WOLFORD VS. LOPEZ IS A SECOND AMENDMENT RUSE.

REGARDLESS OF HOW THE ROBERTS COURT DECIDES WOLFORD, IT WON’T SETTLE THE NATURAL LAW RIGHT OF CIVILIAN CITIZEN ARMED SELF-DEFENSE IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY.

The sole issue presented by Petitioners, as stated in their Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and as accepted verbatim by the U.S. Supreme Court is this:

Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding, in direct conflict with the Second Circuit, that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit the carry of handguns by licensed concealed carry permit holders on private property open to the public unless the property owner affirmatively gives express permission to the handgun carrier?

We will delve into the nuances of that issue in our next article. But we need to point out a critical matter pertaining to this issue, in the present article.

The “Sensitive Place” restriction issue is, on one level, a trivial matter. And, on another level, it is harmful to the sanctity of the Second Amendment.

For, regardless of how the issue is decided, for or against Petitioners, there is a dangerous presumption at work—an implication, i.e., a matter unstated but one that may be likened to a viper lying in wait beneath the surface, ready to strike a person without warning.

The implication in Wolford is that a State, Hawaii, in this instance, has the unfettered right to deny Americans the right to armed self-defense in public—a principal holding in Bruen—and the implication applies to a specific type of private property, namely “private property opened to the public.”

“Sensitive Place” restrictions crafted by states to frustrate a person’s right to self-defense outside the home are a bugaboo that threaten destruction of the essence of the Bruen ruling.

The Justices who signed onto the Majority Opinion were not blind to the dangers posed by a State that, antithetical to the notion of civilian citizen possession of firearms WITHIN THE HOME, albeit grudgingly accepting it because of Heller, would be absolutely apoplectic at the idea of the mass of citizenry exercising their Natural Law Right to armed self-defense OUTSIDE THE HOME.

Bruen arose as a challenge to the Constitutionality of New York’s Handgun Law that prevented the majority of people who applied for a concealed handgun carry license from ever successfully acquiring one.

Some background regarding the New York Handgun Law is necessary here.

In 1911, New York enacted a handgun licensing statute mandating that all civilian citizens, residents of New York, who wished to carry a handgun in public, must first acquire a license to do so, a valid license issued by the State.

Although some jurisdictions in New York had, prior to the Act of 1911 (referred to as the Sullivan Act, named for the principal Legislator who sponsored the bill), required that a person first obtain permission from a New York government official, such as a local sheriff, municipal police officer, or city magistrate, this was an informal process. The Sullivan Act refined that process and made “formal,” through specific State legislative enactment.

The Act mandated a uniform system of handgun licensing throughout the State. The New York Government had hoped that implementation of this formal licensing structure would persuade the public to forgo the ordeal involved in obtaining a license.

However, since, with enactment of “Sullivan,” there was no impediment to a person’s ultimately obtaining a concealed handgun carry license if that person truly wanted one, New Yorkers, by the thousands, would jump at the opportunity to acquire a concealed handgun carry license, and those that did want to carry a handgun for self-defense would and did jump through the hurdles to obtain one.

This disconcerted and dissatisfied the Government that had thought most people would forgo carrying a handgun if they were required to obtain a license, perceiving the process as time-consuming and expensive, and therefore not worth the effort. In this, the New York Government was wrong.

The State failed to appreciate the determination of the public. So, in order to curb the inordinate number of licenses issued, the State came up with a draconian mechanism to prevent the issuance of a substantial number of handgun licenses.

In 1913, two years after enactment of the Sullivan Act, the State added a “Proper Cause” standard and a “Good Moral Character” requirement. The application of this standard and requirement prevented issuance of all but a few licenses.

New York Government officials exercised absolute discretion in that regard.

“Proper Cause” and “Good Moral Character” were facially unconstitutional. But, without the rulings in the Heller and McDonald cases, there would be no legal and logical peg for a person challenging the legality and constitutionality of those instruments to hang a hat on.

It would take over a century before the legal and logical legal framework was in place through which a challenger could effectively attack the constitutionality of “Proper Cause,” enabling a citizen, residing or working in New York, to be able to overcome the impediment to acquiring a concealed handgun carry license. This would not have been feasible prior to the Bruen rulings. And Bruen would not have arisen were it not for the rulings in Heller and McDonald.

