs. McDonald (2010), and New York State Rifle & Pistol Association. vs. Bruen (2022), laid out parameters beyond which states and the Federal Government are forbidden to tread, AND SET THE STAGE FOR THE CASES THAT WOULD COME AFTER. BUT NOTHING CAME AFTER BRUEN THAT CAN BE PROPERLY CLAIMED TO BE ANOTHER LANDMARK SECOND AMENDMENT CASE.

And, the States and the Federal Government, undeterred from the plain meaning of the words, “shall not be infringed” apropos of the right of the people to keep and bear arms, have since, ratification of the Bill of Rights, enacted laws to severely constrain exercise of the Right.

And the three Landmark cases, Heller, McDonald, and Bruen have done little to prevent stubborn defiance by many of the States and by the Federal Government, too, as Government constantly looks for loopholes to overcome the rulings of the Supreme Court. This requires the High Court to grant review of Second Amendment cases on a routine basis.

This is the only way for the Supreme Court to effectively contend with stubborn States and a well-entrenched overbearing Federal Bureaucracy.

The States and the Federal Government cannot be entirely faulted for this, for as we have stated many times in our articles, and in the present essay, too, it is in the nature of governmental entities to hoard power and authority.

Always searching for a loophole, or, at least, a seemingly plausible way to offend Heller, McDonald and Bruen, these states continued to thwart exercise of the Right, regardless of the plain meaning of the Right and Court rulings.

So, when a case comes along, most recently, Wolford vs. Lopez (a case out of Hawaii), many people and Pro-Second Amendment organizations view this as a cause for celebration, presuming the Court majority will strike down Hawaii’s “vampire” law.

The elation is understandable, but Americans should take a step back and reflect on the actions of the John Roberts. Taking up the least significant of Second Amendment cases, which requires the Court to employ concepts and standards articulated in the THREE LANDMARK CASES, that require clarification and explication when there is none to be had because the Court failed to grant review of significant cases, posing issues that, once resolved, would allow for clear, precise rulings in future Supreme Court cases and would also provide guidance for the lower courts, making it more and more difficult for jurisdictions that are antithetical to the Second Amendment Right to continue to devise end-runs around High Court rulings.

But Wolford IS NOT the case that will slow down the actions of those jurisdictions that are predisposed to weaken the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms. The ruling in Wolford is likely to do little to prevent continued attacks on the Second Amendment given the narrow and scope of it.

And it is to that point we raise our concern.

Since the Supreme Court grants very few Second Amendment cases on a writ of certiorari, the natural tendency of those who cherish the right of the people to keep and bear arms is to celebrate any Second Amendment case that the Court happens to take up with the aim that doing so will yield a positive result, strengthening the right to armed self-defense, and strengthening by clarifying the three landmark cases.

ONE SHOULD ASK HIMSELF WHY THE SUPREME COURT HAPPENED TO GRANT REVIEW OF WOLFORD, WHILE DENYING REVIEW OF ANTONYUK AND SNOPE, AND WHILE NOTING THAT THE COURT DISMISSED CONSIDERATION OF THE SALIENT ISSUE IN WOLFORD, CLARIFCATION OF THE HISTORICAL TRADITION TEST THAT HAPPENED ALSO TO BE THE SAME ISSUE IN ANTONYUK.

Many Americans tend to view individual cases in a vacuum, set apart from, walled off or boxed off from what has obtained before, compartmentalized or “boxed off” from what has gone before.

The Wolford case may seem important, but it isn’t. In fact, whether the Court rules in favor of the Petitioners or not, the case is, on both legal and logical grounds, faulty. If the Court were to rule in favor of the State, “Sensitive Place” restrictions, whether public or private, will be utilized with increasing regularity to chisel away at the usefulness of carrying a handgun for self-defense when outside the home.

And, if the Court strikes down Hawaii’s statute, it will simply create a status quo regarding the notion of consent involving private property, but the impact of “Sensitive Place” restrictions on negatively impacting one’s right to armed self-defense in the public arena will continue. Little if anything will change. Consider, the situation in New York. Regardless of how Wolford is decided, the ruling will have no positive impact on New York’s draconian Handgun Law that continually becomes more unconscionable.

WHEN CONSIDERING “SENSITIVE PLACE” RESTRICTIONS, THE PRESSING ISSUE IS WHETHER A STATE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO IMPOSE THEM ON AMERICANS AT ALL. THIS IS WHERE THE COURT’S EXAMINATION OF AND CLARIFICATION OF THE TEST OF “HISTORICAL TRADITION,” FIRST ENUNCIATED IN HELLER, REQUIRES EXTENSIVE EXPOSITION, SO THAT THE COURT CAND DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH SENSITIVE PLACE RESTRICTIONS AN OTHER STRATEGIES DEVISED BY JURISDICTIONS THAT ARE DEAD-SET ON DESTROYING AMERICANS’ EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHT TO ARMED SELF-DEFENSE.

We will continue our analysis of the Supreme Court’s failures in exercising its Article III powers to safeguard the Second Amendment from the actions of recalcitrant states and a sympathetic Press, and internal and external Marxist Globalist forces that intend to destroy it.