The McDonald case arose as a challenge to Heller and Bruen was possible as a result of the rulings of the two predecessor cases, McDonald and Heller. Each case built on the one that came before it. Heller itself could be explained as the natural desire of a few members of the Supreme Court, namely the late Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, and Associate Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, resolving to clarify the “collective right” vs. “individual right” nebulousness of the much older Miller case.

In Miller, the High Court considered whether the Second Amendment protected the possession of a sawed-off shotgun. the Court held the Second Amendment did not protect the possession of such a weapon because it did not have a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia. However, the decision in Miller did not explicitly clarify or implicitly suggest whether the Right codified in the Second protected an individual or collective right, leaving the issue unresolved until seventy years later, when the High Court decided Heller.

Bruen sprang as a challenge by the New York State Rifle and Pistol Association and by New York citizens who raised a simple, commonsensical question:

Why must a citizen demonstrate extraordinary need as a pre-condition to carry a handgun for self-defense when in public?

After all, doesn’t an American have a fundamental right to defend his life with the most effective means available, when confronted by a dangerous threat? Well, of course!

The Court majority agreed with Plaintiff Petitioners and struck down the “Proper Cause” standard as unconstitutional, on its face.

New York had long employed “Proper Cause” [for well over a century].

The device effectively prevented most New Yorkers from acquiring a valid unrestricted concealed handgun carry license in the State and, more especially, in New York City.

Those New Yorkers who were able to acquire a license under Section 2(f) of the New York State Statute had an unfettered (unrestricted) right to carry a handgun for self-defense.

The State HAD NOT enacted “Sensitive Place” restrictions for carrying a handgun for those issued a concealed handgun carry license. There were so few licenses issued, the State obviously felt there was no need to refrain imposing a State restriction on the carrying of a handgun in public that would essentially reduce the utility of it to a nullity.

Even before Bruen was decided, the New York Government could see the writing on the wall. After Oral Argument, in November 2021, The New York Government knew they had lost the case, and the State was appalled.

But, once “Proper Cause” was struck down, anyone, not under disability, had an unfettered right to carry a handgun for self-defense, when in public. No pre-condition attached, such as a showing of need to carry a handgun. And thousands, perhaps tens of thousands more licenses would be issued. The State would be compelled to issue handgun carry licenses if it was to be in compliance with Bruen.

The implication of the Court’s holding was immediate, and it was profound.

It meant that States—not just New York—can no longer demand that an American provide to the satisfaction of the State official, a “need” for carrying a handgun for that need is nothing other than “self-defense”—as it always has been, and self-defense is presumed. Explanation or exposition isn’t needed, as such explanation or exposition would be contrary to Bruen, and, as well, logically redundant.

Anticipating that a stubborn, obtuse, and unrepentant New York Government would invariably find a loophole around the Bruen ruling, and aware of what that loophole would be—namely, the crafting of “Sensitive Place” restrictions to negate the utility of all those concealed handgun carry licenses that the State would now be required to issue—the Associate Justice, Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority, said this:

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Although we have no occasion to comprehensively define “sensitive places” in this case, we do think respondents err in their attempt to characterize New York’s proper-cause requirement as a “sensitive-place” law. In their view, “sensitive places” where the government may lawfully disarm law-abiding citizens include all “places where people typically congregate and where law-enforcement and other public-safety professionals are presumptively available.”. . . It is true that people sometimes congregate in “sensitive places,” and it is likewise true that law enforcement professionals are usually presumptively available in those locations. But expanding the category of “sensitive places” simply to all places of public congregation that are not isolated from law enforcement defines the category of “sensitive places” far too broadly. Respondents’ [the State’s argument would in effect exempt cities from the Second Amendment and would eviscerate the general right to publicly carry arms for self-defense that we discuss in detail below . . . Put simply, there is no historical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan a “sensitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected generally by the New York City Police Department.

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Governor Kathy Hochul and the Anti-Second Amendment Legislators in Albany knew that the U.S. Supreme Court would strike down “Proper Cause.” And the Court did just that.

New York needed a substitute to salvage the State’s draconian Handgun Law.

Since the State could not prevent issuance of thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of concealed handgun carry licenses—a situation that existed after enactment of the Sullivan Act—the Government devised “Proper Cause.” And “Proper Cause” worked well for the Government.

But once the High Court struck down Proper Cause, in Bruen, over a century later, the New York Government was back to square one. It had to devise a new mechanism to thwart the utility of carrying a handgun for self-defense in the State, and, particularly, in New York City.

The mechanism New York came up with is “Sensitive Place” restrictions—this despite the admonition of the Justice Thomas. What, then, did the New York State Government do about this. There wasn’t much the State could do other than either adhere to the ruling and reasoning of the High Court or brazenly ignore the Supreme Court’s Bruen ruling and reasoning.

The New York Government, at the behest of its Governor, Kathy Hochul went with the latter. It opted to ignore the ruling, and, in so doing, contemptuously flouted U.S. Supreme Court’s Article III authority under the Constitution.

New York crafted a brand-new Statute and applied it with abandon. The State delineated a host of sensitive places that deny a holder of a valid concealed handgun carry license the right to carry (or use) a handgun for self-defense even when (and especially when) faced with a life-threatening assault.

Reflect on what this means. A person henceforth carrying a handgun in a “Sensitive Place” has already broken the law and he would lose his license and his handgun (and all other firearms he might happen to possess) if an officer caught him carrying a weapon in that sensitive restrictive area. And if the licensee were to use his handgun to neutralize a threat to his life, he would be tried for voluntary manslaughter if not for murder, apart from the felony of merely happening to carry a handgun in a restricted area. He would be alive, sure, but his life would be ruined thereafter, ever after, as long as he lived.

The concept of “Sensitive Place” Restrictions was a boon to Anti-Second Amendment jurisdictions. And they jumped on the use of them immediately, knowing that, if challenges came (and they would come, it would take time and money to challenge unconstitutional state laws. But time would always be on the side of the state as long as no injunction were imposed by a court against the state.

Once New York crafted a Statute, delineating several areas and types of areas handgun, other States followed suit. Hawaii was one such jurisdiction.

An immediate problem ensues. By crafting a slew of new areas that operate effectively as “Gun-Free Zones,” it is often unclear which areas are public, which private, and which quasi-public or quasi-private, or a mixture of the two.

The matter at issue in Wolford conjures up the concept of a hybrid area—an area not public, but private, yet a private area that operates ostensibly like a public one, i.e., a private area opened to the public. The nuances would not necessarily create a legal issue but for the impact on a person carrying a gun into the area, which a state wishes to regulate.

The question here concerns the import of and implications for a person carrying a firearm into a “private area open to the public.”

The specific issue involves how, or whether, a State can constitutionally employ such a schema at all, as doing so immediately abuts against the notion of a right of armed self-defense whether one is at home or in public.

If a property is truly private or is a hybrid or quasi-private area, defined as a private area open to the public, can a State legally impose requirements on the owner of that area open to the public.

But, before the U.S. Supreme Court resolves that issue—in fact, even before the Court can logically resolve that issue—the Court must deal with an issue upon which the “sensitive place” issue is logically dependent: the standard of review to be utilized by the reviewing court to resolve the issue.

Prior to Heller, reviewing courts used a standard referred to as “interest balancing” that ostensibly weighs the right of the State, under its Tenth Amendment police powers, to interfere with the right of the citizen to exercise his right to keep and bear arms as codified in the Second Amendment.

The problem with interest balancing is that a Court has, traditionally, generally found that the balancing works in favor of the State against the individual.

Heller changed that. The Court rejected interest-balancing, in favor of a new test constructed by the Court, referred to as “Historical Tradition.” The application of this new consisted of two parts. The first part easily decided (or one that should be easy to resolve by a reviewing court) goes to the question of whether a state action impinges on the core of the Second Amendment.

If so, then the reviewing court is required to apply the second part of the test, and the onus is upon the state to demonstrate, on the basis of historical tradition, whether there is a suitable historical analogue that supports the state’s present action, overriding the potential infringement of a fundamental right, codified in the Second Amendment.

The Petitioners in Wolford properly realized the antecedent importance “Historical Tradition.”

In Petitioners’ Writ of Certiorari, there were two issues. Most commentators lose sight of this and the Press never mentions this because the Roberts Court denied consideration of the second issue. A person would have to read the Petition itself to see that there were in fact two issues presented.

The second issue—the one truly critical issue—was directed to the Heller test of “Historical Tradition.” The Petitioners posed the issue as follows:

Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in solely relying on post-Reconstruction Era and later laws in applying Bruen’s text, history and tradition test in direct conflict with the holdings of the Third, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits.

The Supreme Court rejected review of that issue. Why? The answer is plain to us, although disturbing.

The Roberts Court didn’t want to deal with that issue precisely because it is the most important issue.

It goes to the point in time the reviewing courts are to look to in ascertaining whether an historical analogue is present that justifies the present state action. A request for High Court clarification is necessary and it is wanting. In fact, that issue was also presented in Antonyuk.

Without clarification, the lower courts have to second-guess how to employ the standard.

But how do you even get a meaningful application of this standard, first articulated in Heller, if the lower courts do not know the date to consider when ascertaining the presence or absence of a historical analogue correlate. Does the Roberts Court even know?

It is for the High Court to make the determination, as the Court that crafted the test. But, when the issue is raised in a petition for writ of certiorari, the Court either denies review of the petition out-of-hand, as it did in Antonyuk, or it strikes the issue from consideration when it grants certiorari, as the Court has done in Wolford.

Since the U.S. Supreme Court, that crafted the standard, must itself employ it, and since, for the Court to be able to do that, it must first clarify the appropriate date in time from which both it and any lower State or Federal Court must approach the task of searching for a historical analogue, and if that start date is not ascertained, how can the Court resolve the constitutional issue pertaining to whether a historical analogue exists. The problem is as much problematic for the U.S. Supreme Court as it is for any lower State or Federal Court.

In the Wolford case, the Supreme Court cannot properly determine whether a proper analogue for Hawaii’s “sensitive place” restriction is constitutionally sound, without the Court itself explaining how to rule on the commencement date—ideally that point in time when the Bill of Rights was ratified. Otherwise, the constitutionality of the sensitive place law will remain in doubt.

But Chief Justice Roberts refuses to entertain, first articulated in Heller, but never effectively clarified. And, the Court was well aware, as recited in Heller, that further work is necessary to refine the standard to make it a sharp, refined, and effective tool, without inconsistencies appearing in the various circuits.

This failure of the Court to expound upon, explicate, clarify the standard means that, for purposes of the present Wolford case, then, however, the Court resolves Wolford, the Court is flying blind. It doesn’t have a coherent standard to apply to Hawaii’s sensitive place law, if, in fact, “sensitive place” restrictions are constitutional at all.

Thus, whatever the Court does amounts to an ad hoc response, which is tantamount to no law at all on the subject.

This is no small matter because the Court is dealing with our most vital and sacred right. The Court is legally, morally, and logically required to provide a standard that both it and lower courts can use.

If the High Court doesn’t apply its own standard of review, because it hasn’t troubled itself to articulate it, then how can a lower court be expected to do so? It can’t.

The High Court could have avoided this by granting review of Antonyuk, which logically flows from Bruen, as a direct challenge to New York’s blatant, flagrant, even reprehensible disregard of the Bruen rulings.

But the Roberts Court perfunctorily, unforgivably denied the Antonyuk Petition sans comment. And now it denies the salient issue in Wolford, having denied review of it. We find this non-action reprehensible.

If the Court had taken the issue up in Antonyuk and had determined that the historical tradition test goes back to 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified, that would put an end to the State’s meddling with the Nation’s most important right. And the notion of “Sensitive Place” restrictions—a modern construct, would have dissolved into the nothingness from which it sprang.

The High Court’s use of its own absolute discretion serves to discredit the Court’s actions, certainly in matters involving the Second Amendment.

More to point, the Supreme Court has absolute discretion to accept issues as drafted, deny one or more issues, or rephrase issues, as presented by petitioners. See, e.g., Trump vs. United States, 603 U.S. 593, 144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024).

Could the U.S. Supreme Court legitimately reject an issue that arises in a Petition once it grants review of a Petition? The answer is, “yes.” But that doesn’t make its actions ethically sound. The Court has acted unsoundly many times.

This is most unfortunate, and, to our mind, amounts to an abuse of the Court’s own discretion—denying difficult, but crucial tasks that it has the responsibility to take up but won’t because John Roberts evidently seeks to keep legal issues involving our most important Right in a perpetually nebulous state, inviting States to blatantly, shamelessly shred the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms.

The problem in Wolford is that even if the Court rules in favor of the Petitioners on the “Sensitive Place” issue that it has agreed to take up, having done so without changing the wording of the issue as presented by the Petitioners, then any High Court ruling leaves open the possibility of Hawaii’s further meddling with the right to carry a handgun for self-defense. For, Hawaii law already requires a person to acquire a license to carry a handgun for self-defense and Hawaii’s law is even more draconian than New York’s (if that is possible). See Wilson vs. Hawaii, 145 S. Ct. 18 (2024).

Hawaii maintains a near-total ban on the public carrying of firearms, thereby impliedly acknowledging it doesn’t even need “Sensitive Place” restrictions. But then, Hawaii places its own laws concerning the Second Amendment above that of the U.S. Constitution. See the Wilson case. Thus, any action of Hawaii involving the Second Amendment is legally dubious from the get-go.

Why is the issue presented in Wolford a dangerous one? Consider the argument made by an Anti-Second Amendment group.

The notorious Anti-Second Amendment group, “Everytown For Gun Safety,” says, in principal part, that

A ruling for Hawai’i [in Wolford] . . . would be a ruling for local choice. It would allow states to listen to their constituents and set the default rules that work best for their specific communities. Hawai‘i residents may want one rule, while Floridians may want another—that would remain up to them. https://www.everytown.org/wolford-v-lopez-second-amendment-scotus-oral-argument/

Now, consider the implications of that statement.

What “Everytown For Gun Safety” is saying is that the Second Amendment should be treated not as a fundamental, unalienable right, but as a man-made right (i.e., a “privilege) subject to the whims of particular jurisdictions.

In other words, this would mean treating the right codified in the Second Amendment like “Abortion”—a state issue to be handled by the states as they wish. See, Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022). But, “abortion,” isn’t a fundamental right, notwithstanding its proponents that wish to make it so.

Contrariwise, the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms is a Fundamental, Unalienable Right—clearly recognized by the Framers of the Constitution as such, as grounded on the Natural Law—Eternal, Unconditional, Unmodifiable, and not subject to Government tampering. For this Law is not a creation of Man. I

It is the creation of the Divine Creator. What man, or man’s artifacts, such as and especially, government, has not created, neither man nor any of his artifacts can legitimately, lawfully, constitutionally modify, abrogate, bestow on one, rescind, or deny, or ignore.

Hence, even a ruling against Wolford would not have much of an impact on Hawaii.

Hawaii would simply have to adopt a “Sensitive Place” restriction similar to New York’s apropos of private areas open to the public. In other words, a person could carry a firearm into that area UNLESS the proprietor had posted a sign to the contrary—again, similar to a posting of a no-trespassing sign, on private property.

But, regardless of how the Supreme Court rules in Wolford, there is, still the danger the Court may hold that “Sensitive Place” restrictions are a jurisdictional matter, which is the point made by “Everytown,” and that would unconscionably treat a Natural Law Right like a non-fundamental man-made law, which, is ultimately, conditional, transitory, and subject to the whims of man.

If so, this creates the concern articulated by Justice Thomas on more than one occasion, i.e., turning armed self-defense into a second-class right.

The ruthless forces aiming to crush the Natural Law Right to Armed Self-defense (and they are many), display constancy, determination, and ingenuity. We must give them that. But truth to tell, they are emboldened because of the timidity (or, otherwise, because of the tacit complicity) of the present Chief Justice, John Roberts, in refusing to grant review of the most important and compelling Second Amendment cases to come before the High Court since voting to grant review in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association (NYSRPA) vs. Bruen in 2021—a case that became the third, AND LAST, landmark case to be decided by the Court, in the summer of 2022.

Two subsequent cases, Antonyuk vs. James, and Snope vs. Brown, would have become the Fourth and Fifth seminal Second Amendment cases, respectively, had Roberts, together with the two senior Associate Justices, i.e., Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, voted to grant review of the cases at conference. Both Thomas and Alito, strong defenders of our most sacred and vital fundamental, unalienable Natural Law Right had sought to take those two cases up. Had John Roberts agreed, then the Junior Associate Justice, Neil Gorsuch, also a staunch defender of the Second Amendment, would have joined the other three, voting to grant review of Antonyuk and Snope.

Those four votes would be sufficient to warrant review of the cases. The other two junior Justices, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney-Barrett, would have guaranteed a decisive win for Plaintiff Petitioners, supporting the Second Amendment, buttressing the three previous landmark cases.

Some scholars may argue that the Chief Justice has no more say in what petitions for a writ of certiorari are granted than any one of the other nine Associate Justices. That is patently false.

A Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court sets the tone and tempo, the tenor and theme, of the High Court over which he presides. A Chief Justice is not to be construed as merely one of nine votes.

As the presiding Jurist, a Chief Justice has substantial control over what cases are to be granted review and what cases are to be denied review.

By voting against review of the petitions in Antonyuk and Snope, Roberts has acquiesced to those forces that are not only antagonistic to the Natural Law Right of armed self-defense but abhor exercise of the Right.

His failure weakens the three pillars of the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence—District of Columbia vs. Heller, McDonald vs. City of Chicago, and New York State Rifle and Pistol Association vs. Bruen.

Anti-Second jurisdictions take note of Roberts’ insipid, if not quietly hostile attitude toward the Second Amendment. That attitude has encouraged wayward states, like New York, and California, and Illinois, and Hawaii to brazenly invade both Supreme Court Second Amendment law, and the sanctity and inviolability of our Nation’s Bill of Rights, generally.

The import of Heller, McDonald and Bruen have suffered.

A slow, but methodical and inexorable process toward decay has occurred, creating a domino effect that cannot be easily attenuated.

Once Heller made plain that the right of the people to keep and bear arms is an individual right not connected to one’s service in a militia, the stage was set for further Court action to invigorate the fundamental, unalienable right, codified in the Second Amendment. That Supreme Court jurisprudence required Heller at all, attests to the deterioration of this—our Nation’s most important right—through time.

For over Two Hundred Years, commencing with ratification of the Nation’s Bill of Rights in 1791, up to the High Court’s decision in Heller, in 2008, the Court has granted review of a paltry number of Second Amendment cases, and those cases that it did agree to hear, were, to the extent our research at present indicates, invariably decided in favor of government, i.e., the States or the Federal Government.

Heller clarified the language of the Second Amendment if the Supreme Court or the lower Courts ever doubted or chose to read into the Second Amendment whatever it wanted to read, consistent with the predilection of the Courts that the Second Amendment doesn’t really mean what the plain reading of it says, namely, that the preface to it—“A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state”—establishes a LIMITATION ON the independent clause, “the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,” instead of of a rationale for the independent clause.

Any grade school student of English grammar learns that the independent clause—a sentence, comprising subject and verb predicate—expresses a complete thought, which is to say, the independent clause stands alone. On the other hand, a phrase, or dependent clause, is not a sentence, it does not express a complete thought. It cannot stand alone.

The Framers who drafted the Second Amendment could have simply stated, “THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS SHALL NOT BE INFRINGED,” and left the matter at that.

While acutely prescient of the dangers of Government, none —neither FEDERALISTS nor ANTIFEDERALISTS—had thought that, down the road, some Americans would hold an ulterior view of the reality of this NATURAL LAW RIGHT, and the need for it. The inclusion of the Second Amendment could well have remained unexpressed, as an unenumerated Right, presumptive true in the NINTH AMENDMENT. That, the Antifederalists demanded an express recitation of it, had less to do with the PEOPLES’ need for an express recitation of it, they knew that GOD BESTOWED THAT RIGHT IN THEM, and that is enough.

Rather, the explicit recitation SERVED as message to those in GOVERNMENT—an unmistakable WARNING that the GOVERNMENT WAS NEVER TO BECOME A TYRANT, lest IT FACE THE POWERFUL WRATH OF THAT WELL-REGULATED MILITIA (THE COMMON MAN) READY TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE THE SECURITY OF A FREE STATE. Thus, the inclusion of the dependent clause—as a rationale for enumerating the GOD-GIVEN RIGHT—A WARNING TO GOVERNMENT was expressly stated.

Yet, by the mid to late 1800s, Government, the FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, and in the 1900s, the STATES, challenged THE UNALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS.

Indeed, some scholars, having concluded, bizarrely and erroneously that the Framers of the Constitution would never have contemplated that Americans could legally, or should be able, morally, to overthrow the U.S. Government. But, to be logically consistent with that belief, these scholars would have to conclude that, even where the government becomes a tyranny, the citizenry does not have a legal right to overthrow that Government. That would be the strict view of scholars. If so, then the Second Amendment would be nonsensical.

But that doesn’t explain why the Second Amendment exists. The Framers weren’t idiots. Was the Second Amendment to be construed merely as an afterthought, then, a redundancy—a “hats off” to the import of the Declaration of Independence and the American Revolution but that, at the end of the day, has no real significance? This explanation is either altogether illogical or, at the very least, not logically satisfactory.

Other scholars adopt the philosophically liberal or weak view of the irrelevance of the Second Amendment, propounding that the right of the people to keep and bear arms to overthrow a tyrannical government is sound but that, realistically, it is not possible to evince a time or circumstance where the Federal Government would devolve into tyranny such that the people would have the legal right and the moral duty to overthrow that Tyranny, and that it would be difficult to define what that Government would look like that would fall into a workable definition of ‘tyranny.’ The Founders of our Republic would look askance at either one of these ideas.

But why would John Roberts give disreputable Anti-Second Amendment forces a leg to stand on, ensuring that the Heller, McDonald, and Bruen could be effectively quarantined and thereby effectively ignored until such time as the Court may be emboldened to strike down the cases altogether.

The question presumes that Roberts, although siding with the majority in the three landmark Second Amendment cases, as Associate Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito had simply pulled him along.

So, then, why did Roberts agree to grant review of Bruen?

We believe that the Chief Justice was compelled to do this as a promise to Justices Thomas and Alito for having dismissed the New York State Rifle and Pistol Association vs. City of New York on the dubious ground of mootness. That earlier New York case would likely have seen the Court ruling that the right to armed self-defense applies outside the home, no less than within it, thus becoming the Third landmark case two years before Bruen, if the City of New York case were heard on the merits as it should have been, since the Court had already granted review of it, and the dismissal of the case on grounds of mootness was dubious and justifiably, vigorously attacked as such by Justice Alito.

But Roberts must have made clear to both Alito and Thomas that he would not abide further cases that would have the potential of becoming the next landmark Second Amendment cases, and we have seen none, and likely won’t see another as long as John Roberts presides as the Chief Justice.

Having dispensed with review of the issue going to clarification of the Historical Tradition Test, there was, to our mind, no need to take up the Hawaii case.

But having granted review of Wolford, that case places the Court in a bind.

State crafted “Sensitive Place” restrictions may be facially unconstitutional, regardless of how they are treated unless the Roberts Court will strike them down as unconstitutional. But, that won’t happen without clarification of the Historical Tradition test with which “Sensitive Place” restrictions are inherently illegal. But, as long as they exist, they weaken Bruen. ‘

The Supreme Court is no less susceptible to crafting an ad hoc decision in Wolford, absent a coherent, consistent standard of review. The result is likely to be an unmitigated mess, which is why we believe Wolford vs. Lopez is one Second Amendment case that the Roberts Court should have denied review of.

The case places the Court in quandary that need not arise and would not have arisen had the Court granted review in the infinitely more important Antonyuk case.

The Wolford case wouldn’t have had a leg to stand, had the Court taken up the issues in Antonyuk. State creation of sensitive place restrictions would be facially unconstitutional as logically inconsistent with the right to carry a handgun for self-defense in public. That means Private property opened to the public would be treated as public, and carrying a firearm allowed, unless the property owner had signs to suggest otherwise—not unlike the posting of private property no-trespassing signs.

Hawaii, for one, a State, like New York, that virulently abhors the idea of civilian citizen possession of firearms, created its own twist on sensitive place restrictions.

The Court granted review on the case (with Oral Argument scheduled for January 20, 2026).

We will delve deeply into the intricacies of the problems that the U.S. Supreme Court created for itself and for the lower Appellate and District Courts in its tepid handling of Second Amendment matters since ruling on Bruen, and having all but muddled Rahimi.

The impact on Americans’ fundamental natural law right is in jeopardy.

Once we have reviewed the transcript of the Court’s hearing in Wolford, getting a handle of the case through the questions posed by the Justices, we will continue our extensive and intensive review of the U.S. Supreme Court. The hearing in Wolford is scheduled for tomorrow, January 20, 2026, at 10:00 AM.

We will be listening to Oral Argument and providing our critique of it in light of what we have discussed here and in light of our previous articles on Antonyuk—the Fourth Landmark Second Amendment case that, unfortunately, never was.

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